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ABSTRACT
THE PRESIDENT AS ADMINISTRATOR:
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL BELIEFS IN PRESIDENTIAL
DECISION MAKING
FEBRUARY 1992
DAVID ALAN SMAILES
, B.A., COLLEGE OF WOOSTER
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Lewis C. Mainzer
This research seeks to discover why and how presi-
dents choose their administrative strategies. The hypo-
thesis advanced argues the political beliefs of a presi-
dent make some administrative strategies more appealing
than others.
Chapter One offers a critique of current explanations
of presidential behavior, including the "classic" models
of the "rational decider" and "personality" models of
decision making. A third model, that of "political
belief," is described and discussed. The chapter
concludes by arguing this belief model can escape the
methodological problems plaguing the other "classic"
approaches to explaining behavior.
Chapters Two, Three and Four test this model by
examining the reorganizational and budget decisions of the
Nixon, Carter and Reagan administrations. Chapter Two
viii
demonstrates that Richard Nixon's belief in the indivi-
dual's power to control one's life best explains his
decisions to decentralize government through reorgani-
zation and revenue sharing. Chapter Three concludes that
Jimmy Carter's belief in a progressive agenda to demo-
cratize government best explains his decision to reorgan-
ize government from the ''bottom-up" and through the use of
zero base budgeting. Chapter Four finds that Ronald Rea-
gan's decisions to reorganize the executive branch from
"within" and to alter the budget process are best ex-
plained by his belief in government as an agent for social
change, but only in specific areas of activity.
Chapter Five concludes the research by briefly
examining the Bush presidency, and concludes that Bush,
like Jimmy Carter, is a president more concerned with
"process" than "policy." Each "classic" methodology is
demonstrated to be flawed, and the "belief" model is shown
to best explain the behavior of each president. For that
reason, the project closes, political science under-
appreciates the role of political belief in decision
making.
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CHAPTER I
DECISION MAKING AND POLITICAL BELIEFS
The choices shaping the federal administrative system
constitute one element of presidential decision making.
Why and how do presidents choose their administrative
strategies? My research will test the hypothesis that the
political beliefs of a president make some administrative
strategies more appealing than others. By examining the
effect of these beliefs on choice, 1 this research will
1Use of the word "choice" in the statement of my thesis is
not meant to imply an endorsement of the "bounded ration-
ality" approach to the study of public administration, as
outlined particularly by Herbert Simon, Administrative Be-
havior; A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Admini-
strative Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1957).
Instead, the term is meant to suggest the attempts presi-
dents must make to organize and prioritize the functions
of government. Indeed, as Stephen Skowronek suggests, the
period of active "state building" seems to have ended and
the modern challenge to administration is the organization
of the "hapless giant" of administration and reforms to
relieve the "...plight of presidents severely constrained
in their leadership by the normal routines of the bureau-
cratic state." Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American
State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 285-
92, esp. 291. While Skowronek ' s characterization of the
administrative apparatus as "confused" and his conclusion
that the organization of state power requires an attack on
the bureaucracy itself (presenting opportunities to "roll
1
seek to clarify why specific administrative strategies are
chosen, rather than simply describe those choices or ana-
lyze their effects. 2
back domestic bureaucratic programs and regulatory activi-ties essentially the Reagan domestic agenda) may be
cutiv's
1 LrrOVerSia1 ' reading ° f the -dern exe-ive task seems accurate.
2Clearly, the president is not the sole actor in the ad-ministration of government; as Marver Bernstein pointsout no single executive can perform all administrativefunctions. Since Richard Neustadt
' s seminal work, thepolitical context of presidential control of admini-
stration has been more clearly defined. However, thepresident does act as an "administrator-in-chief "
accountable for the action of the whole executive estab-lishment, to some extent (if hardly enough to match tradi-tional public administration hopes), while lacking com-plete control over its constituent parts. See Marver
Bernstein, The Job of the Fedgr^l Executive, (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), 65-68. While
Bernstein does describe the influence Congress has over
this process, especially when friction over policy
develops between the executive and legislative branches,
he concludes that reorganization attempts have begun to
strengthen the president's ability to direct and control
administration (90-110). Emmette Redford and Marian
Blissett describe similar efforts by the Johnson admini-
stration in Organiz ing the Executive Branch (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 165-85; Robert Rector
and Michael Sanera make the same argument for the Reagan
administration in "The Reagan Presidency and Policy
Change,
"
Steering the Elephant; How Washington Works , ed.
Rector and Sanera (New York: Universe Books, 1987), 328-
49. While these efforts do not give the president ex-
clusive political control over the administration of
government, the constitutional authority of the office and
the techniques of government reorganization can give a
president tools with which administration can be directed.
John Millett, Government and Public Administration (New
York: McGraw -Hill Book Company, 1959), 266-71. As a
result, elections may not provide direct popular control
over the administration of government but, as Dennis Riley
concludes, election results can confirm voter satisfaction
and provide legitimacy for administrative decisions while
giving some direction to upper-level administrators, in-
cluding the president. Dennis Riley, Controlling the
2
ss
To understand more fully one of the primary functions
of the presidency, the faithful execution of the laws, it
is important to understand why particular methods are
chosen for the administration of the laws, without thi
appreciation, political science can not explain some use
of the "executive power," and this realm of presidential
activity, with far reaching consequences (as recent ana-
lyses of administrative reform suggest 3 ), is imperfectly
understood. 4
While many studies of the Presidency seek to under-
stand presidential behavior and decision making, none ade-
quately explain what motivates a president to select a
particular administrative strategy. Although this thesis
offers an explanation, it should begin by separating the
scope of its subject matter from other, more systemic
Federal Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1987), 24-57 as well as the discussion of power in
footnotes 4 and 12 below.
3 Peri Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986), 312-16.
4 For the impact on one aspect of administration, see as an
example Terry Moe, "Regulatory Performance and Presi-
dential Administration," American Journal of Political
Science 26 (May 1982): 197-224. Obviously, this should
not suggest the president exercises sole control over the
federal government; the plural sources of power in the
federal government have been noted in the literature since
the end of the Second World War (see discussion below and
footnote 12). My position is simply that the president
provides much of the direction for public administration,
as note 2 concludes, and especially where comprehensive
coordination is required, beyond the perspective fostered
normally by the bureaucratic or the congressional com-
mittee systems.
3
examinations of the presidency. For example, the choices
of administrative strategy discussed in these pages do not
"..constitute metamorphoses of the institution," as Jef-
frey Tulis describes his work in The Bh^^^.i
dene*. 5 Insteaa> fchis thes . s aadresses ^ with _
in a particular institution during a limited scope of
time, or "fluctuations" rather than "metamorphoses." To
claim more would move this examination beyond the bounds
of its subject matter.
Studies that focus on the presidency and admini-
strative power itself offer little guidance for under-
standing why decisions are made. More recent developments
in the investigation of decision making offer little im-
provement in this area. A brief examination of the tradi-
tional study of administrative power and the presidency
suggests some reasons for this lack of understanding.
The herald of a renewed examination of the presi-
dent's exercise in administrative power can be dimly heard
in Woodrow Wilson's seminal article, "The Study of Admini-
stration." Wilson argued a new study of administrative
power was needed, particularly the relationship between
politics and administration. In the course of his argu-
ment, Wilson claimed some hierarchical control of admini-
stration was needed to "straighten" government, and that a
5Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1987), 6-9, esp. 7. Nor would
I include this study in the list he provides in the notes
therein.
"centered and responsible" leadership would be the key to
good administration, as it is in business. 6
Picking up this call at the turn of the century,
Frank Goodnow argued politics and administration were, in
fact, divisible roles for the government to play when he
wrote "..the action of the state as a political entity
consists either in operations necessary to the expression
of its will, or in operations necessary to the execution
of that will. "7 Goodnow went on to identify the ex-
pression of will with the legislatures and the execution
of will with the executive and judicial branches. 8 The
executive was to function as an arm of the legislature,
with regard to administration, and the dichotomy between
politics and administration would be supported by an
independent Civil Service. The scope of decision making
would be limited to non-political judgements, therefore,
and presidents would carry out, rather than initiate,
changes in policy.
Goodnow' s description could not survive the Great
Depression, however, when such academic distinctions began
to dissolve. With that dissolution came a renewed focus
on the executive and the political role presidents play in
6Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," Political
Science Quarterly LVI (Winter 1957): 481-506.
7Frank Goodnow, Politics and Administration: A Study in
Government (New York: MacMillan Company, 1900), 9.
8Goodnow, Politics and Administration , 1900, 23-46, 72-
132 .
5
administration. The first work to give public recognition
to this role was the Report of the President's Committee
on Administrative Management in 1937. The Committee sum-
marized the President's tasks in terms which seem mundane
today, but struck early readers as nothing less than revo-
lut ionary
:
Our Presidency unites at least three
important functions. From one point
of view the President is a political
leader
- leader of a party, leader of
Congress, leader of a people. From
another point of view he is head of
the Nation in the ceremonial sense of
the term, the symbol of our American
national solidarity. From still an-
other point of view the President is
the Chief Executive and administrator
within the federal system and service.
In many types of governments these
duties are divided or only in part
combined, but in the United States
they have always been united in one
and the same person whose duty it is
to perform all of these tasks. 9
The recognition of this political and administrative role
is evident in the committee's call for the union of
efficient and responsible administration to a democracy
through an expansion of presidential authority. The
important element in this formulation was the idea of
democratic responsibility. The committee observed the
yPresident 1 s Committee on Administrative Management, Re-
port of the Committee (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1937), 2.
6
growth of a "..headless
-fourth branch- of the Government,
responsible to no one, and impossible of coordination with
general politics and work of the Government as determined
by the people through their duly elected representa-
tives. "10 By recommending presidential control over that
"fourth branch," the committee's recommendations helped
recombine (in a more overtly political president) that
which Goodnow had separated: politics and administration.
The new recognition of the president as a primary
political as well as administrative actor led to a renewed
interest in the institution of the presidency. Louis
Brownlow, a member of the President's Committee, argued in
1949 that new expectations of the president's abilities to
shape politics had ended the politics-administration di-
chotomy, a theme echoed by Paul Appleby that same year."
By the time Harold Stein assembled his policy reader in
1952, the Goodnow distinction was all but pronounced dead
and buried. 12
This renewed interest in the presidency also sparked
renewed interest for scholars of public administration in
executive control over the bureaucracy. Examinations of
10President 's Committee, Report of the Conmdtfcee
,
31-47,
esp. 32.
1:LLouis Brownlow, The President and the Presidency (Chi-
cago: Public Administration Service, 1949), esp. 52-72.
Paul Appleby, Policy and Administration (Birmingham: Uni-
versity of Alabama Press, 1949), 6-15.
xz Public Administration and Policy Development , ed. Harold
Stein (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), x-
xix.
oes
the executive role, such as Chester Barnard's
tions of fche Kv^ntWn or Phillip Selznick's Lead^hip^n
Administration described the personal factors needed t
coordinate bureaucratic activity, but made few referenc
to the elements relevant to the decision making process of
the individual executive. 13 Organizations are presented
as a complex synthesis of physical, biological, personal
and social elements in a state of mutual dependence, while
the executive is presented as a rather monolithic and un-
complicated coordinator of bureaucratic activity. The
executive was recognized as being in charge, but how the
executive decides remained largely unexplored.
A more sophisticated understanding of the president's
role in administration emerged with the pluralist inter-
pretation of American politics. with the publication of
David Truman's The Governmental Prnnp a « a new post-World
War Two understanding of the presidency recognized the
complexity of exercising both formal and informal grants
of power in a system of checks and balances and a plural-
istic political world. The discussion in both public ad-
ministration and presidential studies began to move from
the formal grants of constitutional power to the politics
13Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1938). Phillip Selz-
nick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper and
Row, 1957). I would also include in this list most tradi-
tional examinations of executive behavior, like Alfred
Marrow, Behind the Executive Mask (New York: American
Management Association, 1964).
8
of interest group liberalism and the requisite amounts of
Power exercised by the executive and legislative branches
in a system of separated powers. 14 Debates over the
merits and dangers of a "strong" versus "weak" president
dominated the literature, particularly in the aftermath of
the Vietnam War and Watergate. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.-s
no^rec^ted in Zl^* ^JSS* ^MacOregor Burns, The Bead.^ ^SZ^ZT"Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963). See also the discussion infootnote 1 above and Louis Fisher, The P^UU^!S^edPower: Congress and Eacecufclve (Washington, D CCongressional Quarterly Press, 1981) as well as Presidentand Congress (New York: Free Press
, 1972 ) . See alsoLarry Berman, The New American Pr^sidgncv
,
(Boston-Little Brown and Company, 1987), esp. 16 for his defini-tion of "constitutional insolvency" and the problem ofseparation of power. Certainly Congress and the presidentshare administrative power as they share legislativepower, as described in Lawrence Chamberlain, The Presi-dent, Congress and Legislation (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1946); Stephen Wayne, The Legislative
Presidency (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); Nelson
Polsby, Congress and the President (Englewood Cliffs-
Prentice Hall, 1976); Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., Congress
Against the President (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1975) and Lawrence C. Dodd and Richard L. Schott, Congress
and the Administrative State (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1979), among others. This relationship has been
given the greatest study in the area of foreign policy, as
noted by Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations
and the Foreign Policy Consensus," American Political
Science Review 52 (1978): 725; James Robinson, Congress
and Foreign Pol icy Making (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1976);
Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy bv
Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
Additionally, the fragmented nature of power in Congress
itself has implications for this relationship. See, for
example, Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, Congress, the
Bureaucracy and Public Policy (Homewood: Dorsey Press,
1976) and Michael Malbin, Unelected Representatives (New
York: Basic Books, 1980).
9
The imperial Pr^irWy
, like all the literature of this
discussion of power, gives an account of the importance of
administrative power to this struggle, particularly for
shaping the federal bureaucracy, but does little to ex-
plain the choices presidents make as they exercise power.
Considering the role of political beliefs in shaping stra-
tegic choices might suggest that understanding formal and
informal grants of power can not explain changes in the
institution of the presidency itself or its use of presi-
dential power.
Other, more specific accounts of particular reorgani-
zation efforts, such as Redford and Blissert's Organizing
the Executive or Richard Nathan's The Plot that Failed ,
begin with a president's decision to reorganize as a
given, without considering why a particular reorganization
plan was selected. In this sense, both Blissert and
Nathan explain what happened without explaining why, and
thus offer no method for anticipating errors of particular
choices in the future. 15 The narrow focus of these
studies provides an adequate account of the policy process
i:3Redford and Blissert, Organizing the Executive Branch .
1981. Richard Nathan, The Plot that Failed; Nixon and
the Administrative Presidency (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1975). I would include in this list more general
works on reorganization, such as Dodd and Schott, Congress
and the Administrative State , 197 9, and Stephen Hess, Or-
ganizing the Presidency (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1976).
10
and its consequences but an incomplete understanding of
the first and crucial step, presidential choice.
More recent analyses of the presidency have begun to
integrate the considerations of public administration and
presidential studies by examining presidential decision
making. But even as these approaches have gained by de-
parting from a too mechanical presidency as a chief ele-
ment of political understanding, such approaches may have
also lost an adequate sense of the president's admini-
strative responsibility and the role of beliefs in shaping
that responsibility.
This study will attempt to create a more complete
understanding of presidential choices of administrative
strategies. As the previous summary suggests, current
political science accounts of those choices neglect or
assume without closely focusing on the reasons why par-
ticular choices are made. This analysis will treat these
reasons as a matter of primary concern and will offer an
explanation for those decisions. Specifically, my thesis
will assess the impact of a president's political beliefs
on presidential selection of administrative strategies
.
16The only other study to detail an ideological link
between presidents and their decisions is presented by A.
James Reichley, "The Conservative Roots of the Nixon, Ford
and Reagan Administrations," Political Science Quarterly
96 (Winter 1981-82): 537-50. But Reichley does not con-
sider the selection of strategy, only a conservative
approach to certain policy issues. Indeed, Reichley does
nothing to discover the importance of this ideological
orientation to the choices made in office. Some studies
11
By examining the role of political beliefs in shaping
presidential administrative choices, this study will
better explain the reasons for particular choices.
This chapter will describe current understandings of
decision making, examining the factors relevant to de-
cisions and paying particular attention to the role of
beliefs in the decision making process. To understand
political beliefs more completely, the focus of the second
half of this chapter will be on the concept of ideology
and will offer a research design for better understanding
the role of beliefs in decision making.
—
Decision Making anri hh e Ro i fi of Political Beligfg
Many political scientists argue that decision making,
while often included in broader studies of bureaucracies
and their functions, is crucial to political action. in-
deed, some contend "..all the other attributes of the ad-
ministrative process [are] dependent on, interwoven with,
have examined the ideology of bureaucrats, however, by
comparing the responses of bureaucrats to a set of state-
ments and then categorizing the responses on a "liberal-
conservative" scale. The limits and pitfalls of this type
of study will be addressed later in the chapter See, for
example, Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, "Clashing Beliefs
Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration
Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review LXX (June
1976): 456-68 and, more generally, Hugh Heclo, A
Government of Strangers (Washington, D.C. : The Brookings
Institution, 1977).
12
and existent for the making of decisions...17 Executives
are decision makers, and while the president is not the
sole decider in the political system, the central role of
the chief executive does suggest that an examination of
presidential decision making win reveal important aspects
of the political process. Administrative choices are
therefore promising units of study when examining decision
making, since these choices are an important element of
the political system, and since recent history suggests
presidents are likely to play an increasing role in ad-
ministrative decisions in the future, this research
focuses on presidential selection of administrative stra-
tegies . 18
While the term "strategy" may seem to suggest a
series of choices, the term "administrative strategy" is
used in the context of this dissertation to note single or
multiple decisions seeking to achieve some end result.
Specifically, this study examines presidential admini-
strative strategies concerning reorganization of the
7 James McCamy, "Analysis of the Process of Decision
Making," Public Administration Revi ew VII (winter 1947):
41. John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 7.
William Dill, "Administrative Decision Making," Concepts
and Issues in Administrative Behavior, eds. Sidney Mailick
and Edward Van Ness (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1962), 30.
18James MacGregor Burns, Presidential Government (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 124-36. Herman Finer, The Presi-
dency: Crisis and Regeneration (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1974), 51-55.
13
executive branch and general budget policy. Both areas
are recognized as critical to the exercise of presidential
power, and both areas centralize executive power in the
president. 19 Understanding the decisions related to re-
organization and budget policy seems likely to reveal the
important elements of decision making and provide infor-
mation on the importance of each element to decision
making itself.
The study of decision making is extensive, with many
studies attempting to "map out" the process for both
individual and groups. While group decision making is
less relevant to this thesis, even observers of groups
argue that group decisions can best be understood as an
accumulation of many individual decisions. 2 0 All define
decisions as choices made by individuals or groups in pur-
suit of some purpose. 21 While many studies outline the
19Ernest Griffith, The American Presidency: The Dilemmas
of Shared Power and Divided Government (New York: New
York University Press, 1976), 23-32. John Burke, "The
Institutional Presidency, " The Presidency and the Poli-
tical System, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988), 363. See also
Elizabeth Sanders, "The Presidency and the Bureaucratic
State," The Presidency and the Political System . 1988,
382-89.
20Bruno Leoni, "The Meaning of 'Political' in Political
Decisions," Political Studies 3 (October 1957): 232;
more generally, see Samuel Kirkpatrick, Dwight Davis and
Roby Robinson, "The Process of Political Decision Making
in Groups," American Behavioral Scientist 2 0 (Septem-
ber/October 1976): 33-64.
21Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision , 1974,
16.
14
relevant steps of decision making, nearly all parallel the
Phases outlined by William Dill: Agenda building (de-
fining goals and tasks for organizations and assigning
priorities for their completion), Searching (looking for
alternative courses of action and for information which
can be used to evaluate them), Commitment (testing pro-
posed "solutions" to choose one for adoption), imple-
mentation (elaborating and clarifying decisions so they
can be acted upon), and Evaluation (testing the results of
previous choices). others have noted that the first two
steps are the most important for providing direction to
decisions. 22 while each step in fche decision process ha£j
been examined by scholars, action by the president tends
to occur in the earlier stages, making them most relevant
for study in this project. 23
Although there is general agreement on the important
stages of decision making, there are diverging inter-
pretations of the range of presidential decision making.
One interpretation argues presidents play a role in deci-
22Dill, "Administrative Decision Making," 1962, 34. Irwin
Bross, Design for Decision (New York: MacMillan Company,
1953), 19-20.
23Theodore Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 18-19;
William Colby, "The President and National Security," The
American Presidency; Principles and Problems (Washington,
D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 50-51 and
Daniel Snowman, "President Truman's Decision to Drop the
First Atomic Bomb," Political Studies XIV (October 1966):
3 65-73 are several examples of the general agreement on
the relevant decision making phases.
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sion making but the range of their options is severely
constrained. m other words, presidents do not really
"decide" but rather have decisions shaped for them. For
example, Doris Graber argues the nature of information
gathering may constrain presidential action, making the
collection of data the most important factor for decision
making. 24 Similarly, other studies focus on the role of
analysts or experts for understanding how objectives are
defined and solutions found for problems. 25 Political
limits, such as public tolerance, the limits of time or
other resources, or even public opinion are also fre-
quently noted as constraints on decision making. 26
None of these studies claims that these limits on
presidential decision making stop presidents from taking
action when desired, however. m other words, the con-
straints noted above are offered as potential, not ab-
solute, limits on presidential action. For example,
information is certainly important to making decisions,
but executives can find information gathering to be a
source of power and not a constraint when acting on a
O A
Doris Graber, "Executive Decision Making," Proceedings
of the Academy of Political Science "34 (1982): 75-87.
25Randall Calvert, "The Value of Biased Information: A
Rational Choice Model of Political Advice," Journal of
Politics 47 (May 1985): 530-55. Arnold Meltsnew, Policy
Analysts in the Bureaucracy (Berekley: University of
California Press), 129-39. Allan Lerner, The Politics of
Decision Making: Strategy, Cooperation and Conflict
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976).
°The best discussion of these constraints can be found in
Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House . 1953, 22-56.
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particular problem. 27 similarly> „ experts „
give contradictory advice and may provide leveis
of information rather than speaking with one voice.28
Even political limits change with time and are different
under different circumstances. Thus, while scholars must
he mindful of the potential limits on decision making in
given situations, none of the limits described above can
be seen as a permanent constraint on presidential decision
making.
A stronger version of this position is found in the
recognition of an "institutional presidency," frequently
characterized by the complexity of the executive branch
and the divestment of political authority to the bureau-
cracy.29 Stephen Hess, in Organizing i-he Pr, Ri^n.y
argues the managerial role of the president is lost in the
political complexity of the White House. Specifically,
Hess argues the growth of the executive office, the rising
influence of staff members and the declining influence of
the cabinet, the tension between the president and the
bureaucracy, and the role of assistants as "special
pleaders" for particular interest groups all combine to
'Graber, "Executive Decision Making," 80-86.
28Meltsner, Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy . 1976, 224-
26. See also Louis Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), 335.
2 9One of the best descriptions can be found in Burke, "The
Institutional Presidency," 358-64.
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limit the role presidents play in decision making. 30
Similarly, Hugh Heclo contends the political ambiguity of
elections, the disorganization of a complex executive
branch, the divergent loyalties of bureaucrats and the
operating realities of a complex nation all combine to
limit the effect any executive can have on the political
realm, although it may not limit the amount of public
attention given to those executives. 3 !
While the constraints noted by the "institutional
presidency" scholars cannot be ignored, Hess and others
have overstated their argument. Rather than limiting all
decision making, the institutional constraints of the
presidency can be seen as a force in most, but not all,
presidential actions. in other words, presidential action
is constrained in some areas, but still significant in
others. Hess himself acknowledges that presidents do make
some (albeit only a few) highly significant political
decisions which set national priorities. Among these,
Hess writes, are reorganization and budget policy deci-
sions. 32 Thus, while it is foolish to argue presidents
can simply pronounce judgements and have the political
system respond swiftly and effectively, it is equally
erroneous to argue presidents never make important deci-
JUHess, Organizing the Presidency . 1976, esp. 9-10 and
145-47
.
31Heclo, A Government of Strangers . 1977, 8-14, 84-88.
32Hess, Organizing the Presidency . 1976, 10-11.
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sions. Certainly, in the areas of concern for this
research, presidential decision making can still be seen
as an important activity.
indeed, the "institutional presidency" position is
ultimately undermined by its proponents' acknowledgements
of the ability of presidents to change their environ-
ments. 33 Most scholars view presidents as possessing a
great deal of power in personally organizing their office
to control the decision making process. Francis Rourke,
for example, argues the "government of strangers" lamented
by Heclo can be controlled by presidential action, and
that increasing public frustration with bureaucracies will
lend even greater support to presidents for reorgani-
zation. 34 while each Qf thege schQlars acknowledges fche
political constraints of office, all contend that presi-
dents retain a good deal of latitude in determining their
choices. 35 Presidents still decide, although their deci-
sions certainly exist in a political world and are often
frustrated by the limits of that world.
33Heclo, A Government of Strangers . 1977, 177-83. Hess,
Organizing the Presidency . 1976, 3.
34Francis Rourke, "Grappling With the Bureaucracy,"
Politi cs and the Oval Office: Towards Presidential
Governance, ed. Arnold Meltsner (San Francisco: Institute
for Contemporary Studies, 1981), 123-40. Certainly the
scholars discussed in the remainder of this section would
be included in this group.
3 5Laurence Lynn, Jr., Managing Public Policy (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 140-41. See also
Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House , 1953, 4-6,
10-11.
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Presidential decision making is therefore a signifi-
cant subject for study, and presidents do, in fact, make
important decisions with significant consequences. This
discussion, however, still begs the question of why and
how presidents make these decisions. The political
science literature offers two dominant models of decision
making which address this question most directly; a third
model will then be offered for consideration. Both models
offer more comprehensive methodologies which take into
account politics, administration and decision making, and
both have become the framework for a series of studies
which have adopted these approaches. in that sense, they
remain the "classic" explanations of presidential behavior
in the political science discipline.
1
* The "Rational Decider" Model ; Richard
The first, and certainly most widely accepted, model
of decision making is the "rational decider" model. Many
scholars link the development of statistical methodology
and the increased use of rationality modeling, with the
increasing use of computer technology, the rational model
has been applied in the fields of economics, mathematics,
and psychology as well as policy studies. 36 In many ways,
36Bross, Design for Decision . 1953, 2-3. Steinbruner, The
Cybernetic Theory of Decision . 1974, 8-9. Bross notes at
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rational modeling advocates argue, we are all "rational
deciders," acting
...to ^ximize [our] values^ ^
constraints [we] face. "37
Given the wide acceptance of the "rational decider-
model, a description of its particulars is unnecessary.
However, it is useful to keep in mind its broad outline:
the model argues agents seek goals and pursue those goals
by rational means, so long as what is being sought can be
transitively ordered (in other words, goals or preferences
can be found)
.
Rational behavior becomes defined as the
choice of the goal or preference which will maximize util-
ity or satisfaction of the decider by using a "cost-
benefit" analysis mode of decision making, borrowed from
economic theory. 38 The model ±g fchen tested ^ ^ ^
world by examining the revealed preferences of the decider
(by observing the choices that person makes) or by
positing preferences for the decider (by proposing a goal
and observing if the decider acts in ways to achieve that
goal) .39
Executives play a particularly important role in this
process, since they are often the only deciders who have
256 that the principle of rational modeling is the basis
of all decision making.
37 Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision . 1974, 8.
38William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, An Introduction to
Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1973) 16-20.
39Riker and Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive
Political Theory . 1973, 13-14.
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perspectives which reach across an entire organization.
Thus, executives can determine goals and best measure
potential costs and benefits for each decision alter-
native. 40 Anthony Downg has applie(J the „ rational de_
cider" model to bureaucratic agencies as well, however,
and argues that officials at all levels engage in this
form of decision making. 4 !
Of course, not all decisions can be freely made.
Most "rational decider" models recognize some of the
constraints on decision making noted in the previous
section: time, information, the number of issues con-
sidered, the requisite data required for decision, and
uncertainties about alternatives .42 Even new situations
can upset the decider, providing a new problem and re-
quiring reconsideration of all the steps listed above. 43
in such cases, new sciences, chiefly utilizing computer
technology, have emerged to help deciders recalculate
costs and benefits. 44 Where these technologies are not
* uBross, Design for Decision . 1953, 260. Riker and
Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory .
1973, 75.
41Anthony Downs, "A Theory of Bureaucracy," American
Economic Review LV (May 1965): 439-46.
42Downs, "A Theory of Bureaucracy," 442.
43john Ries, Executives in the American Political System
(Belmont: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1969), 89-90.
44Herbert Simon, The Shape of Automation for Men and
Management (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 58-76.
22
available, deciders must learn to "satisfice," finding
alternatives that are "good enough. "45
Although the concept of rational decision making
certainly has some validity, the model itself avoids the
more difficult issue of preference formation and the
shaping of options to be considered. For example, it is
easy to understand how a computer can be programmed by a
"rational decider" to play checkers or chess, and why such
games could be described as exercises in "decision
making." However, the model does not explain why one
might prefer a game of chess rather than checkers on a
particular day. Critics of this model argue that the
clarification of values or preferences simply is not ad-
dressed by the "rational decider" model and thus these
goals are taken as "givens."46 simply measuring thege
values may be difficult, as no single method of assigning
value to alternatives is agreed upon by "rational decider-
modelers, with each study speaking a very different
language from its predecessor. 47
The result of this problem is a conceptual dilemma
for "rational decider" models: since one can rarely
measure or determine the values of the decider, one must
45Herbert Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981), 36.
46Harold Lasswell, "Current Studies of the Decision Pro-
cess: Automation Versus Creativity," Western Political
Quarterly VIII (September 1955): 389-91.
47Bross, Design for Decision . 1953, 85-98.
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look to the outcome of the decision to find the goals and
preferences underlying the decision process. However, by
taking this step, the modeler creates a self-fulfilling
prophecy concerning what has been assumed to be the goals
and preferences in existence from the start of the deci-
sion process. 48 Far from rational> ^ preferences q£ ^
decision maker may lead her or him to decide to use
..irra-
tional" means to some desired end, and the choice of those
means may be determined by the end itself, a possibility
which is incompatible with the rational decider model, m
other words, the definition of the boundaries of
.'ration-
al., decisions, determined by this assumption from out-
comes, places other goals outside the consideration of the
observer. 49
This objection can be most clearly illustrated by
examining the first "classic" explanation of presidential
behavior offered by presidential studies, Richard Neu-
Stadt ' s Residential PnWPr
. According to Neustadt, the
fragmentation and sharing of authority in government
forces the president who wishes to be successful to
develop the ability to persuade. Unless this ability is
developed, affirmative grants of power would be meaning-
less words on paper. Like the "rational decider" model,
'Charles Anderson, "The Place of Principles in Policy
talysis," American Political Science Review 73 (Septei
48
(
Analysxa,-- f ±i
1979): 712-13.
49Leoni, "The Meaning of 'Political' in Political Deci-
sions," 227-28.
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Neustadt takes presidential success through legislative
and administrative action to be the given objective of
presidents and argues the ability to persuade rests on a
President-
s
skill at cultivating a professional reputation
for being effective and tough, and on a measure of public
Prestige. Both reputation and prestige can be threatened
by the perception of failure or frustration. To avoid
this perception, Neustadt believes presidents must make
careful, rational choices in applying political per-
suasion. 50 it is this rational calculation of political
costs and benefits to achieve the goal of success that
characterizes Neustadt description of decision making as
an example of the "rational decider" model, as well as his
more normative recommendations for presidential behavior.
While subsequent chapters will test Neustadt
'
s
thesis, it is important to note that Neustadt does not
escape the problem of the rational decider model: his
theory cannot account for the goals and preferences of
individual presidents, and can only assume that the re-
sults obtained by presidents were motivated by the goals
he posits for them. Later chapters will argue this is not
the case at all times, and other goals which seem "ir-
rational" to Neustadt' s thesis will seem quite "rational"
when considered in light of a president's political
beliefs
.
50Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1980), 26-79.
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2. The
A second explanation for presidential behavior can be
found in the "cognitive" or "personality" model of deci-
sion making. Cognitive theorists generally argue the
"rational decider" model ignores the most important ele-
ment in the decision process: the decision maker. By
focusing attention on the individual, cognitive theorists
attempt to discover what happens in the mind; the science
of psychology therefore becomes the basis for under-
standing behavior (as economics provided the basis for the
"rational decider" model). 51 To do so, cognitive theory
argues behavior is linked to a mental process which is not
open to direct, conscious experience but must be ob-
served. 52
Adding to the information and environmental con-
straints recognized by the previous model, personality is
a key factor for understanding decision making, according
to this model. 53 Each decision reveals the personality of
the decider, and thus each administrative decision "..re-
51Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision . 1974,
90. D.J. White, Decision Theory (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing, 1969), 10-12.
52 Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision . 1974,
90-92.
53McCamy, "Analysis of the Process of Decision-Making,"
44-47.
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ac-
veals the President as a person. "54 Thig personality
shapes the administrative actions of the president,
counting for various presidential "styles. "55 under-
standing the personality of the president, therefore, is
the key to understanding how presidents make decisions.
The "classic" study of presidential personality,
James David Barber's President-^! Charagter best illu-
strates this understanding of presidential behavior.
Although Barber does separate "personality" and "charac-
ter," his methodology proceeds from the same arguments
presented above. Barber argues the president's character
shapes performance by interacting with the "rational"
side; Barber explains this by applying two baselines for
understanding character. The first, "active-passive,"
refers to the president's use of power; the second,
"positive-negative," refers to the president's attitude or
perception toward the task of being president. Presidents
who enjoy the position they hold and utilize the powers of
office to achieve their ends are classified as "active-
positives;" those who do not enjoy the office but util-
ize its powers are "active-negatives;" those who enjoy
the office but rarely exercise its powers are "passive-
54Koenig, The Chief Executive . 1964, 353. Lynn, Managing
Public Policy , 1987, 143.
55Hess, Organizing the Presidency , 1976, 3. Koenig, The
Chief Executive , 1964, 337-42.
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ePositives;" and those who do not enjoy their position and
rarely use the powers of office are
"passive-negatives 56
Although Barber
-b analysis recognizes the importanc
of ideology or "world view, it neglects to consider it
influence in shaping the direction of presidential action,
instead, Barber uses the single variable of character to
explain presidential behavior. 57 while Barber's analysis
does move beyond the "rational decider" model by con-
sidering why some presidents might choose administrative
strategies which seem "irrational" (in terms of maximizing
political power), his analysis of character is limited in
its explanatory value. Like the "rational decider" model,
Barber must extract his account of character from the
behavior of the subject, reading into that behavior the
type of character Barber wishes to perceive. In this
sense, the approach Barber utilizes suffers the same
affliction as that of Neustadt: the subject matter of
both studies (policy goals, evidence of character) cannot
be examined before the behavior takes place but can only
be found as being reflected in the behavior observed,
opening both to the "bias trap" noted below. 58
In both models, the explanation for presidential
behavior fails to account successfully for the admini-
56James David Barber, Presidential Character , 3rd. ed.
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 8-10.
57Barber, Presidential Character , 1985, 7.
58Heinz Eulau, Politics, Self and Society (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1986) 53-56.
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strative choices of the executives. Behavioral style
alone is not a satisfactory explanatory source for be-
havior in an area such as politics, as will be even more
evident in the following chapters when beliefs are
examined. No political leader merely drifts through
office totally unaware of the meaning of the experience,
the opportunities it presents, or the purposes each leader
brings to the task of governing. For that reason, poli-
tical beliefs are just as significant for explaining the
behavior of political leaders, even those who seem clearly
pragmatic or, to put it bluntly, opportunistic.
3. Values and Preferences
To understand decision making more fully, one must
return to the start of the decision process, the selection
of preferences and goals. This is the first step in all
decision models and is acknowledged (although then is
posited or ignored) by the "rational decider" and "per-
sonality" models. 59 All three models acknowledge that
individual presidents are the relevant unit of analysis
for those wishing to understand presidential behavior. 60
59Lasswell, "Current Studies of the Decision Process,"
387-89.
60Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New
York: Random House, 1963), 14-16.
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An examination of political k-hbeliefs, however, can begin to
reconsider the preferences of the decider.
By defining decision making as a question of value
allocation, some early scholars attempted to escape the
institutional interpretations described earlier and to
establish the central role of political beliefs in deci-
sion making. 61 The leading figure in this reconsideration
of values and beliefs is Harold Lasswell, whose
Personality argues the predispositions of the individual
decider are critical for understanding decision making. 62
Lasswell argues elsewhere that decision making is, in
fact, "participants (with various value perspectives)
employing base values by various strategies interacting in
an arena to influence outcomes and effects." The im-
portance Lasswell places on understanding these values is
clear in a set of questions he offers to elicit infor-
mation concerning the study of decision making, including
the scope of the values of the participants, the ob-
jectives sought as a result of those values, and the
position of the participant in the social structure. 63
Although the study of decision making is thus less
formalized than the "rational decider" and "personality"
61Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics. 1963, 27-
29.
Harold Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: The
Viking Press, 1948), 105-7.
63 Lasswell, "Current Studies of the Decision Process,"
382-88.
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models, Lasswell suggests more information concerning
decision making will be discovered by considering these
Questions. 64 Similarly, Heinz Eulau argues that while the
examination of beliefs may be difficult, they play an
important role in decision making. 65
Although a more complete presentation of this concept
will be presented later in this chapter, a better appre-
ciation of the role of political beliefs in decision
making would begin to address the limitations of the
previous models. By understanding and clarifying the
reasons why particular administrative strategies are
chosen and the importance of beliefs to that choice, a
"belief system" model of analysis would explain the
seemingly irrational decisions unaccounted for by the
"rational decider" model. The concept of a political
belief system could also help to better explain the inter-
action between personality and environment unappreciated
by the "personality" model. 66 But
-beliefs" and "ide-
ology" are often used interchangeably, and the relation-
ship between the two concepts is vague. Some clarifi-
D4 Lasswell, "Current Studies of the Decision Process,"
384-85.
65Eulau, Politics, Self and Society . 1986, 72-74.
6 6Lasswell, "Current Studies of the Decision Process,"
3 89-91. Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 112.
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cation of that relationship is needed before a plan of
study based on a "belief system" model can be proposed. 67
B. Ideology and BeHpf. * ReaftaT.„h n^^
The study of ideology has undergone a renaissance in
recent decades, gaining a place in the language of social
science which has given it wide circulation. The term
"ideology" finds its roots in the French Revolution, be-
ginning with De Tracey's attempt to define the ideas
raised by different revolutionary groups. 68 Most ob-
servers credit the Second World War, with its geopolitical
conflict between "competing ideologies," with providing an
67 It is possible to propose a fourth decision making
model: incrementalism. Indeed, incrementalism is often
offered as an alternative to the "rational decider" model
as explained and defended by Charles Lindblom, "The Sci-
ence of 'Muddling Through'," Public Admini strati on ReviewXIX (Spring 1959): 79-88. Lindblom argues the rational
model simply cannot handle value clarification since
disagreements on values exist, preferences fail to form
and conflicting values cannot be transitively ranked (81-
82). While Lindblom' s point is well taken, his conception
of incrementalism also limits the study of values by
arguing those choices are also guided incrementally (83).
Thus, Lindblom' s model fails to account for decision
making by arguing only minor decisions will be needed.
Critics point out that while Lindblom' s analysis may be
adequate for daily administration, its focus cannot
explain the type of strategic choices under consideration
in this study. See Yehezkel Dror, "Muddling Through -
Science' or Inertia?" Public Administration Review XXIV
(September 1964): 153-57.
68Hans Barth, Truth and Ideology (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1976), 1.
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infusion of vigor to discussions of political beliefs.
Recent political "awakenings" of many so-called "Third
World" nations, as well as events in the Russian Republics
and Eastern Europe, have also increased scholarly interest
in the concept of ideology. Although use of the term ide-
ology has moved away from these discussions, as this sec-
tion will outline, the term itself has gained new sub-
stance and is a central part of many political discus-
sions
.
69
All concepts of ideology make some reference to
institutions of political action, arguing ideology needs
the political system to give ideas reality. Indeed, it
was this aspect of ideology (in part) which led Mannheim
to differentiate ideology from mere Utopian thinking. 70
Not all definitions agree that ideology is important to
activity in that political system, however. Understanding
the different concepts of ideology helps to explain the
relationship between ideology and belief, and the effect
of ideas on the political system.
David Minar provides a useful typology for under-
standing various conceptions of ideology and the litera-
ture surrounding the use of this term. Minar himself
argues understandings of ideology are needed to explain
69Walter Carlsnaes, The Concept of Ideology and Political
Analysis (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 3-11.
70Karl Loewenstein, "Political Systems, Ideologies and
Institutions: The Problem of Their Circulation," Western
Political Quarterly VI (December 1953): 689-706.
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the consensus surrounding the political institutions of a
given society. Minar-s own definition, therefore, shapes
the conclusions reached at the end of his essay. However,
the typology he presents for understanding the different
definitions of ideology offered by social science is not
bound by his own definition. 71
Minar's typology delineates two categories of
ideological definition, with an "intermediate" position
between the two. The first category includes "macro-
definitions, which Minar indirectly describes as beliefs
held by an entire political system. m particular, Minar
argues ideology as "thought distinguished by its locus"
typifies these definitions: concepts of ideology in this
category consist of social ideologies, or those beliefs
held and shared by an entire society (the "isms"). 72
The second, or "intermediate," category describes
ideology as "thought distinguished by its function."
Three subsets of this category are offered, each bridging
the "macro" theory described above (system wide beliefs)
and the "micro" theory described below (individually held
beliefs). First, Minar distinguishes "personal-social
function" ideologies as those ideas used by an individual
71David Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," Midwest
Journal of Political Science V (November 1961): 318. I
describe Minar's categories in different order than his
original article, to clarify what he describes as "macro"
and "micro" conceptions of ideology.
72Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," 325-26.
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to rational^ one • s Xlf. or social role
_ ^
subset i. th6
"organizational function" ideologies
, Qr
ideas which connect an organizational pattern of activi-
ties. The third ana final subset is ideologies which
Perform a
..transmission function" through persuasion and
reorientation of thought.73 Karl Loewenstein ^
example, that an ideology must be formulated in such a
manner as to be communicable to the mass of
..power-
addressees, accepted by those masses and not confined to
a social elite, and oriented toward human values or pre-
ferences to create an attachment to these ideas. V 4 The
"end of ideology thesis also draws upon this third subset
of "transmission,., arguing substantive debates between
ideologies have ended. 75
Both categories are encompassed in the traditional
literature on the concept of ideology. By tying the
definition of the "intermediate" category to that of the
"macro" category, Minar opens both definitions to a common
critique. This critique was advanced by Karl Marx in his
7 3Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," 322-25.74 Loewenstein, "Political Systems, Ideologies and
Institutions," 691.
"^Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the ExhaimM™ ofPolitical Ideas in the Fifties ( New York: The Free Press,
1965). Others argue this definition of ideology restricts
the scope of debate too narrowly, thus defining away much
of the current ideological debate. For responses, see the
various contributors to The End of Ideology Debate , ed.
Chaim Waxman (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968) and Ken-
neth Minoque, Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
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discussion of ideology and historical materialism, when
Marx argued ideology was nothing more than the "false con-
sciousness" of a society or class. By definition, ide-
ology was associated with error and falsehood, and there-
fore was not to be taken seriously. These "macro" defi-
nitions of ideology (and the "intermediate" concepts
associated with them) were mere devices for hiding power
behind social beliefs designed to protect the owners of
the means of production. 7 6
The Marxist critique of the concept of ideology led
followers of Marx to dismiss ideology as an unimportant
phenomenon, until the evident social power of such ideas
began to challenge this conception. An attempt to "res-
cue" ideology was made by Louis Althusser in For Marx .
Althusser reclaimed the use of ideology as an important
subject, while redefining ideology to be ideas which are
evident to humans, even as those ideas remain imaginary
with respect to true knowledge. 77 in other words,
Althusser argued a distinction could be clearly drawn
between ideology and science, with the former representing
disillusion and the latter truth. 78 Antonio Gramsci
'
s
7 ftFor an excellent summary of Marx's critique of ideology
and the problems associated with his argument, see Martin
Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1977).
77Louis Althusser, For Marx (New York: Vintage Books,
1970), esp. 229-36.
78Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain, "The Question of Ide-
ology: Althusser, Pecheux and Foucault," Power, Action
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discussion of ideology followed similar lines. Like
Althusser, Gramsci argued ideology was a part of political
discourse, but ultimately agreed with Marx and Althusser
that ideology was still a class based phenomenon, masking
the exercise of power.79 In the end> ^ Alfchusser ^
Gramsci all agreed ideologies were not an important phe-
nomenon for study, although the use of ideology certainly
merited attention.
The first strong challenge to this conception of
ideology came from Karl Mannheim at the beginning of this
century. Mannheim argued the Marxist interpretation of
ideology was oversimplified in its understanding of the
relationship between ideology and class. Instead, Mann-
heim sought to replace this understanding with a concep-
tion of a "sociology of knowledge, •' encompassing the
perspective of a subject and identifiable with the social
group from which the subject emerged (a process he labeled
"particularization»).80 ThuS/ Mannheim loseg nQne Qf fche
social determinism of Marx and yet suggests ideology is
not merely a negative denial of truth. Instead, Mann-
and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? , ed. John Law(Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), esp. 161-63.
79A good discussion of the agreement on this point can be
found in Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology , 1977,
as well as Stanley Aronowitz, Science as Power: Discourse
and Ideology in Modern Society (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1988), esp. 196.
p AouThe best summary of Mannheim on this point can be found
in William Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New
York: Atherton Press, 1967), 56-63.
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heim .s definition argues ideology can be ,
force for making sociai interchange possible. As one
observer explained, Mannheim offers a new understanding
»
-which depicts ideas as causes of human action, which
presents beliefs as major, if not the only, factors in
social integration. "81
This "sociology of knowledge" informs most modern
uses of the term ideology. But that use, as well as its
Marxist roots outlined above, has come under increasing
attack by post-modern theorists for its inadequate under-
standing of power relationships. Leading this attack is
Michel Foucault, whose writings challenge traditional
definitions of power as located in a particular segment of
a society. Foucault most directly challenges Althusser's
(and, by implication, Marx and Gramsci) distinction be-
tween science and ideology, arguing power which lacks
self-conscious activity and located in "discursive prac-
tice" has no use for ideology. 82 Foucault position that
power is not "hidden" but, more accurately, dispersed
throughout a web of power relationships leads observers to
the conclusion that there is no need to "mask" power in
the fiction of ideology, and thus the Marxist under-
Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters ; On Mo-
dernity, Post- Modernity and Intellectuals (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1987), 107.
John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philo-
s°PhY (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 86-88.
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staging of power is in error.83 Ideology
, it seems> ^ ^
discussion of power which completely misses its intended
target
.
A methodological problem is also raised by the
"macro" concept of ideology which limits its useful appU.
cation for understanding decision making. Isolating and
defining an ideology is difficult since there may be no
clear conception of an "ideal type" for the ideology. As
Karl Loewenstein observed, "Even the most elementary
classification reveals that... most modern ideologies con-
tain elements of collateral, complementary and even anti-
thetical thought and belief patterns. "84 0ne recent gtudy
has attempted to apply this concept of ideology to bud-
geting and therefore merits closer examination. Steven
Koven ' s Ideological Budget dng. The Influence of PnHH. a i
Philosophy on Public Pol i cy , argues, as this thesis does,
that ideology plays a significant role in shaping decision
making on budget policy. Koven's definition of ideology,
however, is rooted in this "macro" category, which he
83Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of
the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 26; The
History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction (New
York: Vintage Books, 1980), 140. See also the discussion
throughout Foucault: A Critical Reader , ed. David Couzens
Hoy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), as well as Cousins
and Hussain, "The Question of Ideology," 177-79. For a
rejoinder, see Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan, Michel
Foucaul t: Social Theory and Transgression (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1982), esp. 112-14.
84 Loewenstein, "Political Systems, Ideologies and Insti-
tutions," 695.
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describes as theories on how power in a society should be
organized. 85 Given this definition, Koven goes on to
describe ideologies of Nationalism, Communism, Socialism,
Capitalism, Fascism and Democracy, each with character-
istic social patterns of thought (placing him closer to
Mannheim-
s definition of ideology, although he fails to
reflect on the origins of his use of the term). 86 Koven
defines the American ideology as Liberalism, and goes on
to provide definitions of "liberalism" and "conservatism"
within these broader categories. in this sense, Koven
moves beyond most studies in this category by taking the
"macro" definition of ideology and associating it to the
"micro" definition, as described in Minar s "intermediate-
category. 87 However, Koven 's conclusion returns to the
"macro" level by arguing all budgeting is bound to a
conception of Liberalism, which finds differing ex-
pressions on a liberal-conservative continuum. Koven 's
definition of these categories, however, remains "time-
bound," and his application of the liberal-conservative
categories cannot escape some of the methodological
problems described later in this section. 88
85stephen Koven, Ideological Budgeting; The Influence of
Political Philosophy on Public Policy (New York: Praeger
1988), 22-25.
86Koven, Ideological Budgeting
. 1988, 29-51.
87Koven, Ideological Budgeting . 1988, 55-83.
88Koven, Ideological Budgeting
. 1988, 167-68. See also
discussion below on the "bias trap" of such categories.
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The final category in Minar. s typology describes the
"micro" theories of ideology, or those defining indi-
vidually held beliefs. "Micro" theories may not stand
separately from discussions of "macro" theory, however,
and therefore ulnar's categories do not provide safe
definitions of ideology. Minar describes these as
"thought distinguished by content or structure" and
includes two subsets in his discussion of this category.
The first subset, theories of "content," includes a
personal attachment to some values, particularly as that
idea relates to the immediate concern (or "life space" )
of the individual. Minar points out, however, that these
beliefs are shaped by outside forces. Thus, the "micro-
level concept of "content" is often (if not always) con-
nected to the "macro" concept of "thought distinguished by
its locus." This "content" definition is thus open to the
same critique as the "macro" concept, with the associated
methodological problems as well.
For example, this "content" definition is the most
commonly utilized conception of ideology in American
political science, according to Minar, since it includes
the liberal-conservative dichotomy used in voter
studies. 89 Everett C. Ladd's study of the American polity
is a good example of the link between this definition of
89For an example of this concept of ideology in use, see
Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald
Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960).
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ideology and the ".acre" theories noted above. Although
Ladd defines ideology as an individually held belief, he
argues ideology becomes significant only when it is a part
of a larger, coherent view of the world. 90 This con-
nection exposes Ladd-s definition to the same theoretical
and methodological objections noted earlier.
The second subset of this category is "internal
structures of thought," or beliefs individually created
and maintained by stable, interconnected systems of
thought. This subset should be considered separately from
the other categories for two reasons. First, the subset
does not rely on the "macro" definition of ideology for
its substance, thus avoiding the theoretical grounds for
criticism already advanced above. since this definition
does not seek to define ideology as a system of thought
(necessarily) shared by a society, it considers beliefs
from a different perspective which need not provide "true"
readings of power. in other words, these beliefs may be
wrong, but that error does not invalidate their importance
or usefulness in understanding behavior (while the Marxist
and Foucaultian critiques of "macro" definitions argue
these concepts either mask or miss true power rela-
tionships ) .
* uEverett C. Ladd, The American Polity (New York: w.w.
Norton, 1987), 58. See also Philip Converse, "The Nature
of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," Ideology and Dis-
content (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 206-61.
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Second, the methodology employed by this subset can
escape the most difficult methodological problem facing
the previously described categories: how can ideological
individuals hope to study the phenomenon of ideology with-
out imposing their own ideological beliefs? Karl Mannheim
observed this problem from a different perspective in Ide-
oloav and Utopia.
What we are concerned with here is the
elemental perplexity of our time,
which can be epitomized in the symp-
tomatic question "How is it possiblefor man to continue to think and livein a time when the problems of ide-
ology and Utopia are being radically
raised and thought through in all
their implications?" 91
Mannheim argued individuals living in an "ideological age-
will find it difficult (if not impossible) to think
clearly about ideology. Yet, the concept of ideology is
most relevant to social scientists during such ideological
ages, as the previous discussion suggested. This paradox
troubles Mannheim, and was only resolved by redefining
ideology as a "sociology of knowledge." At the same time,
Mannheim cannot avoid the charge that such an under-
standing obscures the power relationships of a society. 92
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia; An Introduction to
the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1936), 28.
for a discussion on this point, see Connolly, Political
Science and Ideology . 1967, 76-79.
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sMannheim's paradox is stin a problem for any attempt
to understand ideology and beliefs, however, and finds it
way into the sooial soientifio application of ideology
described by Miner. The paradox ensnares those who at-
tempt to test the existence of ideology through the appli-
cation of these definitions in the political world. Some
refer to this problem as a •bias trap,- Minar describes
the problem by arguing
...ideology becomes response to anitem or set of items selected by the
researcher, who must assume that his
instrument probes to a basic layer of
disposition significantly related to
political choice.
. .even with sophis-
tication, the indicators of ideology
are evoked responses to artificial
stimuli . 93
In other words, the researcher necessarily shapes the
results of the research by defining and applying arti-
ficially created categories of belief, no matter how
carefully those categories are defined or how precisely
they are measured.
How does one escape this "bias trap?" One method is
suggested by William Connolly in The Terms of Political
Discourse, when he argues observers must take into account
the existence of "essentially contested concepts." Con-
nolly argues that scientific application of definitions, a
93Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," 329.
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methodology borrowed from the natural sciences, fails to
explain beliefs which carry impi icitly held values
_
the concept
••is appraisive in that the state ofaffairs it describes is a valued
achievement, when the practice de-
scribed is internally ^ in fchaits characterization involves refer-
ence to several dimensions, and when
agreed and contested rules of appli-
cation are relatively open, enabling
parties to interpret even those shared
rules differently as new and unfore-
seen situations arise, then the con-
cept in question is an "essentially
contested concept." 94
Connolly observes that politics itself is the "ambiguous
and relatively open-ended interaction of persons and
groups who share a range of concepts, but share them im-
perfectly and incompletely." Attempts to apply categories
to beliefs, therefore, fail to understand politics and
produce "serious misreadings" of these concepts. 95
If Connolly is indeed correct, one must turn to some-
thing other than the broad categories of "macro" under-
standings of ideology to understand beliefs, since those
categories necessarily generalize about these "essentially
contested concepts." Indeed, this side of ideology is
lost in works utilizing these categories on the "macro,"
94William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse
(Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1974), 10.
95Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse . 1974, 6.
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"intermediate" and "content" levels because the researcher
must impose an artificially created category to produce
the generalized responses from the observed political sub-
jects, only the final subset offers a chance to observe
these contested concepts as the individual understands
them. This, for example, is the error made by Koven in
his study of budgets and ideology: Koven can only measure
the beliefs which fit within his defined category of
Liberalism and, more importantly, the liberal-conservative
continuum. Thus, Koven must assume, all liberals believe
the same things, as do all conservatives, if one can even
begin to explain what those categories mean. As a result,
Koven is either forced to place all presidents and other
political agents under a single category ("Liberals"),
thus failing to distinguish between such diverse presi-
dents as Ronald Reagan and Franklin Roosevelt, or to group
presidents into categories which ignore contested concepts
within the bounds artificially created by Koven, thus
failing to distinguish the "liberal" beliefs of Jimmy
Carter from those of Lyndon Johnson (again, assuming these
categories can even be defined)
. As Minar describes
above, the result is an artificial response to some arti-
ficial stimulus which may bear no relation to the actual
beliefs of the individual.
The problem for students of ideology, then, is to
find a technique for studying ideology which accounts for
these "essentially contested concepts" but escapes the
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"bias trap." One important first step might be a more
careful reflection on terminology. The WOrd "ideology.. is
normally associated with a set of beliefs held by a so-
ciety or segment of a society; all the definitions noted
above are in agreement on this point. "Beliefs, on the
other hand, are usually associated with individuals and
are seen as preceding the formation of ideology. 96 As
John Plamenatz explains
What makes beliefs ideological
.. is
their constituting a system of beliefs
which is functional in these ways[holding together groups and justi-
fying their attitudes and charac-
teristics]
,
and is therefore accepted
regardless of whether or not its con-
stituent beliefs satisfy the criteria
of truth The set of beliefs need
not, and usually is not, a theory. 97
Thus, the important unit for analysis when attempting to
avoid the "bias trap" (as well as the objections raised
against the "macro" definitions of ideology) is political
beliefs, as defined separately from "ideology." Although
the terms are often used as if they were interchangeable,
the theoretical and methodological questions raised by
each suggest one must take great caution in their use.
Eulau, Politics, Self and Society . 1986, 50-51. See
also James Borhek and Richard Curtis, A Sociology of
Belief (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1975), 3-8. To observe
this definition in use, see Louis J. Halle, The Ideolo-
gical Imagination (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972).
97John Plamenatz, Ideology (New York: Praeger, 1970), 31.
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The theoretical debate around the true nature of power
relationships, and the methodological problem of the "bias
trap" are raised by "ideology" but avoided by "beliefs."
This is more evident when one considers the use of
this final category, "internal structures of thought," or
political beliefs. Robert Lane put this concept into
practice in much of his research by arguing the political
behavior of an individual comes from within and is asso-
ciated with belief: "if one knows what ideas will be use-
ful to a man in his time and situation, with his goals and
needs, one knows how he will select from among the avail-
able alternatives, and in what direction he will strain
them. "98 By discovering thege ideag/ ^ argueg/ a
researcher can better understand the structure of the
beliefs held by the subject under observation.
This step alone will not escape the "bias trap," how-
ever, since the researcher can still impose a given set of
categories on these beliefs. As Lane points out, two
techniques can be used to uncover beliefs:
An outsider cannot see another per-
son's values the way he can see his
behavior, but he can find out about
them in two ways. One is to observe
that person's choice of goals, to see
what they have in common ... Or one can
ask that person to reflect on his own
behavior and thought, so that he can
say for himself what is worthwhile,
98Robert Lane, Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chi
cago: Markham Publishing, 1969), 2.
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what is a value. There is scarcely
any other way to find out. 99
interestingly, the first option suggested by Lane moves to
the "micro" level described in the last category, but may
still be vulnerable to the "bias trap" since that obser-
vation can be shaped by only the goals for which the
researcher is watching (or, to paraphrase Felix Frank-
furter, where one goes in determines where one comes
out). 100 ThiS/ as x argue . n fche prev . ous sect . on ^
will demonstrate in this research, is the trap which
ensnares the "classic" descriptions of presidential
behavior offered by Neustadt and Barber.
The second option proposed by Lane offers greater
promise to the researcher seeking to avoid the "bias
trap,
"
since the information given to the observer comes
from the subject. Although this technique certainly
creates more vaguely defined categories of beliefs (or no
category at all, theoretically) it does promise to avoid
9 9Lane
'
Political Thinking and ConsciousnssR . 1969, 19.10 °A useful illustration of this danger can be found in
the discussion in William Bluhm, Ideology and Attitudes(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974), esp. 8-10.
Bluhm argues categories may not exist for the elements of
an ideology which is very important to the subject of the
study. These categories, like the "liberal-conservative"
dichotomy noted earlier, come with their own sets of
defining political ideas, and thus may either misrepresent
or omit other relevant political beliefs. Other examples
of this conception in practice can be found in Jerrold
Schneider, Ideological Coalitions in Congress (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1979) and Gerald Hikel, Beyond the Polls
(Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1973).
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the artificially created observations of the other con-
cepts of ideology. Milton Rokeach offers one technique
for discovering such beliefs by carefully uncovering the
"belief system" of the subject, defining such systems as
"...all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses,
conscious and unconscious, that a person at a given time
accepts as true of the world he lives in. "101 Rokeach
contends individual beliefs can only be linked to behavio
through this discovery, although this aspect of belief is
generally ignored or presumed. 102
How can one be sure a "belief system" has been un-
covered and understood? The methodology described here
does have the difficulty of creating single categories of
political beliefs. Rokeach resolves this problem within
the context of his discussion by observing that "belief
systems" are based upon a set of "primitive beliefs" that
can be uncovered by observation. These "primitive be-
liefs" are characterized by their repetition and the
importance assigned to them by the individual . 103 Minar
anticipates the nature of this methodology and its limits
his explanation merits lengthy quotation (keeping in mind
the use of "ideology" he employs here has been redefined
as "beliefs" ) :
1U
-'-Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York:
Basic Books, 1960) 33.
l° 2Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind , 1960, 18-19.
l° 3Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind . 1960, 40-42.
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Another approach to the study of ide-ology that may possibly yield some ofthe relevance of the macro approach
and some of the rigor of the micro,proceeds from the study of policybackward through behavior to the ide-
ational antecedents. This appears tobe the least cultivated approach tothe subject.... as people engage in thepolicy making process, therefore, they
are engaging the ideology, if any,
which actually preconditions political
action. m responses to the policy
process, it should be possible to de-
tect ideology that can be defined in
specific operational terms and that
actually represents beliefs that
really will be acted upon in the pre-
sence of political stimuli. it may bedoubted that ideology is real, or, if
real, is very important, unless it canbe shown to make a difference where
action is involved.
. .The problem of
establishing linkage is a difficult
one, but in any case the student of
the effect of ideology on political
behavior must probably be content with
demonstrating relationships rather
than causes
.
104
This project proposes to utilize this concept of "belief
systems" to better understand the role of political
beliefs in decision making. By examining the admini-
strative system control decisions of presidents, this
study will test the three models of presidential behavior
"rational decider," "personality" and "belief systems."
The following three chapters will present accounts of
presidential decisions, will examine and evaluate the
104Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," 329-30.
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three models using counterfactual arguments, and win
conclude that the
..belief systems" model provides the best
explanation for the decisions under consideration. To
maintain a reasonably consistent data base, the decision
of each president concerning administrative reorganization
and budget policy will be examined. As noted earlier in
this chapter, a consensus exists among presidential
scholars that these areas are productive subjects for
understanding decision making since the president has
relatively greater control over the decisions, thus pro-
viding the clearest examples of presidential decision
making.
Chapter Two will therefore present an account of
Richard Nixon's major administrative choices in these
areas; Chapter Three will examine Jimmy Carter's choices;
Chapter Four considers the choices made by Ronald Reagan.
These particular presidents will be examined for several
reasons: first, they offer divergent views on the role of
government and its relationship to its citizens (and thus
disagreement on at least one dimension of political
belief); second, they view the goals of administration
differently, each offering a comprehensive plan of reform
in the course of his term; finally, they provide the most
sensible cases for comparison since all shared the poli-
tical environment of an expanded "administrative state"
which has prevailed since the Great Society programs of
the Johnson administration (although their differences on
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the first and second points reflect their different under-
standings of that environment).
Each chapter will examine the administrative choices
of these presidents by chronologically presenting the
major turning points in reorganization and budget policy
under each and will utilize a historical approach to
describe those choices. Explanations or justifications
for administrative actions will be found by examining the
primary source material available for each president . 105
By using a chronological approach, these three chapters
will provide a neutral structure for a discussion of
political beliefs. Each chapter will present the choices
of the presidents as a series of conundrums for the
discipline's current explanations for behavior. in other
words, each example will illustrate why the discipline
fails to account adequately for the choices made by each
5Studies of earlier presidents have had the advantage
of full, well-organized archival material. The study of
these three presidents has the advantage of contemporary
participants and their operating in the modern admini-
strative state, although some of the material related to
these activities remains classified or unorganized. The
Nixon papers are currently available for research use in
Washington, D.C. and include separate material on the
reorganization plans, materials related to domestic policy
and some of Nixon's personal papers. The Carter library
"
is now open in Georgia and provides some information on
Carter's reorganization and budget policies (although the
files for the President's Reorganization Project have not
yet been organized)
.
The Reagan and Bush presidential
materials are, to this date, rather unavailable (although
the Reagan library has recently opened), and a greater use
of secondary sources in those chapters concerning these
presidents is necessary.
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president. Each chapter will then offer the "belief
systems" model as an explanation for these conundrums:
the historical record will be searched to find reflections
on the role of the bureaucracy and the duties of the
administrative state, as well as expressions of core or
"primitive" beliefs which can be used to assemble each
presidents "belief system." By reconsidering these
choices, Chapters Two through Four will demonstrate the
role beliefs play in determining the choice of a parti-
cular strategy in a manner currently unappreciated by the
political science literature.
Chapter Five will conclude by describing how these
beliefs can be used to examine other presidents, and a
brief examination of George Bush will be offered. Fin-
ally, the importance of this new understanding of the role
of political beliefs will be described in reference to the
analysis presented in this chapter.
Through this exploration, the role of political
beliefs in the selection of administrative strategy will
be tested and the importance of belief systems to under-
standing presidential behavior will be explored. By doing
so, the analysis will also suggest some of the broader
ramifications of beliefs as a force for shaping political
action.
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CHAPTER II
GOALS AND BELIEFS
: THE NIXON PRESIDENCY
Richard Nixon has often been described (and sometimes
praised) as the "foreign policy" president; analyses of
his administration have often ignored his domestic policy
efforts. 1 one recent biographer has claimed that many
Americans can recall nothing about the domestic agenda of
the Nixon administration, except perhaps the events
surrounding the Watergate affair. 2 while foreign policy
was certainly the preoccupation of Nixon's first years in
office, due largely to the Vietnam War and the initiatives
to open relations with China, Nixon recognized that
domestic policy was important to a successful presidency,
if for no other reason than its implications for con-
ducting foreign policy. 3 While an accurate description of
the Nixon administration must therefore begin by noting
1Paul Light, The President's Agenda (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1983), 47.
2Tom Wicker, One of Us (New York: Random House, 1991),
xiii-xiv.
3Herbert Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 531.
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the importance of foreign policy, one should not leap to
the conclusion that domestic policy was unimportant to
Nixon. Domestic concerns occupied a good deal more time
than many observers realize. 4 Nixon was keenly interested
in domestic policy, and his activity in the areas of
executive reorganization and revenue sharing reflect that
interest. 5 Both goals were mutually supportive, and
separating the discussion of one subject from the other is
rather difficult: without reorganization, revenue sharing
would fail to achieve the goal of decentralized govern-
ment; without revenue sharing, reorganization would lack
a guiding rationale. Nixon considered reorganization and
revenue sharing a "package," and he pursued both with
vigor, albeit with alternating degrees of effort, during
his administration. 6 Both reorganization and revenue
sharing are best understood as elements in a belief sys-
tem, held by Nixon, that emphasized individual initiative
under a limited government, a government close to the
people and, at the same time, ready to exercise federal
power. Understanding the relationship between the two
policy goals and the role of political beliefs for shaping
both is essential for explaining Nixon's behavior. This
4To this point and echoing Parmet, see Wicker, One of Us .
1991, 414, 539.
5John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1982), 207-8.
6Ronald Moe, "Traditional Organizational Principles and
the Managerial Presidency: From Phoenix to Ashes," Public
Administration Review 50 (January/February 1991): 130-31.
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section wil! examine both goals separately, and then con-
sider them as one when evaluating the models of presi-
dential behavior offered in Chapter One.
"Centralized" D^^,aUzaHnn , Pq_, anizatinn
The reorganization of the executive branch was the
first major domestic policy initiative of the Nixon ad-
ministration. Nixon seemed to have high hopes for his
Cabinet when he first took office, claiming he had
appointed "independent thinkers" to advise him. 7 Nixon
Planned to keep the number of formal Cabinet meetings to a
minimum, but planned to have members act independently
within the range of control he established. in a sense,
Nixon's plan for his Cabinet seemed almost contradictory,
even as he described it in his later memoirs:
I felt that the better each Cabinet
member performed his job, the less
time I should have to spend discussing
it with him except for major questions
of politics or policy I had also
seen the hazards of appointing Cabinet
members who were too strong willed to
act as part of a team. I wanted
people who would fight for what they
7Richard Nathan, The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the
Administrative Presidency (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1975), 37-8.
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thought was right but would support mydecision once it was made.
8
Nearly all observers of the administration agree Nixon
became dissatisfied with his Cabinet rather sickly, as he
increasingly felt his new appointees had failed to control
their respective bureaucracies and were presiding over de-
partments which were undermining administration policy.
9
However, this feeling did not mean Nixon had misrep-
resented his plans for the Cabinet. He was apparently
quite serious in his intent to utilize his Cabinet,
devoting a great deal of time during his transition period
to the selection of department secretaries . 10 Had he
appointed his Cabinet, planning all the while to ignore
their advice, it would seem unlikely that Nixon would have
spent so much time and have taken so much care in their
selection. a better explanation might be found in some of
the changing circumstances of the administration which led
Nixon to reconsider his initial Cabinet plan for
reorganization.
At the same time Nixon made plans for his new
Cabinet, the president announced a clear intention to
8Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 338.
9For examples, see Herbert Klein, Making It Perfectly
clear (Garden City: Doubleday and Company. 1980), 300;
Ehrlichman, Witness to Power . 1982, 110-11; Nathan, The
Plot That Failed . 1975, 39-49.
1 oCarl Brauer, Presidential Transitions (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), 143-47.
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decentralize his administration, on both the federal-state
level and within each department. On March 27, 1969,
Nixon directed his newly appointed Cabinet secretaries to
begin a program of decentralization within their de-
partments, placing decision making as close as possible to
those who deliver the services of government to the
people. Nixon did not intend to surrender complete
control over administration to these deliverers, since
decentralization required some centralized body to issue
guidelines and perform review functions, as well as
guarantee that qualified field officers exist. But Nixon
was proposing a more far reaching decentralization of
decision making functions than any modern president had
ventured to date. 11 Bv dpnPTihran,^^ay ecentralizing the government,
Nixon was attempting to increase the political power of
the state and local governments to control domestic
policy. 12 The Cabinet secretaries, an able and inde-
pendent lot according to Nixon, would be given de-
centralized power within the federal executive, and would
in turn initiate the decentralization of their own
departments. *3 Those cabinet officers would thus perform
1:LDwight Ink and Alan Dean, "A Concept of Decentrali-
zation, " Public Administration Review 30 (January/Fe-
bruary 1970): 60-61.
12David Porter and Eugene Olsen, "Some Critical Issues in
Government Centralization and Decentralization," Public
Administration Review 36 (January/February, 1976): 76.
13William Safire, Before the Fall (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1977), 136.
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a dual function: as department administrators, they would
perform regulatory and review functions (making inde-
pendence and competence key); as political appointees,
they would oversee the decentralization of their own
departments. As George Shultz, then serving as Director
of OMB, explained in testimony on June 2, 1971 s
A primary objective of the President's
Departmental Reorganization Program is
to decentralize the authority and
related resources to carry out Federal
programs. Matched with this, his
Revenue Sharing proposals have the
objective of returning resources and
the control of them directly to state
and local governments. Thus, both
forms of decentralization are designed
to bring government closer to the
people. The reorganization does it by
shifting control within the federal
structure down to the level where the
problems exist and where Federal of-
ficials can work more meaningfully
with State, local and private con-
cerns. Revenue sharing does it by
shifting a greater measure of dis-
cretion and control from the Federal
level to State and local authori-
ties. 14
As one of the first acts of his administration, Nixon
ordered a study of administrative reorganization by a
President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization
(PACEO) on April 5, 196 9. PACEO ' s mandate was "To review
14Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, Reorganization of the Executive
Departments, Part One (Washington, D.C. : United States
Government Printing Office, 1971), 160.
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organization of Executive Branch and its links with state
and local governments . "15 Nixon named a£}^ Qf ^
Council Roy Ash, the President of Litton Industries.
Nixon had a good deal of confidence in Ash's skills as an
industrial management reformer, knowing (and apparently
caring) very little about Ash's politics." The number of
Ash council members was deliberately kept low to facili-
tate speedy action; in addition to Ash, George Baker
(dean of the Harvard School of Business), John Connolly
(at that time a partner in a prominent Houston Law firm),
Frederick Kappel (chair of the ATT Executive Committee)
and Richard Paget (a partner in the management consulting
firm of Cresap, McCormick and Paget) all served on the
Council. to further speed the Council's work, a series of
memoranda (rather than a single final report) were issued
to the president as the work was completed. m fact, the
15
"To: PACEO Briefing Book Recipients," March 6, 1970White House Special Files, John D. Ehrlichman, box 32Nixon Library, 64-11.
16Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Nixon in the White
House: The Frustration of Power (New York: Random House,
1371), 237. in fact, Roy Ash explained in an oralinterview that the call came from out of the blue, and
that he had only briefly met Nixon, laughing as he
explained "..I volunteered for something I wasn't sure
what I was volunteering for!" Ash claimed he had only afive minute interview with Nixon before being offered the
position. See "Oral Interview with Roy Ash, January 13,
1988," Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, Nixon Library.
If Nixon was concerned about the outcome of the Council's
study, or wished to direct that outcome toward an
administrative "coup," one must conclude his method of
selecting Ash was foolhardy at best.
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Council planned to work so quickly that they intended to
be "out of business by December, 1970. "17
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Ash Council
was the amount of time Nixon devoted to reorganization
discussions: Nixon gave the Council a good deal of access
and attention, although he was personally bored by the
details of reorganization planning. 18 The Council worked
for eight months, interviewing past and present officials
in the Executive Office of the President and the executive
branch, outside experts on administrative organizations
and industrial managers, and by reviewing past reorgani-
zation studies. 19 At its peak, the Council employed some
47 staff members20 and
, after facing some immediate start _
up problems, had prepared a number of reports for the
president by mid-1970. 21
The Council's reports to the president reflected the
perception of many executive branch observers that there
17
"To: PACEO Briefing Book Recipients," 64-12. in fact,
the Council continued to work until mid- 1971, although itdid product the first reorganization plan in mid-1970 as
promised. See memorandum from Water Thayer to Ron
Zeigler, "Summation of PACEO Council Agenda," September
10, 1969, White House Central Files, Staff Member and
Office Files, PACEO, Box 6, Nixon Library.io
peri Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 277, 280-
82; Evans and Novak, Nixon in the White House . 1971, 238.
i9
"Reorganization Plan of 1970," Public Administration
Review 30 (November/December 1970): 617.
20Roy Ash (testimony June 2, 1971), "Reorganization of
Executive Departments," 167.
2 lArnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 278-79.
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existed a greater need for coherence and organization in
domestic policy planning.22 In a CQver ^^
accompanying its first set of reorganization proposals,
the Council noted that reorganization of the Executive
Office was a necessary first step before any other reforms
could be contemplated, explaining "it is a question of
putting the horse before the cart. The organization of
the Executive Office is crucial to the effectiveness of
the other changes we will propose. "23 The Ash Council
proposed in its first set of reorganization plans the
formation of a Domestic Council, resembling the National
Security Council, to aid the President in the formulation
of domestic policy. The Council would include the presi-
dent, Vice President, Attorney General, and the Secre-
taries of Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce,
Labor, HEW, HUD and Transportation. The Ash Council also
recommended the restructuring and renaming of the Bureau
of the Budget into a new Office of Management and
Budget. 24
22William Carey, "Presidential Staffing in the Sixties and
Seventies," Public Administration Review XXIX
(September/October 1969): 457-58 broadly reflects this
perception even before the Ash Council began its most
serious work.
23
"Memoranda for the President," July 19, 1969, White
House Central File, Staff Member and Office Files,
President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization
(PACEO), Box 1, Nixon Library.
24Cabinets and Counselors: The President and the
Executive Branch (Washington, D.C. : Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1989), 40.
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Notes taken during one of the Ash Council's early
meetings with Nixon and his immediate White House staff
indicate Nixon gave the new reorganization plan high
priority, recognizing the need to move quickly if the
Council's recommendations were to be adopted. 25 These
notes, taken at the August 20, 1969 meeting at San
Clemente, captured the President's reactions to the first
set of Ash Council recommendations. in addition to the
Council members, the President, Haldeman, Ehrlichman,
Kissinger and Flanigan were all in attendance. Nixon
seemed most concerned about the need to make change
possible, even when the White House has a vested interest
in keeping what had been created in previous adminis-
trations. He seemed particularly concerned that members
of the Cabinet would become captive and would be unable to
evaluate their department's programs. 26 At the same time,
25
"Memorandum for the President," Reports and Papers,
Council Meeting August 20, 1969. File [6-1], White House
Central Files, PACEO, Nixon Library. The notes referred
to in the following paragraph were written onto the
document by an unnamed person. Since the notes appear on
the PACEO copy and that copy was retained for PACEO ' s
official file of the meeting, I am assuming the notes are
accurate. A cover letter accompanying those notes and
authored by Andrew Rouse, the Deputy Executive Director at
PACEO, summarizes these handwritten notes and uses them to
create a set of recommendations for revisions. It is
therefore clear Rouse considers them accurate and
authoritative representations of the President's wishes.
Although it is somewhat difficult to tell, the handwriting
does appear to be that of Rouse, who is also listed as
being present at the meeting.
26
"Memorandum for the President," handwritten notes on
front and reverse of page five.
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the Report clearly delineated the dangers of allowing the
staff to control too much, arguing "A President whose
office lacks these [well-organized systems of information]
will necessarily be less inclined toward delegation and,
will try by default, to retain in his control operating
responsibilities he cannot possibly handle." On that same
page, handwritten notes indicate Nixon recognized the need
for such an information system. 27
While reorganization was later perceived as a method
for replacing Nixon's discredited (in his view) Cabinet,
one would be mistaken to assume reorganization was merely
a method for avoiding recalcitrant Cabinet secretaries.
Had Nixon's original intentions for his Cabinet come to
fruition, it is clear the Ash Council's recommendations
for coordinating the White House would still be considered
necessary. m the course of the August 20 meeting, Nixon
also made it clear that the proposal would have to be
"sold" to the Cabinet, suggesting the president recognized
the importance of keeping the Cabinet together through the
transition. At the same time, according to handwritten
notes of the meeting, Nixon insisted on keeping the report
"where it is - if this report gets beyond this room, we're
in trouble." 28 The central concern for the reorganization
was the patchwork system of exercising executive power in
domestic affairs: Nixon sought to coordinate all domestic
27
"Memorandum for the President," 6
28
"Memorandum for the President," 8 and reverse of 7.
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Policy activity, not control the Cabinet officers. 29 m
hindsight, it may appear the changes were used as a means
to a nefarious concentration of power. The first round of
reorganization is often perceived as a carefully con-
structed and well planned prelude to the second set of
reorganization proposals. At the time, however, changes
in the staff system were judged necessary simply because
Nixon believed that an efficient staff was needed if the
Cabinet itself was to have any hope of running well. 3 0
Additionally, the general need to concentrate power in the
hands of the Cabinet was perceived as equally crucial to
the overall goal of decentralization. if the Cabinet
lacked the authority or ability to act with resolve,
decentralization would be impossible. 31
In fact, the idea of a Domestic Council was hardly
original; the Ash Council had essentially modified a
proposal Richard Goodwin had made to Lyndon Johnson in
1964.32 Ash himself admitted their work was guided by
earlier studies (including the Hoover Commission, the
Rockefeller Committee, the Price Task Force, the Heineman
29william Carey, "Presidential Staffing in the Sixties andSeventies," 457-58.
30joan Hoff-Wilson, "Richard M. Nixon: The Corporate
Presidency," Leadership in the Modern Presidency , ed. Fred
Greenstein (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988)
172 .
a -i
,See Dwight Ink's comments in "President Nixon's
Proposals for Executive Reorganization: A Mini-
Symposium, " Public Administration Review 34
(September/October 1974): 488.
32cabinets and Counselors . 1989, 40.
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sTasK Korce and the Lindsay Task ^33,, ^ new^
from Nixon or any other member of the administration to
consolidate power:
In working through those [reorgani-
zation recommendations of previous
presidential commissions] I saw a lot
of good ideas and decided our job was
not to come up with a lot of newideas. All the good ideas were al-
ready out there. We defined our
mission as getting something done, notDust making another report, throwing
it in, and seeing if somebody wants todo something about it some day. So we
modified some of the previous ideas
slightly, but we worked basically fromthe work that had gone on since Roose-
velt' s time. 34
Despite later analyses, it seems clear Nixon's Domestic
Council was to supplement and correct Cabinet action, not
the first step toward replacing the Cabinet with a new
executive authority.
Nixon transmitted the proposal to Congress on March
12, 1970, claiming that the Domestic Council would begin
to control the large federal bureaucracy and help him
decide what to do, while the Office of Management and
Budget would help determine how and how well those tasks
were being performed. 35 In Nixon's own words:
33Roy Ash (testimony June 2, 1971) "Reorganization of
Executive Departments," 186.
34
"Oral Interview with Roy Ash," 4-5.
35
"Reorganization Plan of 1970," 612.
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A President whose programs are care-fully coordinated, whose information
system keeps him adequately informed,
and whose organizational assignments
are plainly set out, can delegate
authority with security and confi-dence. A president whose office isdeficient in these respects will beinclined, instead, to retain close
control of operating responsibilities
which he cannot and should not
handle. 36
Although Congress was leery of the reorganization pro-
posal, John Connolly (a member of the Ash Council) was
able to help ease its passage. The congressional debate
was surprisingly brief and without serious disagreement
from either party; 37 approval came from fche House ^
Senate on May 13 and 16, respectively.
Nixon was lucky to gain approval of the first round
of reorganization proposals: 1970 was a bad year for
Nixon's legislative initiatives. Although Nixon had a
"rocky" relationship with Congress throughout his
presidency, he was frequently successful at putting to-
gether coalitions of votes during his first two years. 38
However, this should not obscure the fact that Nixon took
a tremendous political risk in pressing the reorganization
plans for the Domestic Council. As William Carey ex-
plains,
"Reorganization Plan of 1970," 612.
Evans and Novak, Nixon in the White House . 1971, 240-41.
Brauer, Presidential Transitions . 1986, 158-59.
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[The Domestic Council reorganization]has the merit of ending a prolonged
and costly inertia in the development
of the presidential office. Movement
was needed
- needed badly. Most
Presidents would have hesitated to act
at a time like this - the country
divided, the presidency in deep
trouble, the opposing party in control
of Congress. Not many Presidents
would have risked it, and I suspect
that in the test hours before the
House voted, some of Mr. Nixon's
counsellors may have regretted their
rashness. But he did it, and made it
stick. 39
But the administration found the bad showing in the fall
mid-term elections had begun to erode the fragile coali-
tion of moderate Democrats and reformist Republicans that
had been crucial to early legislative successes .40 The
general shakeups from reorganization had already begun to
alter bureaucratic control over the federal government
from the top, while revenue sharing (as will be noted in
the next section) threatened to alter bureaucratic and
congressional control at the bottom. In other words, at
the same moment that members of Congress began to realize
the extent to which their control over spending would be
limited by the changes Nixon proposed, the administration
39William Carey, "Reorganization Plan No. 2," Public
Administration Review 30 (November/December 1970): 631.
40Dan Rather and Gary Paul Gates, The Palace Guard (New
York: Harper and Row, 1974), 269-70; A. James Reichley,
Conservatives in an Age of Chance (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1981), 97; Nathan, The Plot That
Failed , 1975, 7.
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began the next serious attempt to alter bureaucratic
arrangements. 41 Nixon clearly hafl Congress ^^^
formulating the first reorganization effort, whose passage
he barely managed to secure, and Congress was not in-
tending to allow more control to be taken by the admini-
stration.
The 1971 State of the Union address also contained a
second round of reorganization proposals created by the
Ash Council. Six Cabinet positions were to be reorganized
into four new ' superagencies" (the Departments of Com-
munity Development, Human Resources, Natural Resources and
Economic Affairs), intended to combine disparate agencies
around commonly held objectives. The Department of Com-
munity Development (DCD) was to absorb most elements of
HUD, the Highway and Mass Transportation sections of the
Department of Transportation, the Community Action Program
of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Farmer's Home
Administration and the Rural Electrification Program.
These programs were to be decentralized into subregional
offices, providing the greatest amount of control for
policy in each region. The Department of Human Resources
41Matthew Crenson and Francis Rourke, "By Way of
Conclusion: American Bureaucracy Since World War II," The
New American State , ed. Louis Galambos (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University, 1987), 160; William Gormley, Taming
the Bureaucrats (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989), 176-77; Ray Price, With Nixon (New York: Viking
Press, 1977), 197; Nathan, The Plot That Failed , 1975,
31, 74-75.
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(DHR) combined the remaining parts of hud, the Unem-
ployment Services and Compensation functions of the
Department of Labor, and several offices of GEO. while
these programs would still be centralized in Washington,
their budgets would be the taroetc? of ~gets the greatest amount
of revenue sharing changes, giving a great deal of
autonomy to regional managers outside Washington for
budgetary control and policy administration. The De-
partment of Natural Resources (DNR) united the Department
of the interior, NOAA from the Department of Commerce, the
Forest Service and the planning departments of the Army
Corps of Engineers, while these agencies were already
largely decentralized into field offices, the reorgani-
zation plan called for the additional creation of new
offices to further decentralize administration. Finally,
the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) would take the
leftover functions of the Departments of Transportation,
Commerce and Labor as well as the Small Business Associ-
ation and the Office of Technical Utilization in the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The plan
called for the current number of field offices to be
maintained to administer programs which were already
decentralized. 42
^Douglas Fox, "The President's Proposals for Executive
Reorganization: A Critique," Public Administration
Quarterly 33 ( September/October 1973): 401-2.
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now-
c
er-
The reluctance of Congress and the bureaucracy to
support the Nixon reorganisation initiatives (and the
revenue sharing proposal discussed in the next section),
argues Richard Nathan, led to the development of the
famous ••administrative presidency," where bureaucrat!
functions were assumed by the White House count
bureaucracy until the details of governing simply over-
whelmed the comparatively small white House staff. 43
Nathan is not entirely certain when this takeover oc-
curred; his preface names either 1971 or 1972, which
could indicate either the early or later reorganization
initiative. 44
Nathan accurately describes the changing nature of
administrative power in the Nixon administration and
generally seems sympathetic to Nixon's reforms. One must
doubt, however, Nathan's conclusion that Nixon's admini-
strative
-coup'' represented a devious act, as Nathan seems
to imply. other scholars of reorganization plans noted
even before the Ash Council began its deliberations that
securing agency cooperation (and with it, congressional
approval) in reorganization would be difficult. 45 Nathan
himself acknowledged rather casually that the "super-
agency" concept was simply the fulfillment of the original
^Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, 51-53.
44Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, vii.
45
"What, Another Hoover Commission?" Public Administration
Review XXVIII (March/April 1968): 170-71.
72
Ash council reco.nendations.46 Nixon , s _ ieanc
toward placing the blame for reorganization resistance ^
the cabinet and not on bureaucrats as a whole. As he
noted in his autobiography later, bureaucrats need di-
rection which "captured" Cabinet officers cannot pro-
vide. 47 Nixon did not mask his agreement with that be-
lief, announcing even as early as March 14, 1969 that he
Planned to move reluctant holdovers from office as soon as
possible, long before Nathan ascribes that motive to Nixon
only after the 1970-71 legislative failures. 48
The irony of Nixon's reorganization effort lies in
the fact that many considered the plan too quick to give
up power, rather than finding its essence in the consoli-
dation of power in the White House. 49 m fact, the
greater irony, as Peri Arnold points out, is that "Nixon
failed in further centralizing executive branch organi-
zation because government was not centralized enough to
give him adequate political leverage to accomplish that
end. "50 critics of the plan argued that the reorgani-
zation effort created too many changes too quickly.
Editorialists throughout the country concentrated on the
46Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, 68-69.
47Richard Nixon, In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory^
Defeat and Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990)279-80.
48Nixon: The First Year of His Presidency (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1970), 16-A.
49see, for example, Roy Ash's testimony in "Reorganization
of Executive Departments," 190-91.
50Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 301.
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political difficulties of passing such a wide sweeping
alteration of bureaucratic responsibility, but they placed
the blame for these difficulties on Congress, not the
president. indeed, most editorialists argued that the
"superagency" proposal was an idea long overdue. 51
Reviewing the plan in 1973, Douglas Fox argued that the
decentralizing effect of the plan would lessen the power
of the new department secretaries rather than increasing
their power to coordinate policy, making the overall
effect of decentralization a loss of administrative
efficiency and not an improvement. By turning power over
to state administrators in some cases, or field offices in
others, Fox noted secretaries would simply lose the
ability to exercise administrative control. Admini-
stration defenders also noted that the effort would lead
to less, not more, control over the functions of govern-
ment; of course, they argued, that was what was intended
from the beginning. 52 Long after leaving the White House,
John Ehrlichman claimed the reorganization efforts were an
effort to strengthen the Cabinet so that decentralization
could take place. Unless power was wrested from those who
had traditionally held government in place, no decentrali-
^See, for example, editorials from the Charlotte Observer
(January 26, 1971), Salt Lake Tribune (January 24, 1971),
St. Louis Dispatch (January 24, 1971) and the Dallas
Morning News (January 26, 1971) in Editorials on File 2
(January 16-31, 1971): 76-81.
52 Price, With Nixon , 1977, 196-97.
74
zation plan could succeed irk-u u. Ehrlichman even suggests in
his account of the Nixon years that the expansion of the
White House staff duties was a desperate last resort, not
Part of a general, preconceived plot to take power. 53
Without question, the simultaneous centralization and
decentralization of government accounts for much of the
confusion surrounding Nixon's reorganization proposals.™
as Nathan himself explained in 1975, Nixon's fundamental
aim was decentralization:
Despite the fact that both decentral-izing and centralizing proposals were
part of the Nixon program, the im-
portant direction of change was de-
centralization. Coming at the end of
a 3 0-year period in which the pre-
dominate trend of domestic policy hadbeen to increase the responsibility of
the national government, Nixon's pro-
gram marked an important shift. 55
By the time these proposals were made, however, Nixon was
struggling to pass even modest revenue sharing reforms.
The widespread reaction to a second round of reorgani-
zation was negative and the proposals were given little
chance of passage. 5 ^ instead, Nixon concentrated his
bJEhrlichman, Witness to Power . 1982, 210-12.
54Evans and Novak, Nixon in the White House . 1971, 241-43.
55Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, 22-23.
56Richard Nathan, Allen Manvel and Susannah Calkins,
Monitoring Revenue Sharing (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1975), 59-69.
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Political efforts on passing
.venue snaring. ^organi-
zation would have to take place through different means.
Nixon considered altering his reorganization strategy
from legislative initiatives to one of reform from within-
after the 1972 election, a general shakeup of the Cabinet
took place. Nixon had found that he could not rely on his
earlier appointees to follow his orders to replace Demo-
cratic holdovers who were hostile to the administration
and its initiatives. Understood in the context of
"Protecting turf rather than political hostility, Nixon's
comments in his later autobiographical account of the
Cabinet shakeup become clear: "I could only console
myself with the determination that ... I would not make the
same mistake of leaving the initiative [to control indi-
vidual departments and force change] to individual Cabinet
members. "57 The administration made some ambiguous at-
tempts at subjecting new appointees to political loyalty
tests. The ambiguity can be explained, at least in part,
by Nixon's early antipathy to loyalty tests and his sur-
prisingly lackadaisical attitude toward the political
loyalty of the early appointees . 58 Appointees with little
political experience were chosen, and Nixon increasingly
chose individuals with no independent public standing of
their own, reducing the chance the appointee would feel
loyal to some interest or group whose political support
57Nixon, RN, 1990, 355-56.
58Cabinets and Counselors . 1989, 28.
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had helped secure the Dositinn t~POSl lo
-
Loyalty was stressed, but
the execution of orders was valued above personal or
Political fidelity. Nixon , s clear go£Q ^ ^^ ^
executive branch responsive to the presidents will, not a
mere mirror image of himself. 59 ThuS/ Nixon turned fcQ ^
politically costly alternative of the "administrative
presidency- as the "superagency" reforms guietly died in
committee. 60 Both the
- superagency" and politicization
strategies came to a halt, however, as the White House
became preoccupied with the Watergate scandal. 61
^ "Centralized" Dejcejxfcray^a£ioni Budget
The second major domestic policy initiative in the
administration's first years was revenue sharing. Al-
though Nixon spent little time on domestic policy, revenue
sharing was the single new budgetary initiative (aside
from reorganization of 0MB) Nixon pursued. 62 The concept
59Nelson Polsby, "Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons
for the Political System," Political Science Quarterly 93(Spring, 1978): 16-17.
60Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 299.
61Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 65-67;
Reichley, Conservatives in an Ace of Change . 1981, 244-45.
62Tom Wicker uses revenue sharing as a prime example of
the misinterpretation of the priority given to domestic
policy by Nixon; while revenue sharing was certainly
never as important to Nixon as winning the war in Vietnam,
Wicker argues it would be a mistake to conclude Nixon was
not concerned with domestic issues. War, according to
77
of revenue sharing was importanh i-o m-t t Nixon, and had been
very much on his mind during the 1968 campaign.63 Revenue
sharing was the centerpiece of Nixon- s concept of "New
Federalism," a more general plan to complete the overall
Plan of decentralization. 64 New Federalism was to sort
out responsibility for domestic action. Like reorgani-
zation, it consisted of a variety of plans to centralize
and decentralize elements of the budget, both between the
federal and state governments and within individual de-
partments. Services delivered to communities were tar-
geted to be decentralized, while certain elements of the
domestic agenda would remain in federal control. 65
Nixon planned to use revenue sharing to accomplish
the first element of New Federalism. 66 Like the concept
of a Domestic Council, revenue sharing had first been
proposed during the Johnson Administration. The National
Governor's Conference called for revenue sharing in 1966,
followed by the recommendation of revenue sharing by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1967
and the National Commission on Urban Problems in 1968.67
Wicker, hides the relative importance of domestic policy
to a president. See Wicker, One of Us . 1991, 412.
63Richard Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 38-39.
64 Safire, Before the Fall . 1977. 275-76.
65Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, 18-19.
66Nixon: The Fi rst Year of His Presidency . 1970, 66.
Nathan, Manvel, and Calkins, Monitoring Revenue Sharing ,
1975, 14.
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Nixon announced his intentions for the general reve-
rnue sharing program on August 8, 1969, stressing its
importance for his overall plan to decentralize govern-
ment. The original proposal was guite modest, asking for
only $5 00 million to be returned in 1971, but Nixon plan-
ned to raise the stakes to $5 billion by 1975.68 The
modesty of Nixon
-s original proposal belied its explosive
political effect. Nixon knew that even a slight re-
structuring of the normal budgetary relationship between
the federal government and the states would be met with
resistance by those who traditionally controlled such
power. indeed, the response from Congress was swift.
House Ways and Means Chair Wilbur Mills was particularly
adamant in his opposition to the proposal, recognizing its
potential and arguing the bill meant money would be
funnelled to larger states who had the least need for new
funds. 69 He re fUsed to schedule hearings on the bill
during the 91st Congress. 70 Nixon stood his political
ground, however, and was unwilling to surrender his
efforts to have revenue sharing enacted. 71 Indeed, Nixon
devoted a great deal of time to revenue sharing, demon-
68Nathan, Manvel and Calkins, Monitoring Revenue shanna
1975, 15-16.
69Jerry Voorhis, The Strange Case of Richard Milhous Nixon
(New York: Paul S. Eriksson, Inc., 1972), 132-34.
7 0Nathan, Manvel and Calkins, Monitoring Revenue sharing.
1975, 16. *
71The Nixon Pres idential Press Conferences (London:
Heyden Press, 1978), 251-252.
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strating an uncharacteristic interest in t-v^ , ,j-nt st: m he complexities
of domestic legislative initiatives. He enthusiastically
lobbied congress for passage and, later, reconsideration
John Ehrlichman noted that Nixon "involved himself fre-
quently" in the legislative battle, something Nix0n often
declined to do and found personally distasteful ( Nix0n
disliked, in his own words, the "buddy-buddy" wheeling and
dealing of the legislative process72 ). But Ehrlichman
reports that Nixon made himself available "virtually on
request" where revenue sharing was concerned, making it "a
personal issue. "73 while those initial efforts were frus-
trated by Mills, Nixon^s initiative gained widespread
support among local government officials (understandably)
and a groundswell of support for the concept of revenue
sharing began to build. 74
in some ways, Mills's obstinacy actually worked to
the advantage of the Nixon administration. By delaying
action on the proposal until the next congress, Mills gave
Nixon enough time to persuade the public to the necessity
for decentralization through revenue- sharing. Nixon spent
a great deal of time developing the details of the revenue
sharing proposal, making it his top domestic policy issue
in 197 0 and 1971 and ordering the Treasury Department to
72Wicker, One of Us . 1991, 205-6.
73Wicker, One of Us . 1991, 527.
74Paul Dommel, The Politics of Revenue Sharing
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 91-93.
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release a large amount of information documenting some of
the details of the new bill to the public. 75 Revenue
sharing became the centerpiece of Nixon's state of the
anion address in January 1971. The speech was unusual in
that it did not mention foreign policy (even as the Viet-
nam war raged) and focused on Nixon, s plan to change the
national-state-local government balance of power. Earlier
in the winter, and throughout the spring of 1971, Nixon
devoted an uncharacteristically large amount of time to
lobbying Congress, laying the groundwork for a new legi-
slative initiative on revenue sharing. 76 By June< the
Administration had proposed an even larger revenue sharing
bill, and Mills had little choice but to reverse his
earlier opposition.
Mills began hearings on the Administration bill on
June 2, 1971, but only on the condition that his own
version of revenue sharing was considered as an alter-
native. A bill introduced by Russel Long, chair of the
Senate Finance Committee was reported out of committee on
April 17
,
1972, with much stronger limits on revenue
sharing priorities. A revenue sharing bill was passed in
the House on June 22. In the Senate, Long put aside the
Family Assistance Plan then under consideration and took
75Stephen Ambrose, Nixon; The Triumph of a Politician.
1962-1972 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 398-99;
Dommel, The Politics of Revenue Sharing . 1974, 96-98.
7
^Domm<
112-14
6 el, The Politics of Revenue Sharing . 1974, 103-4,
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up the revenue sharing proposal. The Finance Committee
reported favorably on the bill on August 16. and a Con-
ference Committee worked out the differences in the
formulas for revenue sharing which existed between the two
houses. The final version was signed into law by Nixon on
October 20. 1972, and given the title "State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act. "" Nixon aiscussed his decigion tQ
sign the bill during his October 28, 1972 radio address,
linking revenue sharing to "..decision making power, and
the means to carry out those decisions, are flowing back
to the grassroots. 1,78
As Nixon managed to press Congress on his revenue
sharing plans, he was moderately successful at removing
administrative control over local programs from federal
agencies and placing it on the states. If anything, Nixon
was even more determined to expand decentralization in the
second administration. 7 9 Nixon encouraged the further
expansion of revenue sharing in 1974, pressing passage in
a Congress which was quite hostile to his administration.
Indeed, Nixon pursued revenue sharing reforms long after
such legislation was politically viable, and even as he
''Nathan, Manvel and Calkins, Monitoring Revenue Sharing.
1975, 16-19.
78The Clearest Choice (Committee to Re-Elect the
President, 1972), 45.
79Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, 70-73.
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undermined his own efforts by simultaneously pressing a
new round of reorganization. 80
Later critics argued that Nixon's revenue sharing
Plan was simply a budgetary device to limit spending or a
"backdoor" method for eliminating unwanted programs. 81 As
Richard Nathan points out, however, such hasty dismissals
fail to capture the complexity of Nixon's intentions for
decentralization though revenue sharing:
According to the latter view, Nixon
simply decentralized the programs hedid not like. I submit that these
interpretations, emphasizing con-
servatism and negativism in the domes-
tic policies of the Nixon years, are
too simple and, in many areas, are
unduly influenced by later events -
Watergate, the White House "plumbers"
and Nixon's resignation. 82
The true aim of revenue sharing, like reorganization, was
decentralization. in essence, revenue sharing acted much
like reorganization: it removed power from Washington and
returned it to the "grassroots ." 83 This made revenue
sharing and reorganization targets for Congressional and
bureaucratic resistance, increasing Nixon's insistence
that further revenue sharing and reorganization efforts
80Nathan, Manvel and Calkins, Monitoring Revenue Sharing .
1975, 19.
8lReichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change . 1981, 172.
82Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, 26.
83william Gormley, Taming the Bureaucracy . 1989), 176-77.
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were needed. The irony of „„».. reform efforts lay i»
the feet that the more successful Nixon was at aohieving
reform, the less successful future reform efforts would
be, as each victory would be more likely to increase the
resistance of those who traditionally wielded admini-
strative power.
By turning this power over certain elements of the
budget to decentralized federal offices and the states,
Nixon created new flexibility in the way money would be
used and accounted for and avoided the necessity to
exercise central control himself. 84 under the best
political arrangement, local governments would control
this money directly. For example, Nixon linked revenue
sharing to the new freedom and responsibility of urban
managers to run their cities, noting in a November 1, 1972
radio speech that "The goal of all these proposals is to
make government responsive again to the voice of the aver-
age citizen. "85 Like reorganization, revenue sharing also
came under criticism for decentralizing government past a
safe point of control. Critics claimed that the executive
branch might lose even more power to set national goals
under such a program. 86 Additionally, some people feared
that the unpredictable nature of state governments would
04The Nixon Presidential News Conferences . 1978, 150-51.
85<rhe Clearest Choice . 1972, 60-61.
86Michael Reagan, The New Federalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1972), 96-101.
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permit fiscally irresponsible state legislatureg ^ decide
how to spend revenue which had been returned to the
states. 87 la the end
, fchese
sharing might create poorer delivery of government ser-
vices at all administrative levels.
With revenue sharing in place, Nixon- s attention had
returned to reorganization. The two policies were thus
intertwined, although separated in their legislative form,
and the only real obstacle to decentralization Nixon faced
was new arrangement of the executive branch. Given the
success of revenue sharing, the reorganization program
gained even greater importance in Nixon plans: without
reorganization, newly decentralized programs would come
into conflict with bureaucratic controls. 88 At the same
time, however, Nixon's increased success in one arena of
reform seemed to lead to less success in the other arena,
as members of Congress nervously reacted to their loss of
power. Rather than compromise in one arena or the other,
Nixon pressed for success in both, and ultimately failed
in both. Nevertheless, revenue sharing remains a point of
pride for the former president. In a 1984 interview, he
remarked "There was a feeling, despite the way [my] ad-
ministration ended, that at least it was an administration
that knew what it was doing.
. .Domestic affairs, despite
87Nixon: The Firs t Year of His Presidgnny
. 1970, 67-68.
88Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, 8.
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the fact we did not have the Congress, we got (sic)
revenue sharing and environmental programs .•• 8 9
C. Exnla-im'nlng the Nixon Decisions: Tr^u^n.i M~1rl -
Nixon's administrative choices present a difficult
problem for the "rational decider" explanation of presi-
dential behavior. On the one hand, Neustadt and others
argue that presidents must increase their power to per-
suade by demonstrating tenacity and skill, increasing
public prestige and their reputation of being "tough." On
the other hand, Neustadt portrays Nixon as a president who
demonstrated these qualities and failed. Neustadt attri-
butes staff deficiencies to the Nixon White House "coun-
ter-bureaucracy" which, to some degree, echoed the "staff
system" of the Eisenhower presidency. That system is
damaged by loyal staff members who view power as hier-
archical in nature, leading to a misguided sense of
loyalty to the president and reducing the amount of dis-
sent and discussion within the White House (in fact, Neu-
stadt intimates Nixon learned this unfortunate organi-
zational lesson from Ike). 90 The reSult, claims Neustadt,
was an "'administrative presidency that could guarantee
89Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 25.
90Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1980), 117-19.
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Nixon or his agents mastery at any time of anybody's
choices, anywhere on the domestic side of government . "91
But the irony of this critique comes from the advice
Neustadt and others give to modern presidents: learn to
persuade and, ultimately, control the government. The
power to achieve one
• s goals is the aim of persuasion, and
Neustadt 's measure of a "successful" presidency is one
where achievement of goals is the end of political de-
cision making. As Chapter One points out, this locks
Neustadt into the "bias trap" of reading a president's
goals as the rational cause of presidential action. if a
president acts in a manner which seems to undermine or
contradict those posited goals, the president must be
making grave mistakes or acting "irrationally". Thus,
Neustadt explains presidential "failures" as either errors
in political judgement or "irrational" behavior.
When this standard is applied to the Nixon decisions,
however, the limits of the "rational decider" model become
clear, when the second set of reorganization plans were
announced, Neustadt hardly considered Nixon's efforts a
mistake in political judgement, claiming "It's not very
new.. It's not as different as it looks. All this is a
determined effort to get control of the details and opera-
tions of the executive establishment. Mr. Nixon was not
the first president who wanted to do this. However, his
91Neustadt, Presidential Power . 1980, 198-200
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is the most intensive effort that I oan recall..M ^
the last sentence would seem to indicate that Neustadt was
troubled by Nixon . s approach< ^ of ^
seems to suggest he was merely surprised by the vigor with
which Nixon pursued change, as were several other politi-
cal scientists interviewed for the same Nation^ .t^.-.
article.
indeed, Nixon followed a pattern of presidential be-
havior which did not seem odd or in error for the modern
presidency. As Peri Arnold points out, the expectation of
the "managerial presidency" requires this type of control.
Arnold concludes that presidents pursue reorganization
precisely because they need to build reputation and pres-
tige. He specifically argues that Nixon's ambitions for
reorganization were not idiosyncratic but "..were charac-
teristic of the modern presidency. " 93 Elsewhere, Arnold
describes Nixon's handling of the Ash Council's recom-
mendations and the later transfer of power from the
"experts" at OMB to the political side of the admini-
stration as an effort to "tame" the departments and in-
crease presidential power. 94 Arnold concludes that the
92Dom Bonafede, "President Nixon's Executive
Reorganization Plans Prompt Praise and Criticism,"
Nationa l Journal 5 (March 10, 1973): 339.
JArnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 361-63,
302 .
9 4Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 273,
294, 356; see also Crenson and Rourke, "By Way of
Conclusion," 161-62.
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"Watergate" syndrome obscured this desire from the obser-
ver's attention:
^6^ifferent in faCt and P^nciplefrom the mass of questionable, covert
activities of the Nixon administra-
tion, those final, unilateral reor-
ganization efforts of the administra-
tion appeared to melt into the mass of
suspicious activities conducted by a
chief executive who seemed not to
recognize the limitations imposed by
the regime in which he worked. 95
Therein lies the task of the modern "managerial presi-
dency": if presidents wish to act, they must control.
Why would a president take on such a task, if control is
so difficult? Arnold does not answer that question
directly, suggesting that the need to make political
choices "come alive" might drive presidents to reorgani-
zation. But Arnold stops short of examining these
choices, and instead relies on the "rational decider"
model for explaining why presidents would choose to engage
in reorganization efforts. 96
The Neustadt model fails to adequately explain
Nixon's decisions, however. Presidents must control the
administrative process if they wish to succeed. If presi-
dents must control government to avoid the appearance of
frustration and build reputation and prestige, Neustadt
95Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 273.
96Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency , 1986, 361-63.
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:er-
seems to imply that they must^ ^ ^
cracy. In fact/ Neustadt ^ ^
to learn this lesson. On the other hand, it is precisely
this control which Neustadt argues led directly to Wat
gate. 97 The political go&1 Qf ^ ^^.^ ^
the strategic choices which lead to control. Neustadt 's
model is thus caught in a dilemma where the goal is under-
mined by the means to achieving that goal. m a sense,
Neustadt wishes to have it both ways: Presidents should
control without being controlling.
To save his model, Neustadt finds it necessary to
separate Nixon from other presidents by distinguishing
Nixon as a person. His focus turns to Nixon's "tempera-
ment, » arguing that one must be careful to "beware the
insecure" when selecting presidents . 98 Elsewhere, Neu-
stadt claims that Nixon's own failings led to his "admini-
strative presidency." Had Nixon been a better judge of
character, more discriminating in whom he placed trust,
more careful to whom he divested power, Neustadt implies,
Nixon would have been a successful president. 99 In the
end, Neustadt relies more on a "personality" model of
behavior than the model he is advancing in the remainder
of his book. Eisenhower's and Truman's failures are de-
Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency, . 1986, 157;
K1 ein, Making It Perfectly Clear . 1980, 357.
98Neustadt, Presidential Power . 1980, 182-83.
"Neustadt, Presidential Power . 1980, 169-70, 189.
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scribed as bad choicesn x , not personality faults. But, it
seems, Nixon is the victim of his own character. Thus,
Neustadt can keep his model of control and simply warn
that the "right person" must be at the helm.
Perhaps Neustadt might reply by arguing that Nixon
merely "overlearned" the lesson of control and that a
moderate middle ground between loyalty and obstruction
might be found. However, the consequences of Nixon's
efforts would have further undermined Neustadt s notion of
persuasion. As argued below, Nixon's proposed reorgani-
zation and program of revenue sharing were reflections of
his desire to surrender power, not increase it. Other
observers, like Richard Nathan, argue that Nixon specifi-
cally rejected the idea of "persuasion" when he moved away
from Cabinet control of domestic policy. 100 ultimately,
Nixon's attempt to alter the bureaucratic setting of his
administration and to promote and expand decentralization
through revenue sharing was seen as a hopeless attempt at
change. Further, the methods for change Nixon selected
decreased, not enhanced, his prestige by increasing the
determination of the bureaucracy and Congress to resist
his efforts at persuasion and, later, control. 101 Thus,
100Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, 41-43.
LU
-LSee the admonitions in Rufus Miles, "Considerations for
a President Bent on Reorganization," Public Administration
Review 37 (March/April 1977): 161-62; James March and
John Olson, "Organizing Political Life: What
Administrative Reorganization Tells Us About Government,"
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the values Nixon sought to put into action through reor-
ganization and revenue sharing are not reflected in the
apparent goal Neustadt assu.es Nixon must possess: the
increase of power. The "rational decider" model does not
consider the possibility that action to increase the power
to persuade may, in fact, ultimately undermine that power.
The Nixon initiatives on reorganization and revenue
sharing cast similar shadows on the "personality" model of
presidential behavior. James David Barber argues that
Nixon is the classic
"active-negative" type, thirsting for
independence and power. Nixon felt a need for "getting,
holding and protecting power." Thus, Barber describes
Nixon as "..power seeking
... [his] life is a hard struggle
to achieve and hold power... "102 Barber's interpretation
of Nixon as an "active-negative" seemed to be confirmed by
the events surrounding Watergate. Indeed, a small indus-
try of "Nixon analysis" boomed in the early 1970 's. Old
opponents like Frank Mankiewicz argued that Nixon had only
a "..limitless appetite for victory.. No one can point to a
Nixon ideology, beyond winning the next election..."
Others went further to argue that Nixon was seeking in his
staff the earlier loyalty provided by his mother, that he
was "anal compulsive" in his desire for power, and that
even his appearance reflected the evil nature of his
American Political Science Review 77 (June 1983): 285-86;
Price, With Nixon . 1977, 194-96.
James David Barber, Presidential Character (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 299, 362, 322, 9.
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character.103 Herbert parmefc ^
even
.ore forcefully in his recent biography on Nixon:
Once the depth of the abuse of powerhad been revealed, there was an in-
satiable appetite for psychological
explanations which, of course, was notunique to Nixon. But noteworthy inhis case was the shelfful of volumes
specifically devoted to psychobio-
graphical dissections. They scruti-
nized every known aspect of his life
most particularly as gleaned from
'
early accounts and contemporary inter-
views. They concluded that he was apsychopathic liar, needed maternal
love, disdained his father, and was sofull of aggression that he loved
mashing potatoes, which was read asproof that he needed outlets for his
inner hostilities. 104
Contemporaneous evaluations of Nixon's reorganization and
revenue sharing efforts belie these backward glances, how-
ever, as described earlier, Nixon did not turn to staff
control of the domestic agenda immediately upon taking
office, and did so only after he began to experience
legislative defeats and dissension within his Cabinet.
Nor, as also noted earlier, was the reaction to Nixon's
reorganization plans universally negative. The pre-
dominant mood, even after the more ambitious "superagency"
103 Frank Mankiewicz, Perfectly Clear: Nixon from Whittier
to Watergate (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), 2; David
Abrahamsen, Nixon Versus Nixon; An Emotional Tragedy (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976), 184, 180-81.
104Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 16.
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Proposal was unveiled, was approval and some condescen-
sion: many thought that Nixon was simply naive to believe
Power could ever be wrested from Congress or the bureau-
cracy. The "personality, model argues that those inclina-
tions should have been present at the start of the Nixon
administration, while the record suggests that Nixon did
not turn to the devices Barber attributes to his
-type"
until much later in the administration.
Moreover, recent works have begun to cast doubts on
the evidence collected by these various armchair psycho-
biographers. Stephen Ambrose's recent two volume bio-
graphy of Nixon, for example, argues that Nixon had a
comparatively normal and, in some respects, somewhat
privileged childhood for a Depression-era family: his
parents were much more loving than previously believed,
and Nixon showed greater amounts of self-esteem than
Barber suggests. 105 Peri Arnold agrees, arguing that
Nixon's behavior is reflective of forces beyond per-
sonality:
The appearance is that President
Nixon's ambitions for reorganization
were part and parcel of the same
personal flaws that led to his misuse
of power. However this appearance is
false, and it may even put things
backwards. Nixon's ambitions for re-
organization were not idiosyncratic;
they were characteristic of the modern
105Robert Strong, "Richard Nixon Revisited," Virginia
Quarterly Review 64 (Summer 1988): 526-27.
94
spresidency... The imperative of themanagerial presidency was that thePresidents must control. If reorgani«txon could not arrange govern^tTomake It controllable, then perhapsother means to that goal are justi-liable. 10 °
As noted earlier, Arnold's explanation for Nixon's choice
fails to account for these choices completely. Yet
, it is
worth noting that personality does not seem to be the
critical factor for shaping those decisions.
Barbers analysis is undermined further when one
considers the ultimate intention of reorganization and
revenue sharing. Nixon's decision to reorganize was an
integral element to his plan to turn administrative power
over to the states and individuals through revenue
sharing, without reorganization, revenue sharing decen-
tralization would not have occurred. 107 If Nixon desired
power, he selected a mode of reorganization and budgeting
specifically at odds with that desire. Again, the posited
values that are attributed to Nixon are not evidenced in
Nixon's behavior, and Barber's assumptions about Nixon's
values provide a poor explanation of the president ' s de-
cisions
.
UbArnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 302.107Moe, "Traditional Organizational Principles and the
Managerial Presidency," 130-31; Nathan, The Plot That
Failed
. 1975, 8.
95
D. Explain
^^o^ecision,. . , 1rr1 . |r
A better accounting of Nixon« behavior might be
found in the "belief system" model
. By lQoking ^ &
consistently held "system," one can better explain the
selection of Nixon- s administrative strategy. Nixon
s
strident ant i-communism and keen interest in foreign
policy tended to obscure his political belief system. On
the other hand, that system was consistent with his con-
cern, nearing obsession, to oppose communism. From 1950
on, the subject of communism was Nixon's strongest theme
when giving speeches, swallowing references to issues
which otherwise might have been given his attention. Just
as his focus on foreign policy can be mistaken for a lack
of concern in domestic issues, however, one would be mis-
taken to assume that Nixon revealed no political beliefs
for the domestic agenda. 108
Like many presidents, Nixon has been classified as a
"conservative," "pragmatic," and even "liberal" president.
Those classifications suffer the "bias trap" noted in
Chapter One, however, and lead to the erroneous conclusion
that Nixon had no political beliefs when he fails to fit
neatly into one of the categories. 10 9 This "bias trap"
also led to the charge that Nixon was merely a political
108Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 298.
109 See, at various points, Parmet, Richard Nixon and Hi
a
America
. 1990, esp. 58-60.
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opportunist, supporting liberal positions Qnoe ^
because they were politically acceptable and turning his
back on "true conservative principle., when such action
would be too politically costly. HO The key vglues hela
by Nixon revolve around his interpretation of individual
freedom. Specifically, Nixoa oriented his political views
toward increasing individual control over one's own
life. HI According to Nixon's belief system, government
intervention can undermine this control, and Nixon main-
tained throughout his political career the principle that
local government is always the preferred source of inter-
ference, if such interference is necessary, only under a
specific set of circumstances is national action desired
(unlike carter and, more importantly, Reagan, as the next
two chapters will demonstrate) . H2
Most observers attribute Nixon's dissatisfaction with
the bureaucracy to his partisan conflict with remaining
Democratic appointees, and Nixon himself occasionally
slipped into this language. But a deeper disdain for
government interference underscores this attitude, and
Nixon's desire to undermine bureaucratic control of
domestic policy predates his own administration. His
early experience working for the OPA during the Roosevelt
110Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 79, 116.111Reichley, Conservatives in an Acre of change . 1981, 56;
Price, With Nixon . 1977, 47-48.
112 For early Nixon views on the subject, see James Keogh,
This is Nixon (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1956), 82.
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years seemed to £irst sour ^ ^
despite the fact that he had gone to Washington with
confidence that more could he done by the government to
help individuals hit hard by the Depression. Nixon noted
that after that experience "1 took a very dim view of
controls. » explaining unrestrained power in the hands of
bureaucrats was to be feared above other uses of power. 113
That fear of unrestrained power, ironic in light of the
Watergate revelations, was also directed at "big busi-
ness." Nixon was no more trustful of so much power in
private hands than public. H*
Nixon was extolling the virtues of individual control
and decrying the power of "irresponsible government agen-
cies" as early as 1945, the beginning of his political
career, arguing (as he later would when justifying revenue
sharing) that individual control is critical to initiative
and democracy. 115 At a Lincoln Day dinner in 1946, Nixon
took the opportunity to depart from discussions of foreign
policy and attacked the Truman administration for re-
placing "individual enterprise" with a "planned economy"
which removed individual control over life. 1!* His first
election circular called for "..a sound progressive pro-
gram in which government will work with and through pri-
H 3 Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 67.H 4Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 62.H 5Reichley, Conservatives in an Acre of Change . 1981, 46;
Keogh, This is Nixon . 1956, 79-86.
parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 29.
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vate enterprise, toward our goal of assuring housing,
clothing, food, education, and opportunity for every
American. "117
These core political beliefs also shaped Nixon-
s
behavior once he took office. His 1947 support of the
Taft-Hartley bill was justified as an attempt to release
the fetters of control from the working class, which Nixon
believed would become an inherently inferior class if
overregulated and overprotected. 118 0ne biographer
credits Nixon-
s concern for individual economic progress
as the cause for Nixon's decidedly progressive views on
civil rights, reflected throughout his service in Congress
and during the Eisenhower administration. As vice Presi-
dent, Nixon advocated spending to improve the nation's
infrastructure, also with the goal of increasing indi-
vidual enterprise. H9
Nixon's 1950 Senate campaign set these ideas out with
greater clarity and force. in his campaign speech notes
for that contest, Nixon stressed his opposition to com-
munism, telling a friend "That's all the people want to
Parmet, Richard Nixon and His Amerioa . 1990, 96.118Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 130-31.
119Wicker, One of Us. 1991, 180. Parmet gives Nixon
credit for being much more vocal and aggressive on
individual economic rights for blacks than most fellow
Republicans. He later argues this same view led Nixon to
his concern for "black capitalism." See Parmet, Richard
Nixon and His America . 1990, 267-69, 546.
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hear about „ But
, as hig notes suggegt
^ Nixon ^ a
domestic agenda in mind as well:
L^ET
St
^f
Wlth ne^tive opposition -
xndefensxble position - opposition tosecurity, wages, housing, medical
care. We must believe & sell ideas
thfn
WS
,T °ffer a System which ^eets
aovt aid ^
tt6r
"
bY receivi^ Minimumg & maximum ind [ependent] en-terprise & voluntary cooperative
effort [Nixon's abbreviations] . 120
Nixon's campaign continued to oppose "compulsory regi-
mentation" on major domestic issues (health care was a
prime example). 121
Nor was this criticism confined to Democratic admini.
strations, as many Nixon observers claim. Nixon argued
that such power in Republican hands was equally intrusive
and dangerous, and erroneously believed Eisenhower recog-
nized the same problem. This view even led Nixon to call
for a retrenchment of Republican government during the
1956 campaign, arguing the protection of individual free-
dom demanded greater attention. 122 During his campaign
for the presidency in 1960, Nixon argued that "terrible
hazards" would emerge if government were allowed to con-
tinue to interfere with the lives of citizens. 123 The
120Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 190.
121parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 189.122Ambrose/ Nixon, 1989, 328-29; Keogh, This is Nixon .
1956, 80-81, 158-59.
l23Earl Mazo, Richard Nixon: A Political and Personal
Portrait (New York: Harper and Row, 1959) 282-83.
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contrast that HiXOn drew hetWeen oommjnism ^
during that campaign also ref leoted these fce_
liefs.124
Nixon repeated this theme during the 1968 and 1972
Presidential contests. 125 During the 1968 ^
argued that "Government is formed to protect the indi-
vidual's life, property and rights, and to help the help-
less
-
not to dominate a person's life or rob him of his
self-respect. "126 William Safire notes that Nixon in-
sisted on adding the following to a speech to be delivered
on October 11
,
-one candidate advocates concentrating
more and more power in the federal government; I say it
is time for new policies which will move power away from
Washington back to the states, local governments and the
people. "127 while Nixon clearly preferred state and local
government to federal intervention, he rarely dis-
tinguished between the two. when he did so, he con-
sistently made reference to local government as being
closest to the people. Even during his 1963-67 exile from
politics, Nixon continued to speak on the theme of de-
l24Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 353-54.
125Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, Nixon: A Political
Portrait (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 314-15; The
Clearest Choice
. 1972, 20-23, 45, 60-61.
126Safire, Before the Fall . 1977, 61.
127safire, Before the Fall . 1977, 95.
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centralists and the in,ortanoe Qf ^ ^
local communities. 12
8
At the beginning of Nixon's administration, these
Political bei iefs Bere meanfc tQ aot ag a guiae
luring the early first months, while he still retained
confidence in the Cabinet as an agency for change, Nixon
circulated a copy of John Gardner's Godwin lectures, which
had recently been delivered at Harvard. Nixon attached a
note to his cabinet members and White House staff, saying
in part »I found John Gardner's Godlcin lectures expressed
better than anything I have read what I hope would be the
Philosophy of this administration." ln the circulated
copy of the lectures, Nixon made a point of underlining
the parts of Gardner's argument calling for putting faith
in private, not public, institutions and the need to re-
store the "vitality of local leadership" over centralized
planning. 12 9
As alluded to earlier, Nixon made these beliefs the
centerpiece of his attack on the Great Society, giving his
words a partisan edge but keeping the focus of his criti-
cism of Democratic policies on their undermining effect on
individual and community life. 13 0 As Tom wicker noteg/
Nixon's opposition to bureaucratic power had little to do
12 8Richard M. Nivnn. ed. Howard Bremer (Dobbs Ferry, New
York: Oceana Publications, 1975), 95
12 9^Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 533-34.
130Reichley, Conservatives in an Aae of Chance . 1981, 169;
Nixon, In the Arena . 1990, 352.
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with the Democrats still i„ the bureauoracy
_ The pres ._
dent's views were brought with him to Washington, and were
not shaped by the Washington bureaucracy at the time he
took office:
Nixon actually had a certain definabledomestic vision, a commodity not everypresident has brought to the White
House: he wanted, and to some extent
achieved, a government doing what
needed to be done for the welfare ofthe nation, but doing it with a di-
minished concentration of power in
Washington. 13 1
Nixon remained, in the words of one observer, "sur-
prisingly constant" in his application of those beliefs to
domestic policy, through efforts at reorganization and his
unwillingness to compromise on revenue sharing when pre-
sented to Congress. 132 This determination and consistency
led Richard Nathan to conclude that Nixon's decentrali-
zation plan was hardly one of political expedience (as one
might expect Neustadt to argue), since it called for the
decentralization of a broad range of categories and made
numerous enemies. 133
131wicker, One of Us . 1991, 540-41.
132Nathan, The Plot That Failed. 1975, 16; Rather and
Gates
'
The Palace Guard, 1974, 231-32; John Osborne, The
Second Year of the Nixon Watch (New York: Liveright
Press, 1971), 148-49; and, more generally, Nixon
Presidential Press Conferences. 1978, 251-52 and Dommel,
The Politics of Revenue Sharing
. 1974, 111-12 for his
determined attitude on revenue sharing.
133Nathan, The Plot That Failed . 1975, 22-23, 26.
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One might even argue N . xon , s ^^^^ fr . enaships ^_
fleet this set of core political beiiefs
, at the risfc Qf
engaging in revisionist
•psychobiography. - Nixon aia have
few close friends, and the people who did get close to him
were all "self-made" entrepreneurs: Don Kendall, Robert
Abplanalp, and Bebe Reboso. to name the more important
friends
.
13 *
Far from being an opportunist or mere pragmatist,
Nixon held a core set of beliefs throughout his career and
during some very different periods of history. Herbert
Parmet neatly summarized those beliefs in his recent bio-
graphy of Nixon, listing them as
..the encouragement of individual
enterprise, protection of those with
modest means from economic hazards as
the nation bumped along through the
uncertainties of reconversion, and a
consistent sense of nationalism and
realpolitik in dealing with the rest
of the world. 13 5
With these ideological goals in mind, the reasons for
Nixon's administrative strategy can be better understood.
A second important element of Nixon's belief system is his
well documented belief in the primacy of executive power.
Nixon viewed the president as the "tribune of the general
interests," acting for people in government and, in this
1 O A
Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America . 1990, 396, 400.
135Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America
. 1990, 116.
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case, even against govern.nent.136 It is lmportant ^ ^
cognise, however, thl. view did not include public PBrtl .
cipation in the process or governing. The people speak ,t
the ballot box, in Nixon's view and i-h.„a , a then expect the
president to act (in coita.hntrast to Jimmy Carter, as the next
chapter will demonstrate,.^ This presidential
is motivated by the ideological ends or, in Nixon's own
words, the "great goals" of a leader. 13 8 Until that
dominance was secured through the use of the Domestic
Council and, later, the
"counter-bureaucracy," the admini-
stration seemed to drift through domestic policy action.
Once that control was established, however, a clear pat-
tern of action emerged aimed at the goal of decentralizing
government .13 9
Additionally, revenue sharing was a necessity for
decentralization, without the revenue sharing plan, de-
centralization would be meaningless, as control over money
would give permanent control to Congress. By selectively
decentralizing the government through a program of revenue
sharing, Nixon hoped to return elements of government
power to the individual or local government. The inten-
Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, Politics. Position
and Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 110;
Reichley, Conservatives in an Aae of Change . 1981, 247.137Jules Witcover, Marathon (New York: viking Press
1977), 398-99.
138Nixon, In the Arena . 1990, 286-87.
139Theodore White, The Making of the President, 1972 (New
York: Atheneum Publishers, 1973), 180.
105
tion of revenue sharing was clear to all, and Congress
responded shortly after Nixon took office by taking hack
the power he had wrested from them. 140 As Tom wicker
Points out, Nixon- s revenue sharing approach was
...perhaps the most successful example
of h1S hope to reorder government
responsibilities so that necessary
services could be performed at the
most appropriate level... if revenue
sharxng did not come close to the
promised 'revolution,' it was still a
good try at redeeming government ... 141
Thus, the central dilemma of the Nixon domestic
agenda can be explained by examining Nixon's own dis-
position to decentralization and executive action, two
beliefs which created both centralization and decentrali-
zation, presidential control and political de-control,
greater regulation and self
-regulation, all at the same
time. 142 As Theodore White described the Nixon paradox in
1975:
[Nixon] held, as a leadership credo,
that the president must control the
government personally; but he held,
as a political credo, that the Federal
government must get rid of most of
140Nelson Polsby, "Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons
for the Political System, " Political Science Quarterly 93
(Spring 1978): 17; Safire, Before the Fall . 1977, 7.
141wicker, One of Us . 1991, 529.
142price / With Nixon. 1977, 76-77; Evans and Novak, Nixon
in the White House. 1971, 241-43; Reichley, Conservative
in an Age of Chance . 1981, 70.
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these controls- social, administra-tive, economic
- which the Democratshad so long concentrated in Washing-
ton. 14 3
The contradictory nature of the Nixon agenda, therefore,
can only be made intelligible through a better under-
standing of Nixon's "belief system."
3White, The Making of the President. 1972 . 1973, 181.
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CHAPTER III
BELIEFS AND FAILURE
: THE CARTER PRESIDENCY
An examination of the Carter presidency clearly re-
veals the troublesome role beliefs can play in decision
making: political beliefs can lead presidents to make
serious policy mistakes which can frustrate their own
success. This chapter will examine the administrative
strategies on reorganization and budgeting selected by
Carter and will demonstrate that Carter's beliefs led him
to pursue failed policies in both areas. The first and
second sections of this chapter outline the policy
decisions on reorganization and budgeting and the con-
sequences they produced. Section three analyzes these
decisions using the "rational decider" and "personality-
models, and argues that neither model can adequately
account for the decisions made by the president. The last
section reexamines the decisions in light of Carter's
political beliefs, and demonstrates that the "belief
system" model can better explain Carter's behavior.
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Eg«ni«inq ArtmlnWation, ^--rrrj^.
Jimmy Carter^ campaign for the presidency in 1976
was unusual in the stress it placed on administrative
reform. No previous candidate for that office made re-
organization a central theme in the campaign, but Carter
repeatedly stressed the need for change in the executive
branch, warning voters not to support him if they did not
support reform. 1 His campaign autobiography argued these
changes could be achieved because they had been successful
at the state level, including Carter's home state of Geor-
gia; the so-called "Georgia example" with reorganization
became a centerpiece of Carter's campaign speeches.
2
Carter's interest in the issue of reorganization was
further highlighted by the establishment of a working
group on reorganization planning during his campaign,
chaired by Harrison Wellford and staffed by a dozen
professional administrators. The group was charged with
developing recommendations for changes in federal organi-
zation and began their review of the executive branch
almost immediately. Their early recommendation for the
1John Dempsey, "Carter's Reorganization: A Midterm Ap-
praisal," Public Administration Review 39 (January/ Febru-
ary 1979) : 74.
2Jimmy Carter, Why Not the Best? (Nashville: Boardman,
1975), 105-16.
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eStablishment of a Deparfcment of Enew ^_
nounced by candidate Carter.
3
Carter recognized reorganization would not be an easy
matter, noting in the 1974 announcement of his candidacy
that "This is no job for the faint-hearted. It will be
met with violent opposition from those who enjoy a special
Privilege, those who prefer to work in the dark, or those
whose private fiefdoms are threatened. -4 The announcement
is particularly noteworthy in that Carter did not cite
more traditional goals for reorganization, such as ef-
ficiency or cost-effectiveness. instead, Carter intimated
his motivation lay in moving the control of administration
from private power to other hands. His plans to do so
were ambitious even in the face of this anticipated oppo-
sition. Early in his campaign, Carter announced that he
Planned to reduce the number of federal agencies from
1, 900 to 200 through reorganization. 5
Believing that swift action would be needed to
overcome the "violent opposition" he expected, the newly
inaugurated Carter quickly moved to begin his reorgani-
sed Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidgnry (Princeton-Princeton University Press, 1986), 308.
4The quotation is from Carter's 1974 announcement of hisintention to run for office. Quoted by Carter in "Remarksto Reporters Announcing the Executive Branch Reorgani-
zation Studies," Public Paners of fchg President-*, of fh.
United States, Jimmy Carter . Vol. II (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1978), 1192.
5Joel Havemann, "Reorganization - How Clean Can Carter's
Broom Sweep?" National Journal 9 (January 1, 1977): 6.
1 10
zation efforts. At his f irst Cabinet meeting/^
asked each department head to submit a preliminary reor-
ganization plan no later than February 15. 6 0nly twQ
weeks after taking office, Carter spent a great deal of
time during his first fireside chat discussing the reor-
ganization effort he was proposing. citing the need to
make government more "competent" and "compassionate,"
Carter explained he would immediately seek congressional
renewal of his authority as president to set reorgani-
zation policy.7 As his announcement speech ^ suggegtedj
Carter noted his goal was to improve communication, not
efficiency alone, stating "Ordinary people should be able
to understand how our own Government works, and to get
satisfactory answers to questions. "8
Following the speech, Carter created a President's
Reorganization Project committee (prp) within the Office
of Management and Budget to make recommendations for
agency reorganization. Chaired by Richard Pettigrew, the
PRP reported directly to Carter but maintained a close
Untitled Memo, Bert Lance to Cabinet Members, February 4
1977, Box 270 [CF O/A 28] [1], Domestic Policy Staff FileJimmy Carter Library.
Presidency 1977 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quar-terly Press, 1978), 69A.
8
"Address From the White House Library," Public Papers of
the Presidents of the Uni ted States, Jimmv Carter. 1977 .
Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 1977), 73.
Ill
association with OMB action on budgeting The PRP in .
eluded a group of political appointees. 0MB careerists and
a group of administrators
"detailed" to the prp by the
individual agencies themselves.10 within its f irst year
the PHP staff had swollen to 300, with a $2,172,000 oper-
ating budget, a considerable commitment of staff and
money.
H
Two days after the first fireside chat, Carter for-
mally submitted a request to Congress for renewal of the
president's authority to submit executive branch reorgani-
zation plans directly to the legislature." The power to
do so had lapsed following Nixon's attempt to secure
passage of his second round of reorganizations to estab-
lish the"superagencies," and Carter believed the authority
was critical to the success of his reorganization ef-
fort. 13 initially, Carter planned to merely ask for a
renewal of Nixon's authority, but his reorganization staff
made several recommendations to Carter for the expansion
of that power. 14 The authority Carter eventually re-
quested went well beyond Nixon's powers by granting Carter
9Mem0/ Hamilton Jordan to Bert Lance and Richard Petti
-
grew, "Structure for Reorganization Effort," Box 52,
Hamilton Jordan's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.
l°Dempsey, "Carter's Reorganization," 74.
HArnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 311.
l 2Public Papers of the Presidents. Jimmy Carter . 1977,
1977, 81-84.
Richard Pettigrew, "Improving Government Competence,"
Publius 8 (Spring 1978): 100.
l 4Havemann, "Reorganization," 4.
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certain new freedoms for proposing and amenaing
mlt plans to Congres3
, wMch wouia ^ enaotea ^
days if congress did not vote to veto the plan. But Car-
ter asked for additional power to submit amendments to
those plans within 30 days of their submission, giving him
the power to bargain and compromise with members and avoid
the possibility of Congressional amendments. Carter also
revested that Congress eliminate earlier rules which sti-
pulated that only one plan be submitted in any 30 day
Period, that each plan cover only one executive area, and
that each plan submitted carry detailed information on
cost savings. Finally, carter requested the reorgani-
zation power be granted for the entire four year period of
his administration. 15 As Peri Arnold reflected on these
changes, he noted:
In this light, the reorganization
authority, as it had been altered for
Carter, seemed an ideal means for
seeking small to medium scale organi-
zational change. The alterations gave
the president more flexibility about
what could be included within one
plan, more flexibility over the fre-
quency with which plans could be sent
to Congress, and more latitude on thejustifications contained within those
plans. 16
Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 309.
Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 310.
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in other words, the Carter reorgani 2ation revest was
designed to piace the greatest amount of control over the
legislative process in Carter's hands.
Approval of this new power was forthcoming, but some
meters of Congress expressed reservations. Carter had
met with congressional leaders on November 17, 197 6 to
discuss the renewal of Nixon's earlier power, particularly
the inability of Congress to amend the president's propo-
sals. 17 The new reguests ra . sed^^ wati<M< ^
the method of approval (adoption through Congressional
inaction) remained the main point of contention. Abraham
Ribicoff CD-Conn. >, as Chair of the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, was willing to simply endorse Carter's
requests, but Jack Brooks <D-Texas), Ribicoff
' s counter-
part as the Chair of the House Government Operations Com-
mittee, objected on constitutional grounds and demanded a
positive vote by Congress for each reorganization plan be
required. 18 The new proposed changes in presidential
authority made passage even more uncertain in the face of
Brooks's almost certain opposition.
Carter submitted his new requests on February 4,
1977. Four days later, Ribicoff convened hearings on the
request in the Senate, with a series of favorable wit-
nesses testifying to the necessity of the new presidential
l 7Havemann, "Reorganization," 5.
18Havemann, "Carter's Plans for Reorganization Get Mixed
Reception," National Journal 9 (February 12, 1977): 2 55.
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authority. Xn the House, HR 3407 was introduced as the
President's version of the reorganization revest, whiie
Brooks proposed a substitute bill, HR 3131. On March 3,
the Senate voted 92-0 to agree to the president's re-
Qtuest.19 In the House
, a comprom . ge bui/ RR so4o
^
on March 29 by a 395-22 vote. while Representative Brooks
still opposed the presidential "fiat" of reorganization
approval, he did manage to limit Carter's authority to a
three year period and demand that cost savings figures be
required in all proposals. with those concessions, Brooks
grudgingly voted in favor of the compromise, calling it
"the best unconstitutional bill that can be drawn up." on
March 31, a House-Senate compromise bill, identical to
that passed by the House, was sent to Carter. 20
Thus, in the end, Congress granted Carter new reor-
ganization authority, but not all the particulars he had
requested. Carter still took pride in the passage of the
Reorganization Act, signing the bill into law on April 6.
At the bill signing ceremony, Carter reemphasized the
importance of reorganization to his administration, and
stressed the public would play a key role in the formu-
lation of reorganization agendas:
y
"Executive Reorganization Powers: Action to Date in the
95th Congress," Congressional Digest, 56 (April 1977)-
106-7.
20,, Recent Major Action in the Congress," Congressional
Digest 56 (May 1977): 129-30.
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The reorganization process which isset into motion today will be an openone. we intend to involve the Con
and
SS/
,
Sta"e ^ l0Cal governments,
wiii be r^ri f"ups and citizens «*>ll affected by change. We shalldepend on public awareness and parti-cipation to help us pinpoint problems,to originate ideas and solutions, andto provide reactions to various op-tions developed by reorganization
study teams which are already at
work
.
2
1
By the end of August, the PRP had already begun 3 0
studies of reorganization proposals in seven major areas:
economic development, general government, human resources,
natural resources, national security and international
affairs, management improvement, and regulatory reform. 22
in July, carter sent to Congress a first Reorganization
Plan, proposing to consolidate many of the White House
staff positions as well as a reorganization plan for the
Executive Office of the President. 23 The plan reduced the
White House staff from 485 positions to 351 and the EOP
staff by 15%. The plan eliminated the Domestic Council
created by Nixon, the Council on International Economic
Policy, the Office of Telecommunications Policy, the
Federal Property Council, the Office of Drug Abuse Policy,
21
"Statement on Signing S.,626 into Law," Public Papers of
the Presidents. Jimmy Carter. 1977 . vol. I, 1977, 573.22David Beam, "Public Administration is Alive and Well -
and Living in the White House," Public Administration
Review 38 (January/February 1978), 72-73.
2 3Betty Glad, Jimmy Carter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980),
412
.
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the Energy Resources Council and hhe *11 t Economic Opportunity
Council. 24 The r*A*n,-,*-4in reductions were not an f-v,««j-e ll they seemed, how-
ever, as many upper level managers were simply transferred
rather than eased from office. As one member of the reor .
ganization team suwnarized the changes,
..it was a reduc-
tion of Indians, rather than chiefs." Nevertheless, the
changes did mark an important conceptual change in the
expected expansion of the EOP.25 In Auffu3t>
ther proposed a 40% reduction in the number of federal
advisory committees and commissions. 26 Carter seemed
ouite serious about fulfilling his promise to streamline
government
.
27
The aims of this reorganization effort remained
vague, however, beyond this seemingly traditional goal.
The administration advocated a "bottom-up" approach to
"Carter Proposes White House Reorganization," NationalJournal 9 (July 23, 1977): 1165. 51
25Dom Bonafede, "White House Reorganization - Separating
?977?: 1307
S
?
bStanCe
'" N*tional ^naj 9 (August 20 *
26pettigrew, "Improving Government Competence," 101
Not everyone in the White House was pleased with thesechanges, however. Hamilton Jordan was informed about cutsin his office and complained "If the cuts were going toaffect everyone equally I could justify having to lose twopersons.. Under your proposal, I will make the greatest
sacrifice of any senior staff member and will have the
smallest staff. GIVE ME BACK MY ONE PERSON." Undated
Memo, Hamilton Jordan to Harrison Wellford and A D
Frazier [CF, O/A 646] [3], Box 53, Reorganization File,
Jimmy Carter Library. Apparently worried the reorgani-
zation team would think he was joking, Jordan included ahandwritten note at the bottom of the memo, saying "I'm
serious about this."
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administrative reform, allowina * m«„<l g a niaximum amount of input
from the people direotly af£eoted by ^ ^
citizens were to lodge complaints and surest reforms for
the agency in question directly to the prp.28 To
strengthen and expand citizen participation, each depart-
ment was ordered in March 1978 to create a public pattl .
cipation funding program. 29 PRP staf£
described and defended the bottom-up" approach in a
speech before the National Capital Area Chapter of the
American Society for Public Administration on December 1,
1977, explaining:
We've labeled this the "bottom-up"
approach to contrast it with prior
efforts that tried to reorganize fromthe "top-down"
- tackling everything
at once and looking only at the toplevel structure of departments and
agencies. We think "bottom-up" is in-finitely preferable because it bases
recommendations on real evidence of
problems; allows the most appropriate
solution
- whether structural, pro-
cedural or administrative; and avoids
all or nothing confrontations
.. .The
third major distinguishing charac-
teristic of our approach is its open-
ness. Past reorganizers have de-
veloped proposals in relative secrecy
and sprung them on the Congress and
2 gPettigrew, "Improving Government Competence," 1978, 102-
3. See also President's Reorganization Authority Mater-ials, Domestic Policy Staff, "Questions and Answers on the
President's Reorganization Project," April 6, 1977 [CF O/A
28] [1], Domestic Policy Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Library.29Memo, Jimmy Carter to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, May 16, 1979, Box FG-3, WHCF-Federal Government-
Organizations, Jimmy Carter Library.
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the people. We see no benefits inthat approach. We want to take ad-vantage of all the expertise availablein this country, learn the lessons ofthe past, and test our proposals be-fore we ask the President to make de-
cisions
.
J0
Thus, the "bottom-up" strategy required citizen par-
ticipation to provide the focus for its efforts at reor-
ganization, without that participation, the PRP would
have a difficult time isolating problems and the admini-
stration would lose the benefit of the public- . experience
dealing with the federal bureaucracy. 31 As a result,
citizens were given several avenues for input into prp
deliberations: interest group surveys on organizational
issues were distributed to approximately 1000 groups after
a more general public appeal was filed in the July 7, 1977
Federal Register
,
as well as an additional 25,000 forms to
smaller organizations; sessions with representatives of
larger organizations such as the AFL-CIO, Business Round-
table, Chamber of Commerce, League of Women Voters, New
Directions
,
National Association of Counties, National
Conference of State Legislatures, and the National League
of Cities and the Conference of Mayors; reorganization
staff members debriefed the 37 Federal Information Center
30,, Remarks of Jim Mclntyre before American Society for
Public Administration, National Capital Area Chapter,
December 1, 1977," 12/1/77-2/6/80, Box 79, WHCF- Government
Reform Neustadt, Jimmy Carter Library.
31Jean Conley and Joel Havemann, "Reorganization - Two
Plans, One Department Down, Much More to Come," National
Journal 9 (December 3, 1977): 1872.
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Regional Managers on the historic pattern of citizen
complaints and questions concerning government perform-
ance; material collected through the White House mail
from individual citizens; clipping surveys; and, fin-
ally, a series of public speeches and open meetings by
Director Pettigrew himself .32 The plan to allow direct
citizen input into the reorganization project had its more
humorous side as well: the PRP was plagued by calls from
one citizen in Iowa who insisted upon payment for ideas he
had submitted for reorganization which were subsequently
adopted. Eventually, the man threatened to sue PRP direc-
tor Pettigrew in a District of Columbia court for failing
to provide reimbursement . 33
Public consultation was also expanded by the prp to
include a survey of Congressional constituent problems.
Pettigrew organized a survey of congressional offices
during the summer of 1977, noting in his report to the
President on September 29 that the survey "...provides an
excellent source of bottom-up information on government
performance;" Pettigrew noted later in that report that
the survey had been "well received" and had provided "rich
detail on the day-to-day functioning of federal programs
32Memo, Richard Pettigrew to Jody Powell, July 13, 1777,
"Public Involvement Activities Report," Box FG-57, WHCF-
Federal Government-Organizations, Jimmy Carter Library.
•^Letter, Hazel Fulton to Richard Pettigrew, June 14,
1977, "Call from Bill Dennis, Iowa City, Iowa," Box FG-57,
WHCF-Federal Government-Organizations, Jimmy Carter
Library.
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from the perspective of the average citizen. - The survey
was returned by some 200 members of Congress, chiefly
Democrats who apparently were doing their best to coop-
erate with the new administration.34 0n October 2^
President Carter sent a memorandum to the heads of exe-
cutive departments and agencies, noting that "Senators and
Congressmen devote a good portion of their time and staff
resources... to helping individual constituents deal with
government agencies." Carter went on to ask the agency
heads to provide the Office of Management and Budget with
information on how the agencies were handling these com-
plaints
.
35
But the rationale behind this choice of strategy re-
mained vaguely stated at best, and the specifics of the
changes Carter would seek were not provided; instead, a
series of "goals" were offered to justify the value of
reform itself. 36 contradictory lists of goals began to
emerge in the press, however, and the rationale behind the
early reorganization decisions remained hazy, while one
might dismiss the confusion as a public relations probl<.em
O A
Memo, Richard Pettigrew to the President, September 29,
1977, "Survey of Congressional Constituent Problems," Box
FG-147, WHCF-Federal Government-Organizations, Jimmy Car-
ter Library. Unless otherwise noted, the emphasis in this
memo and those which follow are those of the original
author.
35Memo, Jimmy Carter to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, October 28, 1977, "Survey of Congressional
Constituent Problems," Box FG-57, WHCF-Federal Government-
Organizations, Jimmy Carter Library.
36Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 312-13.
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PKP was having explaining lts aotions< ^ ^ ^
surprising number of memos, rai si„g w.tloa. abQut ^
seals of reorganization, had begun circulating in the prp
in the fall of 1977
, several months ^ ^ ^.^^
tion.s efforts in this area, and certainly late in the
decision making process when one considers the time and
energy being devoted to reorganization that summer. Mem-
bers of the prp staff held a meeting in the first wee, of
November to reassess the PRP . S efforts and goals. The
report to Harrison Wellford summarizing the results of the
meeting suggests an organization
"adrift., from the mooring
clear goals provide. For example, the memorandum argues
Carter's original reorganization effort, the "Georgia
example, •• attempted to restructure government through
agency reductions. Although such a plan could work on the
state level, the memo argues such reductions are not
likely to be the focus of the PRP's future work (indeed,
the participants shared considerable doubts that the ..bot-
tom-up" strategy was at all appropriate to such changes).
Nor could the committee justify reorganization as a cost-
cutting device. Instead, the committee embraced the ideas
of productivity (in the sense of coordination of programs
and fair enforcement of rules) and, more importantly, re-
sponsiveness (including "increase public participation and
openness"). The conclusion of the memo best illustrates
the confusion surrounding the PRP's goals:
122
We arfnn ? if 3 r6al Problem ^re.
it.l ^
Stating
°Ur 9°als aless than confident fashion) in termsof productivity and responsiveness
that'th"
8 n°t
1
Ut lGaSt t0 me)
e results (projects) will inmost cases be seen to reflect or fur-ther those goals to any significantdegree
* m partir^ r, a aa
.reorganisation pi nnn which shift func-tions and programs from one departmentto another will not ^Tamati rally -im-
prove productivity and r fiBDQnpiL fl»
any more than they will reduce agency
numbers or save budget dollars i
would offer the hypothesis that,
generally speaking, program shiftingthrough reorganization plans can
mamly be justified by reference togoals intelligible mainly from a
bureaucratic perspective; such goals
are not insubstantial, but by them-
selves they will not do much to sellthe program or to turn it into a
selling point for the President. 37
A few weeks later, another ppp ,• r,*.^,
'
uucn ^kp internal memo agreed,
stating:
To date we have not done an adequatejob of establishing firmly in our own
minds, and communicating to the nnt--
side world, the goals of the reorgani -
zation, the rationale for our ap -
proach, and the signif iciance of thin
effort in contrast to others The
result is some embarrassment and frus-
tration about the vagueness and
generality of our goals (and our in-
ability thus far to operationally
37Memo, Si Lazarus to Stuart Eizenstat, November 11, 1977,
"Reorganization Planning," Box 79, Government Reform-Neu-'
stadt, Jimmy Carter Library.
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ooflo?
Ur projects in terms of theseg als), some doubts about the wisdomof our approach, and a hesitancy toengage our critics and aggressively
sell our efforts to the public. ithink this continuing uncertainty
about our goals and approach is unjus-tified and increasingly counterpro-
ductive. 38
The memo went on to note the »bottom-up» approach was
largely responsible for the drift in the organization,
since such a strategy requires that no coordinating prin-
ciples exist (or the underlying rationale, openness, is
lost)
.
Given the discontinuity between the actions being
taken by the administration in the series of reorgani-
zation plans submitted to Congress and the strategy for
formulating reorganization through a "bottom-up" approach,
it is not surprising the members of the PRP were puzzled
by the strategy they were following. Members found the
methods they were employing to gather information were
inappropriate to the type of reorganization they knew
would be politically beneficial, while the Carter admini-
stration made it clear how it would seek to reorganize, it
was decidedly unclear as to why it was following the path
it had chosen.
Memo
'
Keith Miles to Peter Szanton, November 22, 1977,
"The Carter Reorganization: Its Goals, Rationale and
Distinguishing Characteristics," Box 79, Government
Reform-Neustadt, Jimmy Carter Library.
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Despite the confusion at prp cart-^--er's first efforts
were followed by a series of reorganlzation plans ^
with ffreat regularity to Congress between 1977 and 1980
By the time of his first Annual Message to Congress on
January 19, 1978, Carter could claim the initial efforts
at reorganization a success, as the administration had
managed to streamline the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent as well as the White House staff, combined eleven
agencies into a new Department of Energy and abolished 500
advisory committees and small agencies. 39 a second Reor-
ganization Plan of 1977 had been announced on October 11,
proposing to comiine the United States Information Agency
and the State Department • s Bureau of Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs. 40 The 1978 plans . noluded efforts fco
enforce non-discrimination rules by consolidating a number
of "equal employment" activities in the E<Iual Employment
Opportunity Commission, to create a Federal Emergency
Management Agency for the improvement of emergency pre-
paredness, to abolish the Civil Service Commission by
splitting its functions into two new agencies (the Office
of Personnel Management and the Merit System Protection
Board) and to clarify the responsibilities of the Depart-
ments of Treasury and Labor for administering the Employee
3 Q
"Annual Message to Congress, January 19, 1978," Public
Papers of the Presidents; Jimmv Carter. 197ft . vol. I(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1979), 108.
40Conley and Havemann, "Reorganization," 1872-73.
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.41 The 1979 plang
included the establishment of an Office of Federal inspec-
tor for the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System, an
international Development Cooperation Agency to coordinate
government activities relating to the developing world,
the consolidation of various trade functions into an
Office of U.S. Trade Representative and the clarification
of the responsibilities of the Department of Commerce.
Finally, the last plan, submitted in 1980, increased the
authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
powers of its chair. 42
While Carter's efforts at reorganization were
obviously far reaching, they quickly developed into a
struggle with Congress over "turf" between agencies.
Harrison Wellford discovered there was very little
"unidentified territory" between agencies, and that each
reorganization proposal meant a protracted set of nego-
tiations between the affected agencies and members of
Congress. 43 Carter had much greater success with his
second element of reform, the proposal to change the Civil
Service Commission and the creation of a Merit System
Protection Board, designed to guarantee the neutrality of
civil service appointments, and the Office of Personnel
4lDempsey, "Carter's Reorganization," 75; Arnold, Making
the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 328.
42Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 328-29.
43 Joel Havemann, "Carter's Reorganization Plans - Scramb-
ling for Turf," National Journal 10 (May 20, 1978): 788.
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Management to serve as a staff agency on personnel (al-
though the function of both would be radically altered by
the Reagan administration, as the next chapter win ca-
strate)
.
The reforms also created a Senior Executive Ser-
vice, a pool of movable administrative executives at the
senior level, as well as a new set of guidelines for per-
formance appraisal. Although these reforms did manage to
pass through Congress, pressure to compromise on many
issues threatened to reduce their ef fectiveness . 44 only a
major lobbying effort by Carter managed to fend off many
of the challenges to the administration's reform efforts,
and Carter found his efforts were benefited (and perhaps
scived) by a. public which supported reform. 45
Thus, the Carter administration began with a com-
mitment to reform the bureaucracy, and Carter immediately
sought to meet that commitment by requesting expanded
presidential authority to reorganize the federal bureau-
cracy. But these structural changes were unable to im-
prove Carter's ability to govern well by achieving the
goals of efficiency and "compassion" he professed in 1976.
Indeed, the proposals themselves were traditional in their
conception and appeared quite contradictory as they cen-
tralized agency and executive control of reform while
simultaneously pursuing a "bottom-up" strategy for agenda
44Jack Knott and Gary Miller, Reforming Bureaucracy; The
Politics of Institutional Chang* (Englewood Cliffs: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1987), 242-47.
45Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 333-35.
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settings ln other „oraS; ^ reforms^ ^
secure presidential control over the reform effort and
left many despairing Carter, focus on the political
details of reform while ignoring the ends to which the
political system may be used. 47
B
.
The zero Based Al^rrmWa, Carfcer , Bu flaa t r ] i
,
Like reorganization, Carter's plan to reform the
budget process was a major issue in the 1976 campaign.
The zero based budgeting plan Carter proposed as a reform
measure, however, was a well rehearsed concept. 48 Carter
began championing the plan to use zero based budgeting
( ZBB) to set executive priorities in speeches to the
National Press Club on February 9, 1973, during the Law
Day Celebration at the University of Georgia in May 1974,
and at the National Governor's Conference the following
month. m his standard speech delivered to these groups,
Carter described the reorganization program he used to
streamline Georgia's executive branch (the antecedent to
the reorganization effort described in the previous sec-
46Beam, "Public Administration is Alive and Well," 75.
Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency
. 1986, 336.
48There seems to be some dispute concerning the hyphen-
ation of "zero based budgeting"; while some writers pro-
vxde hyphens, I choose to follow the spelling used by the
Carter White House, which omits them.
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tion,. Key to that e££ort< he arjuea
_ a ^
zero based budgeting. in wMch ..
_ every program; existina
and proposed. must now vie for funding ln the new bu(Jget
on an eWl level
. Every single dQllar ^
Justified if it ls to be recorded by the governor for
funding in the following year's budget. "49 zbb was to
provide a mechanism for strict scrutiny of government
activities, such scrutiny would not come from above,
however, as had been the case in previous budget reform
measures. instead, the ZBB strategy called for scrutiny
from below.
The goal of the ZBB plan in Georgia, Carter stated,
was the restoration of citizen control over state
spending: with a zero based budget plan in place, any
citizen would be able to monitor any aspect of state
activity. Additionally, state agents at the lower levels
of the administrative chain of command would be able to
provide input into the formulation and prioritizing of
agency action (in effect, a "bottom-up" strategy for bud-
geting)
.
Carter cited similar claims for his budgeting
reform on a national level, telling Labor Department
employees in the first weeks of his administration that
zero based budgeting "..strips down your department's
activities every year to zero. You start from
scratch.
. .The second thing it does is it lets employees
^Presidential Campaign. 1976. Vol. I, (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1978), 19.
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deep within the department have an input into the budg£t _
ary syste. each year.-SO In the end<^
ZBB meant more open government . 5
1
The concept of zero based budgets was simple to
^asp. carter was first attracted to the idea after
reading an article by Peter Pyhrr
, the originator of the
Plan, in 1971.52 As Daniel^ ^ ^
budget process has two main steps:
in theory, zero based budgeting callsfor total cost analysis of all pro-grams every year. Each item of expen-diture is to be scrutinized to see ifit can be reduced or eliminated.
Thus, zero base budgeting has two dis-tinctive characteristics. Firstbudget requests are formulated in
"decision packages" in each management
50
"Questions and Answer Session with Department of LaborSy™ \T! Pa!r nf. T_^_£_L/ voi. 1 1 1977, 106. Carter repeated the samemessage later that day (February 9, 1977) to employees ofthe Commerce Department, and on subsequent days to em-S^V* °?partme»ts of Treasury (February 10) andHEW (February 16). See 130-132, 159-166.
^"Questions and Answer Session with Department of LaborEmployees," 19-21; see also Jimmy Carter, "Zero-BaseBudgeting," Zero Base Budgeting rnmo« ^ ^ ed> LoganCheek (New York: AMACOM, 1977), 296-303.
52Peter Phyrr, "Zero-Base Budgeting," Harvard BuflinesjjReview 49 (November/December 1970): 111-21. For alengthy description of the plan for ZBB, see Phyrr, ZeroBase Budgeting (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973T~a^d
"The Zero-Base Approach to Government Budgeting," Public
Administration RftviPw 37 (January/ February 1977): 1-8;
see also Graeme Taylor, "Introduction to Zero-Base
Budgeting," Contemporary Approaches to Puhlic Budgeting ,
ed. Fred Kramer (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1979)
149-61 and Joseph Woley, Zero-Base Budgeting and Program
Evaluation (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1978).
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" M * minimum package, in which allexxstxng functions must be justifiedat the lowest practical level of
operation, forms the first block.Addxtxonal decision packages offermore program results for greater
costs, bringing the total budget pro-posals to successively higher levels,
some below the current level, one
whxch might be at the existing level,and others which represent increased
support. Second, each unit manager
ranks all "decision packages" bypriority and each successively higher
manager similarly ranks packages
across program lines clear to the top
of the organization. 53
By implementing this plan, Carter stressed throughout his
campaign and in his first debate with Gerald Ford, ZBB
would eliminate "obsolete" or "obsolescent" programs which
could not justify their existence. 54 Through a "bottom-
up" approach to budgeting, where the individuals closest
to the agency's operations would have the greatest influ-
ence in funding decisions, Carter promised to return con-
trol of the federal government to the people. 55
Carter kept his campaign pledge almost immediately
after taking office by announcing an executive order to
Daniel Odgen, Jr., "Beyond Zero Based Budgeting," Public
Administration Review 38 (November/December 1978): 528.
^Presidential Campaign. 1976. Volume 3 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1979), 69.
55Frank Draper and Bernard Pitsvada, "ZBB - Looking Back
After Ten Years," Public Administration Review 41 (Janu-
ary/February 1981): 78.
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begin zero based budgeting in all federal agencies. 56
indeed, Carter became involved in nearly all aspects of
ZBB integration into the budget process, believing it to
be crucial to his broader plan for reorganization dis-
cussed in the previous section.57 0n February u§ ^
^
Carter delivered a Valentine Day message to the heads' of
all federal departments and agencies, ordering them to
"..develop a zero base system in accordance with instruc-
tions to be issued by the Office of Management and
Budget." wasting no time, Budget Director Bert Lance met
that same day with the new Cabinet members and briefed
them on the ZBB objectives . 58 on March 21, guidelines for
ZBB planning were sent to the departments . 59 OMB quickly
followed by issuing a directive to implement the ZBB plan
on April 19, 1977 (Number 77-9); the directive was
quickly obeyed, to the surprise of many observers. 60 To
facilitate the transition, OMB even provided ZBB liaison
officers who were given a brief "pep talk-' by the Presi-
56Executive Order, "Implementation of the Concept of ZeroBase Budgeting," Box FI-7, WHCF-Finance 2/11/77-2/15/77,
Jimmy Carter Library.
57Donald Haider, "Zero Base; Federal Style," Public
Administration Revipw (July/August, 1977): 400, 405-
406
.
58Haider, "Zero Base," 401.
5
9
Joel Havemann, "Taking Up the Tools to Tame the Bureau-
cracy, " National Journal 9 (April 2, 1977): 515.
60Allen Schick, "The Road From ZBB," Public Administration
Review 38 (March/April 1978): 177.
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dent before they were senh o,^ -t ut to advise agencies on the
new procedures. 6 1
As with reorganization, Carter insisted citizens play
a role in making budget decisions under zero based
budgeting. Shortly after is£ming ^
Carter instructed the department and agency heads to
encourage participation by state and local government
officials in their budget process, particularly when the
issue substantially affected local concerns, as well as
those of individual citizens. 62 The major focus of ZBB,
however, remained at the agency level, while citizens
rarely called in budget recommendations (as they called in
reorganization suggestions), Carter argued citizen parti-
cipation would come in the form of observation: by
eliminating secrecy from the budget process, citizens
could help rank priorities . 63 Thus, Carter pursued budget
reform with traditional goals of economy and efficiency in
mind, but did so to achieve a more critical goal in the
process. As Carter told Department of Interior employees
during his first month in office,
I want to make sure that our Govern-
ment is more economical and efficient,
better organized, better administered,
more competent. At the same time, I
61Haider, "Zero Base," 401.
62Memo, Jimmy Carter to Bert Lance, March 8, 1977, "Zero
Base Budgeting Guidelines," Box FI-7, WHCF-Finance, Jimmy
Carter Library.
63presidential Campaign. 1976 Volume I, 1978, 19-20.
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is cloLr, .
S
K
rS th" our sovemment
altllltl It Pe
°Ple and m°re sen-
""e" a sense °* fear or despair oralienation or disappointment or pre-judice or hatred, and substitute forthose oharaoteristios the nationalinclinations of the people of this
country. 64
As the Carter administration entered its second full
year in office, however, roany began to wonder if the easy
transition to ZBB procedures suggested the "new reform"
was nothing new at all. Aithough Budget Director^
had previously indicated ZBB would create money to apply
to other programs and help to eliminate some programs, but
not balance the budget, Carter held out hope that a
balanced budget could be achieved through ZBB proce-
dures. 65 carter began the year with his Fiscal Year 1979
Budget Message, delivered on January 23, 1978, claiming
that thanks to ZBB procedures the government had "..gained
a better understanding of federal programs and have made
better, more evenhanded judgments;" Carter made no claims
of ZBB success beyond this pedagogic function, however. 66
Indeed, he seemed to hedge on the success of ZBB in an
64
"Questions and Answers with Department of Interior
Employees," Public Papers of fche Presidents. Jimmv pa rh P r
1977
, Vol. I, 1977, 198.
65Memo, Bert Lance to Jimmy Carter, April 29, 1977, "The
Long-Range Budget Outlook," Box FI-7, WHCF-Finance! Jimmy
Carter Library.
66President Carter. 197ft (Washington, D.C.: CongressionalQuarterly Press, 1979), 76.
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interview with a group of editQrs ^^ ^
days earlier, when he told then,
-xt [ZBB] worked out well
for us. I thin, it will get even better in subseguent
years because of experience with it. "67 x more careful
examination of that budget revealed few changes from the
previous year, m fact, federal spending remained at the
same level in 1977 that it would have reached without the
new budgeting procedure. 68 Even Carter seemed worried
about the lack of movement in the budget, telling the
heads of departments and agencies in a gently worded
memorandum:
..some agencies did better than
others. Most agencies need to focus
more attention on objectives and on
ways to accomplish those objectives
more efficiently. m addition, I
think more emphasis should be placed
on the examination of minimum levels,
so I ask that you make additional
efforts to do this." 69
An OMB review of the new ZBB plan, "Assessment of the
First Year of Zero-Based Budgeting, " released in May, con-
firmed this impression when it failed to mention a single
"Interview with a Group of Editors and News Directors,
January 13, 1978," Public Paners of the Presidents: Jimmy
Carter, 1978
,
Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1979), 69.
68Schick, "The Road From ZBB," 177.
6 9Untitled Memo, Jimmy Carter to Heads of Executive De-
partments and Agencies, April 14, 1978, Box FG-2, WHCF,
Jimmy Carter Library.
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specific instance of savings as a result of the new
reform; even the minimum levels of proposed spending
under ZBB plans cut agency budgets by only io-m.70 ta
earlier Nationa!
.Tnurnal interview with the budget offi-
cials of all cabinet departments uncovered nearly unani-
mous disapproval of the ZBB approach. The budget director
for the Treasury Department. Arthur Kalian, went on the
record stating "No matter what OMB says about going back
to zero, we've been nibbling at the margins. "71 mring
that previous year, agencies faithfully following zbb
procedures still freguently lobbied the Appropriations
Committees of Congress to restore their reduced budgets to
the previous year's levels. 72
The departure of Lance as OMB Director created even
more problems for ZBB: program "liberals" who wished to
increase government services clashed with fiscal "conser-
vatives" within the administration, firing off memos to
one another debating budget policy. As a result, whatever
minimal control OMB was able to exercise over ZBB was
quickly lost. 73 Rumors began tQ spread among federal
70Draper and Pitsvada, "ZBB," 77.
71Joel Havemann, "The Budget - A Tax Cut, Little Else,"
National Journal 10 (January 28, 1978): 129.
72Memo, Joe Onek to Stuart Eizenstat, May 9, 1977,
"Soaring Appropriations," Box FI-7, WHCG-FI 4 5/1/77-
5/31/77, Jimmy Carter Library.
Colin Campbell, Managing the Presidency (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 177-80. See also
Charles Jones, The Trusteeship Presidency (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana University Press, 1988), 91-93.
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agencies that chancre*? in t-v.»nang s the economy would undermine
Carter's budget policv rarh 0r v, *P y
*
C te had to issue a memo to the
department and agency heads denying the rumors and
ordering them to continue to use ZBB.74 By 198Q# ^ ^
minimum levels of many agencies were set above the pre-
vious year's appropriations . 75 The 1981 budget fared no
better, continuing the pattern set in 1980.76 To a large
degree, the federal budget looked exactly as it had before
ZBB procedures were adopted. No one could argue with the
fact that ZBB had failed to cut expenditures significantly
or streamline the federal government .77
The reasons for the ultimate failure of zero based
budgeting to achieve the reforms Carter sought were
apparent to most. indeed, a 1962 study of budgeting by
the principles used by ZBB in the Department of Agri-
culture by Aaron Wildavsky and Arthur Hammond predicted
many of the troubles the Carter administration experienced
during the late 1970's.78 For all its apparent simpli _
74Memo, Jimmy Carter to Heads of Executive Departments andAgencies, August 2, 1979, "The Administration's BudgetaryPolicy," Box FG-4, WHCF-Federal Government
-OrganizationsJimmy Carter Library.
7 5Howard Shuman, Politics and the Budget (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 39.
76Glenn Pascall, The Trillion Dollar Budget (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1985), 17-20.
77
"It's a Long Way to October," Economist 274 (February 2
1980): 29-30.
78Aaron Wildavsky and Arthur Hammond, "Comprehensive
Versus Incremental Budgeting in the Department of
Agriculture," Administrative Science Quarterly 10 (May
1965): 321-46.
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city, ZBB was a confusing, incoherent system Qf
Despite calls for ZBB reform by the General Accounting
Office in 1979, the Carter administration remained
constant in its support of ZBB in its original form.79
The directives from OMB were vaguely worded, and terms
like "decision units," central to successful ZBB pro-
cedures, were ill defined, if at all. Those who attempted
to adhere closely to the guidelines found they often had
to consider hundreds, and even thousands, of decisions
units. 80 m addition, the ranking of programs was accom-
plished through a variety of procedures, not all using the
same standards or system. 81 Even the term "zero based-
made little practical sense to the agencies charged with
implementing the new plan, since each agency invariably
used the previous year's budget to construct the new
fiscal year's requests, with no other plan or guideline
from the administration linking the departments of the
executive branch together in an overall budget plan, mana-
gers relied on old habits. 82
79Ha!der, "Zero Base," 402-5. Donald Axel rod, Budgeting
for Modern Governrngnr (New York: St. Martin's Press
1988), 300.
8°Havemann, "The Budget," 130.
81Schick, "The Road From ZBB," 178.
82Thomas Lauth, "Zero-Base Budgeting in Georgia State
Government: Myth and Reality," Public Administration
Review 38 ( September/October 1978 ) : 420. Ogden, "Beyond
Zero Based Budgeting," 528. This was most clearly a
problem for social service agencies, as documented by
Campbell, Managing the Presidency . 1986, 173-74.
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m the end, managers found themselves called upon tojustify each program request, all on an inflexible sched-
ule which gave them little time to organize and reflect
upon a new set of objectives for their agency .83 Lengthy
bulletins from OMB began to arrive in agencies shortly
after ZBB fi rst went into effect, describing additional
classification retirements for agency submission by
specifying additional subfunctions of each agency decision
package. Thus, the originally complex instructions for
ZBB were frequently made more complex as agencies strug-
gled to comply. 84 Administrative
"horror stories" began
to emerge almost immediately under the new ZBB require-
ments: One agency reported a 300% increase in the amount
of documentation needed for budget preparations, in-
creasing its output of paper from 22,500 pages to a
startling 90,000 pages to justify 478 decision packages
(approximately 190 pages per project). 85 others reported
large amounts of time were spent on budgeting alone. Gary
Dietrich, the Director of Management and Operations for
the Office of Water and Hazardous Materials in the
Richard Watson and Norman Thomas, The Politics of thePresidency (Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1988), 308-9; see also Setting National Prior-
ities: The 1978 Budget
, ed. Joseph Pechman (Washington,D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1977), 382-83.
840MB Bulletin Number 77-12, Bert Lance to Heads of
Executive Departments and Establishments, "Additional
Subfunctioning Coding of Decision Units," Box FI-8, WHCF
Finance 8/21/77-8/31/77, Jimmy Carter Library.
85Axelrod, Budgeting for Modern Government . 1988, 297.
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Environmental Protection Agency told one interviewer - It
tthe ZBB process] was 12-hour days, six or seven days a
week, it does take its toll... taother ,taf£„ wag
as claiming spent so much timfl on ^ ^ ^
lot of other things slipped. "86
As a result, programs financed through ZBB became a
permanent part of the federal bureaucracy, the opposite
effect ZBB was meant to have on the executive branch.
Once a program was funded, its objectives could not be
changed without gravely risking the entire financial sup-
port of the agency. Thus, managers learned to "play it
safe" and were careful not to alter programs in their
agencies, sacrificing the goal of "streamlining" to cau-
tion. EPA was widely praised as the agency making the
greatest effort to follow ZBB procedures, but it showed
very little change by the end of the ZBB process. As one
EPA budget official put it, "If we did the best job in the
government, I'd hate to see what the rest of the govern-
ment did. "87
Carter's plan to reform budget procedures using zero
based budgeting ultimately had the opposite effect. As
Aaron Wildavsky and Jack Knott observe:
0bJoel Havemann, "The Tale of How One Agency Used ZBB -
And Lived to Tell About It," National Journal 10 (February
18, 1978): 268.
87Havemann, "The Tale of How One Agency Used ZBB," 265.
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imagxne one of us deciding whether tobuy a tie or kerchief, a simple taskone might think. Suppose/ ho^e^
S
'
nr^L°
rganiZati0nal rules mandate com-prehensiveness; we are required toalter our entire wardrobe as a unitIf everything
,
must be rearranged whenP^Ltem is altered, the probability
xs low that we will do anything.
Being caught between revolution(change in everything) and resignation(change m nothing) has little to
recommend it. Yet this is what a
zero-base, start-from-scratch, compre-hensive approach requires. if one
could actually start from scratch eachyear, the only zero part of the budget
would be its predictability, for zero-base budgeting is ahistorical
.. .Every-thing at every period is subject to
searching scrutiny. As a result,
calculations become unmanageable.
Figuring out how everything relates to
everything else or, worse still, how
other things would look if most things
were changed, defeats every best
effort. Consequently, attempts to
apply intelligence to programs about
which something can and needs to be
done are defeated by mounds of paper.
The trivial drowns out the important*
because if everything must be ex-
amined, nothing can receive special
attention. 88
Rather than simplifying government, ZBB guaranteed
complexity; rather than "streamline" government, ZBB
further entrenched the bureaucracy. ZBB failed to meet
any of its goals as a budget policy.
p p
°Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky, "Jimmy Carter's Theory
of Governing," The Wilson Quarterly (winter 1977): 58.
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C . Expl
a
ininq th* Tarter n,H.^ 1 s ^lassie" Studies
Traditional political science offers two "classic-
explanations for presidential behavior, as described in
Chapter One. m this section, the "rational decider" and
"Personality" models will be applied to Carter's choice of
strategy for reorganization and budget reform. The
"rational decider" model will be tested by applying the
theory of its proponent, Richard Neustadt, to Carter's
choices. Similarly, the "personality" model will be
tested by applying the theory of its proponent, James
David Barber, to Carter's choices. Both explanations win
be found to inadequately account for Carter's decisions.
1. The "Rational Decider;" Carter as Calculator
Neustadt's conception of the "rational decider"
presidency finds explaining Carter's decisions difficult.
Recall Neustadt's argument that presidents must consider
the political costs and benefits of each decision, de-
ciding when to risk the favorable perception of reputation
and prestige. Presidents act when the political benefits
of the decision outweigh these costs, thus enhancing repu-
tation and prestige and increasing the power to persuade.
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Given this understanding of presidential behavior
one might expect Neustadt to argue Carter's decision to
seek reorganization through a "bottom-up- approach was
shaped by a rational decision on Carter's part to attempt
to build a successful record of reform to maximize his
influence as a new president. Certainly administration
advocates of a "bottom-up., strategy thought this would be
the effect. However, Neustadt does not specifically ad-
dress Carter.
s reorganization efforts. 89 Peri Arnold doe;
discuss reorganization using the Neustadt model when he
argues presidents pursue reorganization attempts because
such efforts enhance the ability to persuade. 90
The record shows the opposite to be the case, how-
ever, when one considers the Carter example: Carter's
efforts were a costly expenditure of political reputation
89Richard Neustadt, President-
<
a1 ppwgr (New york . WUand Sons, 1980), 212-20 comes closest to such a dis-
cussxon.
90Arnold, Making the Managerial Pregidgngg
, 1986 # 351-52Indeed, the structure of Carter's reorganization effort
closely resembled the recommendations for success made byNeustadt; see Neustadt, Presidential Power . 1980 219Others who adopt the Neustadt model for explaining presi-dential behavior openly begin by taking ideology as agiven; for example, Barbara Kellerman's discussion ofleadership begins by presuming presidents have their goalsin mind before they exercise leadership techniques; Bar-bara Kellerman, The Political Presidency (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), x. These assumptions
separate ideas from action, however, by failing to con-
sider why political beliefs might lead a president to
select certain administrative strategies for action. For
this reason, they also suffer from the defects of the
"rational decider" model.
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for very little political benefit ^ a ^^ ^
time, a seemingly
"irrational., political act. 91 ^organi-
zation became a frustrating exercise for Carter: although
he did achieve some legislative success with his yearly
reorganization plans, the political cost he paid make them
Pyrrhic victories at best. Rather than enhance his
reputation, political squabbling, made possible by the
fragmentation of authority inherent in his "bottom-up"
strategy, eroded Carter's reputation as an administrator
who could get reorganization accomplished. The Neustadt
model cannot account for Carter- s behavior since it does
not anticipate the possibility that presidents may be
drawn to certain administrative strategies for reasons
other than a "rational" calculation of costs and benefits,
in other words, the Neustadt model cannot explain why
Carter would pursue a strategy with no apparent political
benefit and fraught with political danger (loss of the
power to persuade)
- and that he would do so over a long
Carter's own Georgia experience suggested these efforts
would fail since he failed to realize his reorganizationgoals at that time as well; Robert Shogun, Promises to
Keep. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1977), 34,.
Gary Fink, Prelude to the Presid^y (westport: Greenwood
Press, 1980), 116; Bruce Mazlish and Edwin Diamond, Jimmy
Carter: A Character Portrait (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1979), 199-200. Consider also the resistance of
Carter's own staff to continuing reorganization plans and
Carter's insistence that they go on; Dennis Riley, Con-
trolling the Federal Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1987), 42; Peter Szanton, Federal
Reorganization: What Have We Learned? (New York: Chatham
House Publishers, 1981), 5.
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period of time. 92 carter' o »~k,- t -s objective" appears to be out-
side the bounds of rationality.
Similarly, one might expect Neustadt to argue Car-
ter's decision to streamline the federal government and
open the budget process to political debate through a zero
based budgeting plan was a rational decision on Carter's
part, seeking to build a successful record of reform and
maximize his influence as a new president. 93 Arnold does
note ZBB was an important element of Carter's plan, men-
tioned in the previous paragraph, to reorganize government
to enhance his ability to persuade. Thus, the link be-
tween reorganization and ZBB suggests both were strategies
employed to similar ends. 94
A closer examination of the Carter record shows this
was hardly the case, however. Carter pursued a method of
budget reform which failed to achieve any of the goals he
set for it, while creating the political liability of a
growing federal budget and fragmenting presidential power,
an "irrational" political act by Neustadt
' s standards.
The "bottom-up" approach as applied to budgeting, as with
92 t_Thus, I would argue, Carter can hardly be seen simply
making a mistake in judgement. Although a fine line
certainly exists between judgmental error and more self-destructive actions, it is difficult to excuse or explain
Carter's continued efforts at reorganization as a judg-
mental miscalculation.
93Neustadt does not directly address Carter's budget
plans; as note 63 mentions, the discussion at 212-20
comes closest to this subject.
94Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency . 1986, 315-16.
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reorganization, guaranteed a variety of parochial forces
would gain strength as the ability of the president to
create coherent, goal oriented change disappeared. 95
Without a forum for debate over policy priorities among
the various agencies and political bodies, the Carter
administration found it lacked any sense of direction. 96
By 1978, even Carter's own Office of Management and Budget
had failed to justify the ZBB reforms using any objective
standard for success. Despite this conclusion, Carter
never wavered in his support for ZBB. indeed, he even
advocated expanding ZBB through multi-year plans, putting
even more of the budget out of his direct control . 97 The
Neustadt model thus cannot account for Carter's budget de-
cisions, in the end. Carter risked his power to persuade
on an objective which he appears to have had no rational
reason to support. 98
95Draper and Pitsvada, " ZBB, " 78.
9Wk Vessel, "Zero-Base Budgeting: Setting National
Priorities Through the Ranking Process," Public Admini-
stration Review 38 (November/December 1978): 524.97 Schick, "The Road From ZBB, " 180.
98An excellent example of the problematic conclusion
arising from such an approach can be found in James Benze,
Jr " Presidential Power and Management Techniques (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 55-75. Benze attempts to
interpret Carter's actions within a framework of enhancing
power, much as Neustadt argues (although Benze is less
than explicit about using Neustadt 1 s approach). in the
end, Benze must admit to being confused as to why Carter
would pursue "bottom-up" reorganization and zero based
budgeting.
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James David Barber's discussion of Carter places him
in the
"active-positive" category; these presidents are
characterized by Barber as presidents who possess
...an orientation toward productive-
ness as a value and an ability to usehis styles flexibly, adaptively,
suiting the dance to the music. He
sees himself as developing over timetoward relatively well defined per-
sonal goals
- growing toward his image
of himself as he might yet be. Thereis an emphasis on rational mastery, on
using the brain to move the feet. 9
9
Like Neustadt, Barber neglects to address Carter's reor-
ganization efforts directly in his discussion of the
Carter presidency. Barber might conclude, however, that
Carter's persistence in achieving his goals was the result
of an active-positive president doggedly trying to achieve
an important goal through a results-producing method.
The limitations of Barber's single unit of analysis,
character, is evident when one considers Carter's reor-
ganization efforts, however. Those efforts were hardly a
productive activity for Carter. In fact, Carter's desire
to pursue a failed policy, despite the evidence of failure
"james David Barber, Presidential Character . 3rd. ed.
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 9.
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and the counsel of his closest advisers, reserves the
behavior of an
"active-negative" president . 100 Nor does
Carter-
s
"bottom-up" strategy reflect a desire to pursue
clear goals: instead, simply allowing problems to
"emerge" as one attempts to reform the bureaucracy ex-
plains how one will conduct reorganization efforts but
tells nothing about what is to be reorganized or why. 101
One might explain Barber's trouble accounting for
Carter's behavior by arguing Barber merely misclassif ied
Carter in the character scheme, that Carter is indeed an
"active-negative," like Richard Nixon. Barber describes
this personality type as possessing
..a compulsive quality, as if the man
were trying to make up for something
or to escape from anxiety into hard
work. He seems ambitious, striving
upward, power seeking. His stance
toward the environment is aggressive
and he has a persistent problem in
managing his aggressive feelings...
Life is a hard struggle to achieve and
hold power, hampered by the condem-
Carter makes no claims to success in his own biography,
a rather startling fact when one considers the time he
spent on reorganization; his account presents the Georgia
record instead and focuses on the goal of reorganization
alone. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam
Books, 1982), 68-71.
10 lMemo, Keith Miles to Peter Szanton, "The Carter
Reorganization Project." Arnold, Making the Managerial
Presidency. 1986, 330. Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour,
Politic s, Position and Power (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), 114-15.
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' s
nations of a perfectionist consci-
ence
.
102
Barber provides a rather lengthy refutation of Carter
characterization as an "active-negative" elsewhere in his
book. 103 Additionally/ the ,.bottom_upll strategy>
emphasis on transferring the power to direct admini-
strative reform to the service level rather than toward
the president, would hardly seem appropriate to a presi-
dent who has a character need to enhance his power. But
neither classification adequately explains Carter's be-
havior. Rather than simply a matter of misclassification,
the troubles with Barber's analysis are problems in
methodology, not application. While Barber's analysis
does move beyond the Neustadt model in considering reasons
why presidents might choose administrative strategies
which seem "irrational" (in terms of maximizing political
power), his analysis of character must rely on the same
"self-fulfilling" assumption built into the Neustadt
approach. Barber assumes Carter's goals were those of any
president seeking change, to promote some policy end, and
then uses selected elements of Carter's past to explain
why he chose to attempt such reform. But as the earlier
analysis suggests, Carter sought reorganization not as a
102 Seidman and Gilmour, Politics, Position and Power .
1986.
inn
,luo Seidraan and Gilmour, Politics, Position and Power .
1986, 401-37.
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means to a policv end hmt-y but to a procedural goal determined
by his political beliefs. In this sense
, Barber u
looking in the wrong place fQr dafca ugefui expiaini^
Carter-
s
behavior, and thus neither of his classifications
can account for Carter's decision to seek reorganization
through a "bottom-up" strategy.
Although carter- b zeal in pursuing budget reform
would also seem to confirm Barber's classification of
Carter as an "active-positive" president, the effect of
ZBB clearly indicates Carter was pursuing a failed budget
policy. 104 Indeed/ the „ clear goaisH sQught ^ act _^_
positives were notably and fatally missing in ZBB proce-
dures: there was no political control over the outcome of
the budget process, no clear method for achieving budget
reform, and no guide for national policy. 105 The „bott
up approach thwarted any attempt on Carter's part to pro-
vide coherence to the budget, and the vague language in
the 0MB directives establishing ZBB simply could not pro-
vide clear goals to individual managers. 106 Zero based
budgeting suffered from the same flaws attending Carter's
other "bottom-up" strategy and, like the reorganization
plan, was precisely the wrong plan for an "active-posi-
tive" (or "active-negative") to accept with an unlimited
and unqualified grant of support.
om-
l° 4Haider, "Zero Base," 402.
105Vessel, "Zero-Base Budgeting," 524.
l° 6Draper and Pitsvada, "ZBB," 78.
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Explaining the Carl-Pr Decision.,. ..^11rf
The "rational decider" and "personality" models can-
not adequately account for Carter's decision to pursue
administrative reform by the strategies described earlier
in this chapter. This section will attempt to account for
those decisions using the "belief systems" model explained
in Chapter One. By assessing the influence of political
beliefs on Carter's selection of reorganization and
budgeting through a "bottom-up" strategy, this chapter
will argue that a better explanation for these admini-
strative choices can be discovered.
Most observers have mistakenly concluded Carter is a
president without any philosophy, a "pragmatist" who holds
no central beliefs. Carter seemed to encourage such con-
clusions by claiming to be neither liberal nor conser-
vative during his August 23, 1976 campaign speech at the
Town Hall Forum in Los Angeles:
In the last analysis, good government
is not a matter of being liberal or
conservative. Good government is the
art of doing what is right, and that
is far more difficult. To be liberal
or conservative requires only ide-
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Las
-es a
:om-
.ing
ology; to do what is right require,,
sensitivity and wisdom. 107
A closer examination of this argument reveals the «bi
trap" described in chapter One: each observer appli
category (..liberal., or
..conservative..,, uses a prede-
termined set of policy positions to define that category,
and concludes since Carter fits in neither category c
fortably he must be without beliefs, mistakenly label
him
..pragmatic...108 If one draws on Carter himself as the
source for his own
..belief system," a recognizable pattern
of ..primitive beliefs" emerges in Carter's speeches and
private papers. Carter does believe in the simple power
of reason, to be sure, but this logical thinking is a
means to a political end, not a belief (or the absence of
belief) itself, it is procedure, and not the particulars
of policy, which captures Carter's attention. 109 instead,
carter believes that the relationship between the govern-
ment and its citizens is the most fundamental and crucial
factor for the functioning of democracy. Nearly every
action taken by the government is judged by Carter on a
l° 7Jimmy Carter, A Government as onnd as its P»np1o (Ne„York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 140.
1 0 8 See, for example, the discussion in Kandy Stoud, How
Jimmy Won (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1977),11-13 and Jules Witcover, Marathon (New York: viking
Press, 1977), 207, 225. Many mistook Carter's hatred for
ideological "boxes" as an admission of "pragmatism"
without realizing pragmatism is itself an ideology.
Presidential Campaign. 1976 vol. I, 1978, 99-100.
109Knott and Wildavsky, "Jimmy Carter's Theory of
Governing, " 49
.
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Standard
°
f b6nefit to i^ividuals, and Carter consist-
ently argues governs must accurately reflect the people
themselves
.
HO
Many of Carter's speeches focus on the "people" and
their importance for government. Like Woodrow Wilson, the
needs and desires of the public, what is best for the
nation and how government can best serve to provide both,
is a constant theme for Carter and the most important pro-
blem for government to resolve. HI included in this ser-
vice is the importance of being democratically accountable
and allowing the people to make their own decisions . 112
As he stated in his inaugural speech as Georgia governor,
Carter considers the people to be the most important
source of action for the government: their active role
gives the government energy and direction. The sole mea-
sure of desirable or effective political action, Carter
argues, is the effect that action has on the people
government is meant to serve. H3
The link between the government and the people thus
takes on the greatest priority in Carter's belief system.
110Carter, Why Not the Best? . 1975, 9.
11:LWhile Carter never specifically discussed the intel-lectual antecedents of his political beliefs, save an
admiration for Reinhold Niebuhr and Bob Dylan, he did feel
a sense of kinship to Wilson's beliefs after reading theformer president's first inaugural address. See Carter
Keeping Faith . 1982, 19.
Mazlish and Diamond, Jimmy Carter; A Character Por-
trait, 1979, 257. Presidential Campaign. 1976 . Vol I
1978, 822-23.
I -I -3
^Carter, A Government as Good as Its People . 1977, 106.
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indeed, Carter describee that link as "fundamental., to
government, one of his
..deeply held beliefs" that had
characterized his decision making throughout his life. 114
He argued during the campaign that this connection had
been lost, claiming
When government becomes cut off fromits people, when its leaders are
talking only to themselves instead of
addressing reality, then it is timefor a process of national self-
renewal, time to look outside the
existing governing class for new
leaders with new ideas. H5
Thus, the Carter promise was to reestablish communication
between the government and its people, not merely to adopt
a particular set of policies.
According to Carter, the most important task for
governance is the maintenance of this link, describing it
as "crucial" to bringing a "closeness and an intimacy
between leaders who have been elected and the people who
put them into office. -H6 one of Carter's often repeated
phrases, almost a litany, explains the only way to guar-
antee the government will be "honest, decent, open, fair
and compassionate" will be to have it reflect the people.
As president, Carter clearly believed he had a special
1 *t A
Carter, A Government as Good as Its People . 1977, 7-8.
115Carter, A Government as Good as Its Peopl e. 1977, 141
116 •
"Questions and Answers in Clinton, Massachusetts Town
Meeting,
" Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter,
1977 , Vol. I, 1978, 396.
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duty to discover and reflect the people's will. As Knott
and Wildavsky explain:
lL°lt
e
l
t0 refl6Ct the P^OPle-s will,the best way to organize government isto make it democratic at the bottom
and centralized at the top. The Pre-
sident, then, as chief hierarch and
ultimate definer of the public in-terest, leaps over group interests
through direct contact with the pop-
ulace. President Carter would ratherinterpret the inchoate desires of the
mass of people than bargain over who
gets what the government offers. 117
As Carter himself explained, "The American people are
competent. I see no reason why our government shouldn't
be competent. The American people are fair. i see no
reason why our government shouldn't be fair. The American
people tell the truth. I see no reason why our government
should conceal the truth or lie. "118 Government loses
those qualities, however, when it becomes distanced from
the people, isolated from their problems and unresponsive
to their needs. 119
As a candidate, Carter spent a great deal of time
conversing with the public and, as he claimed, learning
•'Knott and Wildavsky, "Jimmy Carter's Theory of
Governing, " 63
.
118Presidential Campaign. 1976 . Vol. I, 1978, 822.
Carter, A Government as Good as Its People . 1977, 145.
Presidential Campaign. 1976 . Vol. 1, 1977, 407-9.
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from thera.120 Even cynical Qf ^_
didacy like Jules Witcover were impressed by Carter's
sincere desire to understand the needs and wants of the
Public (Witcover contrasts Carter- s sincerity to Lyndon
Johnson and Richard Nixon's claim to "listen to the
public- as a cynical means to getting elected). 121 As
president, Carter's enthusiasm for this principle occa-
sionally created problems for his staff: during a visit
to Clinton, Massachusetts, Carter buoyantly asked a tele-
vision and radio audience to write him personally about
the problems they were experiencing with government. m
one week alone, the White House was swamped with 87,000
letters, four times the normal amount of mail handled by
the staff. At one point, some 315,000 letters sat
unopened; some 20,000-3 0,000 calls were unanswered,
including calls from members of Congress and various
federal and state officials. 122 carter also participated
in an ambitious, if not somewhat amusing, telephone call-
in program with Walter Cronkite on March 5, 197 7 (the
questions ranged from queries about foreign policy to com-
plaints about particular government services). Carter's
12 0 "August 10, 1977 Interview with Harry Reasoner and Sam
Donaldson for ABC News," Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States, Jimmy Carter. 1977 . vol. II, 1978
1467 .
121jules Witcover, Marathon (New York: Viking Press,
1977), 210. This view of Nixon is certainly consistent
with the conclusion in Chapter Two.
x<6<6Haynes Johnson, In the Absence of Power (New York:
Viking Press, 1980), 153.
156
.e was
Policy of listening to and consulting with the peopl
hardly campaign rhetoric: the Carter Administration too*
an active and vigorous interest in consulting the public.
in addition, the notions of •competence" and "effi-
ciency., are also closely linked to the people in Carter's
ideology: far from mere
..pragmatism." co^etence is meant
to include a moral element of responsiveness. Even the
term "streamlining" is concerned with opening up the
governmental process to public scrutiny and not simple
efficiency. As one examination of Carter's beliefs put
it, "If openness is not a form of godliness for President
Carter, it must come close. "123 Carter himsel£ olaimed
that efficiency is only meaningful if tied to democratic
control over administration, claiming "I don't believe
that the government can be sensitive to people's needs nor
meet those needs effectively unless it is administered
well." m a campaign speech in South Bend, Carter
argued government competence requires citizen partici-
pation to tell administrators where problems exist. He
suggested direct telephone conversations between citizens
and the government were the best way to ensure "compe-
tence" in administration (unlike other descriptions of
1 o "3x* JKnott and Wildavsky, "Jimmy Carter's Theory of
Governing, " 53
.
124
"Remarks at a Breakfast Meeting of the Executive
Finance Committee of the Democratic National Committee,"
Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmv Carter, 1977 . Vol
I, 1977, 190.
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that term, implying administrative expertise or tech-
nology) . 125
Memos concerning reorganization and ZBB continually
and consistently emphasized this version of competence.
For example, a memo to Carter from prp Director pettigrew
noted citizen input reaffirmed "..the Administration
agenda to make government more competent to deal with pro-
blems identified, emphasizing the need to improve govern-
ments treatment of people. "126 Carter even suggested
during the 1976 campaign that his political guidance and
agenda came directly from the people themselves . 127 Jack
Knott and Aaron Wildavsky took note of this desire for
openness when they examined Carter's theory of governing
in 1977:
Carter's espousal of openness is con-
nected in his own mind with direct
access to the people. Just as he
favors giving the people open access
to governmental decision-making, he
plans, as President, to speak directly
to them. He values openness "to let
the public know what we are doing and
to restore the concept in Congress
that their constituents are also my
constituents. I have just as much
right and responsibility to reach the
people for support as a member of Con-
gress does." He also said that he
plans to restore Franklin D. Roose-
125Presidential Campaign. 1976 . Vol. 1, 1978, 999-1000;
224-25.
l26Memo, Richard Pettigrew to the President, September 29,
1977.
127presidential Campaign. 1976 . Vol. 1, 1978, 734-35.
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velt'a
"fireside chat," accept "spe-
^ts-^rtfacttyas°i^-PaSS ^ W"
People's xXS; -
Carter^^T^.^ SPGCial Crests,arter says he will go to the people
the ^
eS
;
Cart6r identifiea himself aspeople. m reviewing his exped-ience with consumer legislation inGeor-gia
,
he said: "The special in-terest groups prevailed on about halfof it. i prevailed - rather the Geor-gia People prevailed - on the other
half . "12 8
Thus, the greatest priority for Carter is the establish-
ment of a direct link between the people and the govern-
ment. Absolutely clear channels of communication must be
provided for democracy to work. 129
The crucial key to this link, Carter concludes, is
government reorganization, and with it zero based
budgeting as a tool for communication. 130 whenever Carter
substantively discussed reorganization, his views were
expressed in terms of government openness and respon-
siveness, not efficiency. in fact, Carter's position on
reorganization during the 1976 campaign repeatedly struck
°Knott and Wildavsky, "Jimmy Carter's Theory of
Governing, " 53
.
129Carter frequently referred to reorganization and budget
reform as his "high priority matter [s].» See Memo, Jimmy
Carter to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
June 29, 1977, "Comprehensive Review of Administrative
Services Delivery," [CF, 0/A 28] [1], Box 270, Domestic
Policy Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Library.
130Presidential Campaign. 1976 . Vol. I, 1978, 736.
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this theme. 131 Although matters of efficiency and
management were often mentioned during that campaign,
Carter justified reorganization on the grounds that it
would bridge the "chasm between the people and govern-
ment. "132 That chasm was w . dened by fche confus . ng
of government, enhancing the power of special interests
and further distancing the people. As Carter explained in
1977,
I want it [government] to work, and I
want it to be so that it can be under-
stood by the American people. I want
to root out the influence of special
interests.
. .And in a complex, con-
fusing bureaucracy, those who are most
influential, most knowledgeable, are
the ones who can derive unwarranted
privilege or benefit. That's not
right. 13 3
Without reorganization, Carter's belief system implied,
government cannot adequately serve its primary communi-
cative function, and would instead communicate only those
messages which advantage special interests. Carter main-
tained the people would "..always have a voice in our
deliberations as a government itself.
"
13 4 indeed, the
people were to be more than one voice among other in-
13 lElizabeth Drew, American Journal (New York: Random
House, 1977), 19.
132Carter, A Government as Good as its People . 1977.
13 3
"Remarks at a Breakfast Meeting," 190.
134Presidential campaign, 1976 . Vol. I, 1978, 293. See
also Johnson, In the Absence of Power , 1980, 193.
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terests. Carter desired
..... partnership between the
People and their governs and not a bridge that has to
be crossed nor a wall that has to be scaled. "135
Carter also argued zero based budgeting had played a
critical role of facilitating communication between
government and citizen during his "Goals for Georgia-
campaign in 1971, allowing the people to outline the types
of programs they desired and thus creating a standard for
ranking various state decision packages; Carter fre-
quently related a story during the campaign (sounding a
bit like Reagan) concerning citizen input from the parents
of handicapped children and the influence their concerns
had over ZBB decisions . 136 This commitment was reflected
in the central place in the budget process given to ZBB by
Carter from the start of his administration. Indeed,
Carter considered public input so important he planned to
settle disputes over ZBB goals between his administration
and Congress by consulting public opinion. 137 For Carter/
ZBB was an act of faith, not traditional budget reform. 13
8
Taking into consideration the nature of Carter's
belief system, as well as the justification Carter gives
for reorganization and budget policy, Neustadt would be
135
"Remarks at a Breakfast Meeting" 191.
l36Johnson, In the Absence of Power . 1980, 21-22, 410-11.
137 Johnson, In the Absence of Power . 1980, 419. Schick,
"The Road From ZBB," 177-78.
138Michael Babunakis, Budget Reform for Government (West-
port: Quorum Books, 1982), 11.
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better able to account for Carter- „ k v ,c 's behavior and the
failure of the administration to live up to «,x the expecta-
t ions of the public. 139 such an unaerstanding aisQ
Plains why carter WQUla adhere ^ bagea buaaetin3 ^
a means of political co^nication between the public ana
the governs. A greater appreciation for the role of
Political beliefs in this decision better explains Car-
ter's choice of strategies.
Similarly, James David Barber s analysis might
benefit from an understanding of Carter's belief
-driven
goal of establishing clear avenues of communication be-
tween the government and its citizens: for Carter to
impose a set of reorganization goals on his efforts (as an
Stephen Skowronek also recognizes Carter's reorganization attempt as a politically costly policy; StephenSkowronek
"Presidential Leadership in Political Time «The President and the Political gv^en ed. Michael
19 sT 2ll27
gt
°:v
D ' C
- : »===5S==1 Quarterly Press,88), 1 1-1 . Skowronek explains Carter's decision to
*Zll\l
e7gan,iZati0n aS 3 m°ment in "Political t!£* inwh1Ch leadership consists of establishing credibility inan enervated regime. To gain a "credible leadershipposture," carter campaigned on and organized an outsider'scrusade against the "moral degeneration" of politicsHowever, Skowronek' s explanation goes on to define thisdegeneration only in terms of efficiency, while Carter
clearly considered efficiency a byproduct of greaterdemocratic control over government, not an end in itselfCarter's reform is thus described by Skowronek in purely
mechanical terms and fails to connect morality to tech-
nical issues. This understanding neglects the possibilitythat the method of reform (the "bottom-up" strategy) may
contain the moral aspect of government and may thereforebe a goal in and of itself. Why did Carter choose this
method and pursue it with such intensity? Skowronek 's
account does not offer an answer to either question.
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"active-positive.. might be expected fco ^ ^ ^^
Purpose of a "bottom-up" strategy is to receive messages
from the public would make little or no sense. Past
-conization plans called for chanffes which would come
from government planners, such as the Ash Council, and not
the public, carter hoped to use reorganisation to make
government reflect the public and not the planners, m-
deed, any other form of reorganization would defeat the
very purpose of reform, according to Carter's belief sys-
tem. The same argument can be applied to the budget
Process: a "top-down" decision making process for budget
Planning would close off the very conduit for learning the
priorities and needs of the American people by replacing
them with those of government planners. Both reorgani-
zation and zero based budgeting were critical to the
achievement of Carter 'n nnai a •c e s goals, but inappropriate for an
"active-positive" president.
Political beliefs explain the decisions of Jimmy
Carter more completely than the traditional approaches of
presidential studies and public administration. As one
understands Carter's central beliefs, one can also
understand why the strategies of "bottom-up" reorgani-
zation and zero based budgeting were selected. Further-
more, the reasons Carter would cling to those strategies
even as the evidence of failure was plainly clear to both
outside observers and his own staff becomes more under-
standable when the powerful effect of beliefs on decision
163
-King is considered. without this understanaingi ^
actions of Carter see. to mafce no sense; ^^ ^
understanding, the exercise of administrative peer is
better explained.
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CHAPTER IV
BELIEF AND "SUCCESS-" tht? de.^»„ ~THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY
in the previous chapter, I demonstrated the dele-
terious role political beliefs can often play in decision
making: led by a strong belief in the importance of
citizen input, Jimmy Carter selected a set of admini-
strative strategies which frustrated his attempts to
reorganize the federal government and to create a new
budget policy. As Minar noted in Chapter One, while it is
difficult to prove a belief causes decisions to be made,
chiefly because presidents often provide explanations for
behavior which strike a "pragmatic" tone, one can
associate beliefs with decisions by demonstrating the
influence ideas have over the decision maker and re-
examining the decision in that light. Certainly this
process is easiest to demonstrate when the policy decision
has "failed," since the determination of the decider to
stick to a strategy which creates failure is difficult to
explain by any other means.
165
A .ore difficult methodological issue is raised, how-
ever, when the decision made by a president leads to
"successful., policy, where success is defined as policy
which seems to achieve the goals the president sets for
action. The language of such a definition is dependent,
however, on the
..rational decider., model: One assumes
••success" has been achieved when goals are reached, if
one cannot always determine what the goals were with
accuracy, however, the
..rational decider" model can only
assume they existed based on the end result of the deci-
sion, it is this difficulty which confounds discussions
of political beliefs.
This chapter examines one "successful" president,
Ronald Reagan, and his choices of administrative strategy
on reorganization and budgeting. The chapter will argue
that while these decisions seem "successful," the results
of each decision in fact frustrated Reagan's apparent
goals. in other words, Reagan did in fact get what he
wanted, but he did so by pursuing a strategy which under-
mined the explanation and assumed goals found in the
"rational decider" and "personality" models. Sections one
and two describe those choices and the consequences they
produced. Section three again analyzes those decision
using these "classic" models, arguing that the goals each
model must assume existed in Reagan's mind cannot account
for the decisions made by Reagan. The final section will
reexamine Reagan's decisions in light of his political
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beliefs ana win demonstrate tne celief system" model
- explains Reagan , s behavior< ^ ^
restricted to the public press and . i i •a limited number of
memoirs, a opnerai „
' ge l sense of the mi « ~*nn role of political beliefsin decision making can be traced a1 K „ ,
. „ fc
CS
'
albeit **** clearly thanin the previous chapters a« m«P . s more material becomes avail-
able, a clearer connection may be established.
A. Reorc gnizinq Admini Bhra . i Qn , Tne Rpagan Rp^^
Ronald Reagan.
s commitment to controlling the federal
bureaucracy. like Nixon , s and Carter . g> ^^^
clear during Ms campaign for the presidency in 1980. The
Pride of the Reagan campaign was the candidates professed
belief in "conservative activism:"! a willingness to pre-
sent new ideas for governing while remaining true to con-
servative principles. 2 Reagan ran his campaign on the
promise that he would simnlifv i-v, 0pi ty the government and reduce
lone should note that the term "conservative" is used hereXyp£±SSS id ^°se whom Reagan believed
!
Political eology. The term "conservative" should
use of the ter^
1
" *°* *
hm**i ! "ideology;" instead, there is no short-and way to refer to Reagan-s belief system, a fulldefinition of what is meant by "conservative" in thiscontext is offered in section four.
^
Candidates 1980 (Washington, D.C.: CongressionalQuarterly Press, 1980), 58.
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It. size.3 Reagan , s iQaugurai addregs force£uiiy statea
that
....government is not the solution to our problem.
Government U tha problem„ anfl Reagan
_ ^
bring the legitimate activities of the federal government
under tighter presidential control.
4
To regain that control, however. Reagan eschewed the
traditional tools of earlier administrations in his
attempt to reorganize the federal government. Por exam-
Pie, while carter's reorganization took the form of
changes in department authority <guided by the
..bottom-up.,
strategy)
,
Reagan argued reorganization itself was a time
consuming process which tended to destabilize government
rather than improve its performance, clearly, Reagan's
intention was not to completely dismantle the federal
government as a set of governing institutions; instead,
the administration used limited reorganization plans at
the agency level and rejected government-wide programs of
restructuring. 5 Even these limited reorganization efforts
concentrated action solely in the area of management,
leaving the basic structure of the federal agencies intact
3james Ceaser, "The Theory of Governance of the ReaganAdministration," The Reaoan Administration and theGoverning of America
, eds. Lester Salamon and Michael Lund(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984),
7 9-80
.
4Reaqari's First Year (Washington, D.C.: CongressionalQuarterly Press, 1982), 109.
5Chester Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal - The Reagan
Presidency: Limited Government and Political Admini-
stration," Public Administration Review 43 (January/Feb-
ruary 1983 ) : 13 .
168
and avoidi„g the redrawlng Qf government „ orffanization
charts . "
6
in place of traditional reorganization, the Reagan
administration substituted a plan for the centralization
of the federal government through the upper levels of the
executive branch, creating a "clearing house" for admini-
strative action. Rather than divesting agencies of
authority, Reagan altered agency practices to give the
upper levels of each agency and his own White House staff
a firm hand to control agency activity. 7 The plan called
for the careful selection of loyal cabinet members whose
beliefs were compatible with those of the president, as
well as the screening of new appointees for loyalty to the
Reagan agenda, while the Reagan plan seemed to be a
radical departure from more traditional reorganization
reforms, Reagan was following a trend toward the politi-
cization of the bureaucracy which had been developing
since the late 1960
-s (although Reagan was adopting a form
of this trend which greatly expanded his control). 8 In
essence, the federal government would be recaptured by
6James L. Garnett, "Operationalizing the Constitution via
Administrative Reorganization: Oilcans, Trends and Pro-
verbs '" Public Administrat ion Review 47 ( January/Februarv
1987): 38.
7Elizabeth Sanders, "The Presidency and the Bureaucratic
State," The Pres idency and the Political Svahftm . ed.
Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1988), 383-86.
8Margaret Wyszomirski, "The De-Institutionalization of
Presidential Staff Agencies," Public Administration Review
42 (September/October, 1982): 448-458.
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ending the
..government of strangers" with the right
exercise of executive power, as the critics of Hugh Hecio
predicted in chapter One. As Reagan's Director of the
Presidentiai Personnei Office put it,
...if you are going
to run the government, you've got to control the people
that come into it."
9
The task was enormous, as Reagan discovered upon
taking office. His own Executive Office had grown to 1700
employees even after Carter's radical restructuring, with
an operating budget in excess of 120 million dollars. 10
One of Reagan ra first acts as president wag a
freeze on government employment and the dismissal of many
non-partisan, long-term clerical, secretarial and other
support personnel from the White House if their loyalty to
the Administration's program was at all in question. As
Martin Anderson claimed, "They [staff] were treated as
Presidential appointments even when they were not. it was
also made clear that, with very few exceptions, all incum-
bent employees should be fired." 11
9James Pfiffner, "Political Appointees and Career Exe-
cutives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third
Century," Public Administration Review 47 (January/Feb-
ruary 1987 ) : 59 .
10John Burke, "The Institutionalized Presidency," The
Presidency and the Political System , ed. Michael Nelson
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988)
355-377
.
1:LNewland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 5. Martin Anderson,
Revolution (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich,
1988), 199.
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in addition to these firings, there were long delays
in cabinet level appointments while the administration
carefully screened the nominees for their
.-ideological"
loyalties. 12 As Laurence Lynn, Jr
., explains:
The primary qualification for appoint-
ment
- overshadowing managerial
competence and experience or famili-
arity with issues - appeared to be the
extent to which an appointee sharedthe president's values and would be
reliable and persistent both in trans-fusing these values into agency prac-tices and in executing central direc-
tives bound to be unpopular in his or
her agency. 13
The Cabinet also took on a new role in the admini-
stration, playing an important, but not leading, role in
policy formulation. in this sense, the Reagan administra-
tion had an active Cabinet without operating as a "cabi-
net-style" government: the Cabinet was to act as a broker
between elements of the government and was to coordinate
the implementation of the Reagan agenda, but would not
serve as a decision making body on its own or apart from
the President.
I
4 On the critical economic issues, Reagan
12Richard Nathan, "The Reagan Presidency in Domestic
Affairs," in The Reaaan Presidency; An Early Assessment ,
ed. Fred Greenstein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1983), 72.
13Laurence Lynn, Jr., "The Reagan Administration and the
Renitent Bureaucracy, " The Reaaan Presidency and the
Governing of America, eds . Lester Salamon and Michael Lund
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984), 340.
14Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 5-10.
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reserve* decision making to himself
. ^^
stration considered the appoints of Cabinet officials
c-cia! to the s^ful implementation Qf ^
m this way, Martin Anderson has argued the "ideologue-
capture the White House decision making dynamic.15 By
staffing the Cabinet with loyal supporters, Heagan could
have some confidence the members would not become
-cap-
tured" by their individual departments.
The Reagan plan for recapturing the bureaucracy was
also exercised at the agency level. Using the authority
Carter had secured in the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, Reagan took great care to appoint a conservative to
head the Office of Personnel Management.16 This office,
along with the Presidential Personnel Office, placed its
greatest priority on the selection of loyal "lower level"
employees. Pendleton James elevated the "ideological"
selection of appointees to new heights, according to many
observers. Although James did consult with the relevant
Cabinet members when selecting subcabinet staff members,
15Anderson, Revolution, 1988, 164, 157-58. Lou Cannon
argues a better description would speak of regional(Californians versus non-Californians ) or personal(Nancy's allies versus Nancy's foes) divisions. See LouCannon
'
President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime ( New
York: Putnam and Sons, 1991), 160.
16Edie Goldenberg, "The Permanent Government in an Era of
Retrenchment and Redirection," The Reaoan Presidency anri
the Governing of America
. eds . Lester Salamon and Michael
Lund (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984)
384.
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new
in-
the final aeolsion Qn these appointments restea
-it. House. 17 Onoe appointed; these reuabiy
members were
"blanketed in „ fcy passing a series Qf
civil servioe refQrm laws fco cQnfer ^ ^
cumbents. 1 ^
The new appointees were exn^t-^ «-pected to do more than sim-
Ply occupy offices. Reagan was counting Qn^ ^ ^
Pressure on the Cabinet members to »toe the line.- a plan
for control which had proven successful for Covernor Rea-
gan in Caii£ornia .19 As ,.Agent ProvooateurS/ .. ^
appointees were given
. greater degree of freedom to act
as they believed fit, increesing their personel influence
while altering the agency for which they labored. 20 if an
agency was staffed by long tenured employees not loyal to
conservative principles, the administration took steps to
"gag., the bureaucrats by limiting their contacts with Con-
gress and the press. 21 In adaition
, threatened reductlons
in force (RTFs) and transfers were used to intimidate more
recalcitrant employees. 22
On balance, the efforts of the Reagan administration
to bring the federal government under control were vigor-
1 7Anderson, Revolution
. 1988, 198-99.
39?-92
SrS/ PreSidency and the Bureaucratic State,"
^Nathan, "The Reagan Presidency in Domestic Affairs," 76.
Lynn, "The Reagan Presidency and the Renitent Bureau-
cracy, " 355-61.
21Reaaan 's First YPar . 1982, 25.
22 Sanders, "The Presidency and the Bureaucratic State,"
3 94 .
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ous, far caching, and remarkably successful
_ There
little or no dissention within the early atodlll!ttitloa
(although this changed later), according to Martin Ander-
son, compared to similar periods in other presidencies. 2
3
While the new appointees may not have always agreed with
policy strategies and priorities of the administration,
Joel Aherhach and Bert RocKman compared the appointees to
those of Richard Hixon and concluded Reagan's appointees
maintained a higher degree of agreement with the president
on basic questions of political belief. 24 Lacking faifch
in traditional reorganisation approaches, Reagan succeeded
in centralizing executive power in the white House by
carefully appointing ideological allies in the bureaucracy
and intimidating those who did not share the administra-
tion's set of beliefs. In this sense, Reagan's reorgani-
zation was very different from that of Carter: Reagan
required no reorganization plans and therefore no "Prp»,
Reagan also required no legislative authority or acqui-
escence; finally, Reagan achieved his "reorganization"
through political, not structural, change. For all these
reasons, Reagan created the most politicized administra-
23Anderson, Revolution . 1988, 200.
O A
M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnel, "Ide-
ology and Economic Policy, " Looking Back on the Reaaan
Presidency, ed. Larry Berman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990), 122-155.
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tion since Franklin Roosevelt by changing the personnel,
not the structure, of administration. 2
5
During the 1980 presidential campaign, candidate
Reagan outlined his plans for economic change along with
his reorganization plans: simplification and reduction of
the federal government as part of a pledge to rein in
spending while providing citizens with a tax "break" to
stimulate economic growth. 26 while the details of supply
side economics are unimportant for this discussion, it is
important to note the central role budgeting was to play
in the Reagan plan for domestic policy. Previous presi-
dents had used budget policies to guide resource allo-
cation, but Reagan redefined the budget process in poli-
tical terms. Indeed, this section will argue the budget
literally became the vehicle for the new "activism. "27
A large electoral college victory helped Reagan claim
a mandate for his "revolution;" however, the gains made
by Republicans in the Senate were even more important to
^Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 3.
26Reaqan's First Year , 1982, 109.
27 For the best single summary of "supply side" principles,
see Paul Roberts, The Supply Side Revolution (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984).
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sers
was
n-
exe-
or-
se
Reagan, s legislative plans.28 Reagan anfl ^ ^.
realized that action on the budget would have to take
Place almost immediately if Doniii=,r- =Y 11 P°Pular support for reform
to be harnessed. 29 To = -guarantee his success, Reagan ce
tralized decision making in the upper levels of the
cutive branch (as described in the previous section,, f
mulated his economic policy agenda in a circle of clo
advisers, and gave a frpp han^ 4-~yea r ee d to a trustworthy believer
in Reagan-
s
econoraic principles, Office of Management and
Budget Director David Stockman.30 stockman guickiy^
ized that the only hope for budget reform lay in avoiding
other elements of the administration and Congress, in-
cluding members of the Cabinet. By establishing a budget
working group, Stockman managed to completely eliminate
opportunities for obstruction by upper levels of the exe-
cutive branch. 31 m essence, OMB operated without poli-
28Hugh Heclo and Rudolph Penner, "Fiscal and PoliticalStrategy in the Reagan Administration," The Reagan
Presidency: An Early Ass^smpnt
, ed. Fred Greenstein(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982), 24-25 See alsoNxgel Bowles, The White House and gagita] Hil] (Oxford-Clarendon Press, 1985), 219.
29Laurence Barrett, Gambling with Hishnry (Garden CityDoubleday and Company, 1983), 83-84.
30Lester Salamon and Alan Abramson, "Governance - The
Politics of Retrenchment," The Reagan B^orri . eds. John
Palmer and Isabel Sawhill (Cambridge: Ballinger Pub-lishing Company, 1984), 40-48. Howard Shuman, Politics
and the Budget (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1988),
249-50. More generally (and with some exaggeration), see
David Stockman, The Triumph of Polit-.jpg (New York: Harper
and Row, 1986 ) .
31William Greider, "The Education of David Stockman,"
Atlantic 24 8 (December, 1981): 33; Howard Shuman,
176
tical challenge within the Cabinet (with the notable
exception of the Secretary of Defense, who was consent
of Reagan, s cogent to building up America's military
Posture,, ana the
..top-down., centralists of the admini-
stration also precluded reviews of omrt 0MB recommendations by
the agencies themselves . 32 Administrators were kept as
far away as possible from the budget process, the reverse
of the Carter "bottom-up" approach to budget formulation,
in order to prevent any further bureaucratic resistance . 33
The second key element to this plan, of course, was the
reorganization plan described in section one.
Stockman worked so quickly, in fact, that Reagan was
able to submit his budget revisions for FY 1982 a brief
seven weeks after taking office. 34 The new administra-
tion's proposal called for a large tax cut and sizable,
across the board spending cuts in every domestic spending
area; the message also briefly outlined budget changes
Politics and the Budget (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall
1988), 249; Glenn Pascall, The Trillion Dollar Bn^ t-
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985), 8.32Allen Schick, "The Budget as an Instrument of Presi-
dential Policy," The Reaaan Presidency and the Governing
of America
,
eds. Lester Salamon and Michael Lund (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984): 91.
Joel Krieger, Reaaan. Thatcher and the Politics of Decline
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 184-85.
33campbell, Managing the Presidency . 1986, 183-84.
Schick, "The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential
Policy," 96-97.
34R0bert Hartman, "Congress and Budget -Making, " Political
Science Quarterly 97(Fall 1982), 389.
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Reagan would seek over the next three years.35 Gaining
legislative approval of these proposals would be diffi-
cult, however, as Stockman and others guickly realized 36
The "Reagan Revolution" itself had hardly won a ringing
endorsement in the fall elections, and the new admini-
stration was guite aware of the potency of the political
forces they planned to challenge. m a sense, the only
way Reagan could win the budget
..game" was to change the
rules, and he did so by changing the nature of the budget
reconciliation process created by the Congressional Budget
and impoundment Control Act of 1974. To bypass Congress,
Reagan called for the use of reconciliation procedures at
the beginning, not the end, of the budget process, a
legislative "preemptive strike." The move was not a mere
technicality: In essence, the administration had captured
the legislative agenda and excluded congressional bar-
gaining in the budget process in a single step. 37
By choosing to short circuit the congressional budget
process, Reagan hoped to gain the same results he achieved
by short circuiting his own Cabinet: passage of deep
budget cuts with little or no political resistance and
35 Schick, "The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential
Policy," 102-103. Reagan's First Year . 1982, 27.
36Greider, "The Education of David Stockman," 36-39.
37Allen Schick, Reconciliation and the Congressional
Budget Process (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981). See also
Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline .
1986, 182-83; Shuman, Politics and the Budget . 1988, 252;
Reagan's First Year . 1982, 32.
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with Uttt. examination by hostile agents of individual
interests.38 ln the ^^ ^^ ^
Senate passed the first Concurrent Resolution in AprU.
and the House passed the
"Gra^-Latta I» bill on May , 39
A compromise version of Gramm-Latta was passed later that
month, after only two days of floot debate .40 The M11
passed so quickly, in farh f-* = 4-Y. t ct, that no member knew exactly
what had been cut under the new compromise. 41
To guarantee the cuts would remain in place, the
Reagan team shortly realized, a second round of budget
cuts would be needed and the earlier cuts reaffirmed.
Within two months, a second Gramm-Latta bill was proposed
and debated. But Reagan's advisers were more reluctant to
engage in this particular battle.42 The administration,
flush with its victory in the first round of budget cuts,
had launched a second legislative initiative to reform the
Social Security system. Reagan had readily endorsed the
proposal, having spent years criticizing the government's
program, but resistance came quickly and the Congress was
in no mood to compromise after the early defeat. Reagan
38Jean Peters, "Reconciliation 1982: What Happened'" PSXIV (Fall 1981): 732-36. Bowles, The White House and
""
Capital Hill . 1985, 231.
39Reaoan 's First Ysar . 1982, 33.
40Hartman, "Congress and Budget-Making," 389-90.
41Dale Tate, "Reconciliation Conferees Face Slim Choices,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 39 (July 4, 1981)-'
1167.
42 Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1982)
334-35.
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continued to insist on reform for Social Security even
after his aides persuaded him that the bad feeling created
in the first Gramm-Latta battle had robbed him of his
earlier coalition, and that his efforts were better spent
in securing those first budget cuts. 43
"Son of Gramm-Latta," as the bill was tagged, was in
trouble as well. Reagan found that after two short months
his coalition had begun to collapse, with Democrats or-
ganizing themselves to resist the administration and sup-
porters resenting the administration's
"short circuit."
As Salamon and Abramson explain,
In short, faced with a significant
opportunity to forge a moderate-
conservative coalition in both the
House and Senate behind a program of
domestic spending constraint and
military growth, Ronald Reagan had
tended to stake out an extreme posi-
tion, and hold out for the "whole
loaf" when it has seemed clear to most
that two-thirds of the loaf is all the
political system will accommodate.
Although a case can be made that this
represents an effective bargaining
strategy, the costs are considerable
in terms of the staying power of the
administration's policies and the
consolidation of a workable coalition
in Congress. By 1983, in fact, moder-
ate Democrats in the House felt the
president had cut the ground out from
under them, and even Republican sup-
port for the administration had de-
teriorated considerably 44
43Barrett, Gambling With History . 1983, 154-59.
44Salamon and Abramson, "Governance," 60.
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There is little doubt that the political gains made
in 1982 came at a high political price . Reagan . s early
success came hy holding together
. remarkably cohesive
coalition, hut resentment over his politicization of the
budget process forced the early collapse of that coali-
tion. 45 By 1982> Reagan , s advisers fcnew oomprom . se
Congress would he necessary, even if Reagan himself re-
fused to engage in such compromise. The members of the
Reagan team found themselves in an awkward position:
trying to convince their own president that the approach
which led to such swift and far reaching victory in 1981
had now yielded stalemate and deadlock. Most of the mem-
bers of congress were angry that the White House had
usurped a tool Congress had created to control presi-
dential power to press the passage of the Reagan budget.
House Ways and Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski seemed to
summarize the mood of Congress best when he told his
colleagues
:
As one who served in Congress through
a succession of administrations, I
find it genuinely alarming to see a
pattern developing on major pieces of
legislation in which the work product
of the committee system can be cyni-
cally discarded in favor of substitute
5Allen Schick, "How the Budget Was Won and Lost," Presi
dents and Congres s: Assessing Reaoan's First Y^r . ed.
Norman Ornstein (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), 15-19.
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niaeaway.
.
.
[the result] leaves the in-stitution [Congress] weaker, for it
ti
n
ilt\t° Republlca"s and Democratsal ke the opportunity to write andtake responsibility for our work pro-duct. 46
The effect of the earlier decisions was even more
keenly felt in the effort to achieve the second, and
perhaps more important, element for Reagan's budget stra-
tegy: tax reduction, while tax policy is often con-
sidered a separate subject from budgeting, the Reagan
approach linked the two fiscal elements in a new way. As
Aaron Wildavsky explains,
President Reagan thought of budgets aspolitical instruments. As he saw it,
Democrats were using spending to
create constituents
.. .To prevent this,
Reagan brought in his children's al-
lowance theory, namely, the way to
stop spending was not to issue endless
admonitions but to cut down on the
allowance. If you took the tax money
away, Congress wouldn't have it to
spend. Believing the budget was about
political economy, not just economic
economy, the president radically re-
versed the conventional wisdom, which
held that spending had to be cut be-
fore taxes could be lowered. 47
^Reagan's First Year . 1982, 35.
47Aaron Wildavsky, "if You Can't Budget, How Can You
Govern?" Thinking About America; The United States in the
1990 ' s > eds. Annelise Anderson and Dennis Bark (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 269.
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One might expect passage of a tax reduction to be a
rather simple matter, as giving money i s always more
Popular than taxing money. True to the description^
by Salamon and Abramson, however, the administration chose
to »go for broke," in the words of one Treasury Department
official. 48 Fresh on the heels of Gramm-Latta II, the
administration secured the tax reduction package on July
29. But the victory was short lived, as the economy
failed to respond in the manner predicted by the Reagan
team. The "whole loaf," which Congress had again granted,
began to appear to be a mistake. Republicans in the
Senate, led by Pete Domenici as chair of the Budget
Committee, proposed tax increases only two months after
the tax package had passed, suggesting the coalition had
further collapsed and the support from Senate Republicans
was drifting away from the administration. 49
By the start of 1982, a cadre of Reagan's strongest
supporters, including Domenici, Bob Dole and Paul Laxalt,
were warning Reagan that he could no longer count on the
support of Senate Republicans and demanding Reagan accept
a set of tax increases. Reagan angrily rejected their
proposals, later arguing some in the Senate had "chickened
a little" but admitting his own advisers were among those
clucking the grim news. 50
48Barrett, Gambling With History
. 1983, 170.
49Barrett, Gambling With History
. 1983, 184-85.
50Barrett, Gambling With History . 1983, 338-346.
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Assessing the Reaffan deoision ^ ^
shortcut budget prooeaures is di£ficui^ since ^
tOrU0
°
f 1981 e ««1— effects of this
fiscal policy wiU re-nain a subject for debate among
POlitic.1 scientists ana economists for see time . How-
ever, few can aeny the aeficits generatea ^ ^^
budget contributed greatly to the fiscal crisis the
country races todey.Sl The q£ ^ ^ ^
to debete the „isdom of Reagan .s budget, insteed. the
focus should remein on the budget stretegy Reagan
selected.
The resistance to a second round of reconciliation,
as well as the political fallout from a $200 billion
deficit, forced Reagan to finally agree to meet with Con-
gressional leaders, the so-called "Gang of 17," and to
barter for budget cuts with some tax increases and a
reduction in the amount of defense spending. To preserve
the principles of his economic plan, Reagan had finally
begun to realize he would have to compromise on the
details of its implementation. 52 The mere fact that Rea-
gan was willing to trade these important concessions for
relatively meager budget cuts demonstrates just how
51Joseph Minarik and Rudolph Penner, "Fiscal Choices "Challenge to Leadership
, ed. Isabel Sawhill (Washington,
D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1988), 281.
52Minarik and Penner, "Fiscal Choices," 38-9; Schick,
"The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential Policy, "' 104
-
105; Barrett, Gambling with Hist-.ory
. 1983, 362-63.
184
damaging the "short circuit" k„had been to congressional-
executive regions. 53 It would be erroneoug ^
economic program as he did not reject all attempts to
compromise on the particulars. Ironically, those who
argue Reagan was merely a "pragmatist" ignore the length
of time and the even larger amount of pressure from within
his own administration Reagan had endured to arrive at
this moment. Arguing Reagan had "retreated" from his
agenda would be similar to arguing the South had abandoned
Vicksburg: the final result is captured, but the true
nature of the siege is forgotten.
The new round of budget haggling, coupled with an
economic recession, tarnished the image of the unbeatable
Ronald Reagan and contributed to mid-term losses in the
1982 Congressional elections for the GOP. 54 Indeed, by
1983 Congressional resistance to Reagan's control over the
This conclusion cannot ignore other factors contributing
^q«o *
deClsion
'
however. Certainly the recession of1982 helped to speed the demise of the Reagan coalition inCongress, as joblessness (as one indicator) reached a peakof 9* in May of that year. Such contributing factors do
not mitigate the argument that Reagan had, in effect
"burned his bridges" with Congress, preventing the formu-lation of more short term and limited compromises onbudget and tax policy. See the discussion in Jack Germond
and Jules Witcover, Wake Us When Its Ov^r (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985), 33-35 for a brief
summary of these pressures.
54Jeff Fishel, Presidents and Promises (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985), 151. Heclo and
Penner, "Fiscal and Political Strategy in the Reagan
Administration," 31-33.
185
budget process resulted in6(1 l the Pronouncement that the FY
1*84 hudget was „ aead on arrivai „ ^ conoress
_ ^ ^
budget process refined out of the contrQl o£ ^^
House for the reminder of Reagan . s ^ ^ ^
Keaga^s decision to centralize and control the hudget
Process virtually destroyed that procedure, costing him
the very success he sought in the future. 56
£j Explaini.no l-hc Reagan Pfniaiwu. " Classic" gtujj es
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, one
could interpret Reagan- s actions in reorganization and
budget reform as "successes:" the administration was
"politicized" in the manner Reagan desired and the budget
process was manipulated to administration ends. This
section will argue, however, that these actions were in
fact destructive to what seemed to be Reagan's goals. To
do this, an examination of the "rational decider" and
"personality" models is necessary.
55John Crawford, "Budget Standoffs Characterize the ReaganYears '" Congressional Quarterly Weekly wppnrM- 45 (October
24, 1987): 2572.
56 Schick, "The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential
Policy," 113-14; Fishel, Presidents and Promise . 1985,
181.
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^^1^ was publlshea before the Reagan
Presidency began, but Richard ^ ^
earlier editions that presidential staffs play an im-
portant role in the success of a president, as noted in
Chapter Two. The most recent edition of Neustadt's work
does little to expand upon or explain his advice on this
matter. Earlier, Neustadt had argued executive officials
at the cabinet and sub-Cabinet levels, must be persuaded
into cooperation, since the "literary theory of the Con-
stitution., does not reflect the realities of presidential
power. 57 As notea ia chapter Two> hQwe^ ^ ^
some confusion about Neustadt
• s recommendation for presi-
dential decisions on administrative policy: does a
president select loyal staff members, thus guaranteeing
the efficient exercise of executive power, or will one run
a dangerous risk, like Nixon, of having loyal staff mem-
bers take the president's wishes "too far?" As Chapter
Two notes, Neustadt believes Nixon chose badly, but must
reduce his argument to a condemnation of Nixon's person-
ality to save his theory.
Neustadt 's treatment of Reagan in the most recent
edition of Presidenti al Power further illustrates the
problem of the "managerial presidency," to again recall
57Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Wiley
and Sons, 1980), 29-33.
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Arnold's terminology. Bv fiin««SY. y lling presidential appoint-
»ents with of£lcials whQ are^ ^ Reaffan s
Neustadt might arffue Reagan haa fQuna a ^ ^ auaran_
tee a successful presidency without the risk Qf
"insecure- personality, mdeed. the reputation and pres-
tige enjoyed by a preSident among his hand-picked advisers
would virtually guarantee the success Neustadt argues
every president needs. Barbara ir„i iKellerman praises Reagan's
actions in 1981 for exactly these reasons when she uses
Neustadt 'S framework to examine the "political presi-
dency." Kellerman argues Reagan followed Neustadt'
s
recommendations to achieve early success, and was able to
skillfully persuade others to accept the 1981 budget
through good marketing and "consummate" political leader-
ship. 5 8
Neustadt 's interpretation of Reagan's decisions on
the budget describes a president who simultaneously dis-
played detachment and conviction, while Neustadt notes
Reagan was "not dumb, •' he blames David Stockman for Rea-
gan 's strong commitment to the budget and tax policies. 5 9
His explanation for the depth of Reagan's convictions
echoes the Barber analysis once again, however unwit-
tingly. Just as Neustadt 's accounting of Richard Nixon's
behavior ultimately relies on an assessment of person-
58Barbara Kellerman, The Political Presidency (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 220-253.
59Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern
Presidents (New York: Free Press, 1990), 276-279.
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lity. his explanation of Reagan , s oonfidence ig
President's reaction to Us <audieaoe^ ^ a^logical need for their approval ^ applause
_
60 ^ ^
end, Heustadt's analysis returns to . defense of a
successful method which, unfortunately. has o£ten
used by the wrong presidents.
*he errors in Neustadt's analysis sprinff from Ms use
of sources as well an m 0 *.us hls theory, particularly when de-
scribing Reagan's budget and tax policies Bv re i •" AU ' y lying on
David Stockman-s account, Neustadt
.ay unwittingly adopt
an erroneous view of Reagan's decisions, while a more
lengthy description of Reagan's political beliefs follows
it is worth noting here that Neustadt seems to accept an
image of the Reagan presidency which is coming under in-
creasing reconsideration, without access to the documents
of the administration, analysis of the Reagan White House
must necessarily rely on the later accounts of chief
aides. But uncritical acceptance of the account of a
young Budget Director with a very large axe to grind seems
unwise, particularly when that account is peppered with
sweeping conclusions based on rather shaky evidence.
For example, Stockman claims Reagan had little
interest in economic theory or the realities of budget
cutting, basing this conclusion on the absence of detailed
instruction from Reagan and the president's failure on an
60Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidency
,1990, 273-74.
189
••economics test" administered by stockman
. As notefl both
earlier and i„ the next section
, ^^
gave such detailed instruction, confident that his hand-
picked loyalists could be relied upon to find the most
palatable method for implementing the principles Reagan
articulated. His strategy for •reorganization from with-
in" made such instruction unnecessary, and Reagan never
pretended to possess the technical knowledge necessary to
get the legislative job done, while this may reflect a
shortcoming on the part of Reagan, it can hardly be con-
cluded that Reagan was uninterested in the economic policy
of his administration.
The second charge raised by Stockman is more serious,
since it does suggest ignorance. Again, while a full
account of Reagan's beliefs must wait, it is worth noting
that Stockman's test was hardly a worthy gauge of Reagan's
knowledge. The correct answers on Stockman's test were
written to conform to the outcomes Stockman considered
necessary, while discretion could reasonably be expected
to lead Reagan to different choices. In other words, the
answers Reagan gave were "wrong" only so far as they de-
viated from the legislative plan Stockman had constructed.
Thus, Reagan's failing grade may reflect a disagreement on
the particulars of the legislative strategy, precisely the
aspect of policy making Reagan chose to avoid by selecting
190
Stockman, as well an n,a * •,.s the failing Stockman attributed to
Reagan in the first part of hig charge>61
Neustadt goes even further in hig _ ^
arguing Reagan committed a second error. His analysis
stems from a rather lengthy treatment of the Xran-Contra
affair, and his conclusions are tainted by the lessons of
that event. Neustadt argues Reagan's lack of
-relevant
experience- in foreign affairs and his inability to access
those with such experience left him vulnerable to the
activities of North and Poindexter . 62 ThuS/ a greafcer
background in foreign policy would have saved Reagan from
ignorance about the arms for hostage deal and the
diversion of funds to the Contras.
interestingly, the only independent account of the
Reagan administration has emerged from the investigations
and trials surrounding the Iran-Contra affair. Although
it is beyond the scope of this project to assess the
evidence presented in the public record, it is worth
noting that more complete investigations are also revising
the image of a "helpless" Reagan. Theodore Draper's
compilation of the record has clearly demonstrated the
quite active role played by Reagan in directing the over-
tures to the Iranian government. Confirming the earlier
conclusion about Reagan's involvement in his admini-
stration, Draper does not conclude Reagan actually con-
61Cannon, President Reacran . 1991, 153.
62Cannon, President Reaaan . 1991, 308-312.
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cerned himself with the dav t-«6 a y-to-day operations of the
National Security staff. However, he does argue Heagan
agreed with the foreign policy principles involved
, gpoke
with authority and inteiligence at planning meetings, ana
Provided a good deal more instruction than the Tower
Commission report had indicated. 63 Alreadv fh -x ay, t is early
Pee, into the operations of the White House sug3ests many
have been underestimating Reagan's involvement in his own
administration. It la a safe leap ^ ^
ment extended even more deeply into economic policy, a
subject of equal or more importance during the early ad-
ministration.
Reagan's surprisingly successful first year in office
would seem to confirm Neustadt s initial expectations for
a president who can persuade his own administration. His
ability to shape the government to conform to his prin-
ciples and to alter the government's thinking on budget
matters seem to support this conclusion, with a "blitz-
krieg" of legislation, government resources were shifted
away from social spending and quickly moved to a large
defense buildup, all with little or no internal oppo-
sition. 64 Reagan seems to have managed both changes with
skill, just as Neustadt would predict. On balance, the
Reagan decisions to "recapture" the executive branch
63Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Lin* (New York: Hill -Wang,
1991), esp. 596-98.
64 Schick, Reconci liation and the Congressional Budget
Process
. 1981, 389-91.
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through the politici^-at- -5™ ~* ,iiticization of the bureaucracy and the
swift alteration of th<» hu*„A 4.r e budget process seemed to pay off
in presidential success.
A closer examination of thf> r«»«=«ut cne Reagan record suggests
the opposite result was achieved by the Reagan decisions,
however. By concentrating solely on the substance of a
budget which could be enacted with the swift and mono-
lithic action of loyal aides, Reagan guickly discovered
that by ignoring the political structure of budget
politics he experienced disastrous congressional relations
in his second year in office. The erosion of the coa-
lition led to further troubles in the area of tax reduc-
tion, with Reagan stubbornly refusing to budge on tax
relief until it was absolutely clear the entire economic
passage was in jeopardy. Reagan's use of persuasion
rested on his personal appeal, making coalition building a
secondary concern rather than an important consideration;
in other words, one element of Neustadt's notion of pres-
tige had begun to undermine another, just as Nixon's
administrative strategies had damaged his ability to per-
suade. 65 The reconciliation strategy allowed Reagan to
make full and effective use of his powers of persuasion,
but in the end that decision undermined his policy, and
65Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 53; Salamon and
Abramson
, " Governance , " 59-60.
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:ra-
into a
Political victory actually translate into a losa of
power. 66
The virtual collapse of the budget process in 1981
also opened new avenues of access to a series of interest
group lobbyists, and government agencies began to utilize
the media to compete for shrinking domestic resources;
Reagan became increasingly unable to govern as the
momentum for change shifted away from his administ
tion.67 In the end/ Reagan fQund h . mself iQcked
tense relationship with Congress, with virtually no pro-
cedure for breaking budget deadlocks. 68 a new, efficient
budget process had not been created; instead, Reagan
merely traded the political power of a landslide victory
for an early series of successful votes. By cutting Con-
gress out of the process, Reagan alienated that body and
incurred its desire to reassert some measure of political
control. 69 Politicizing the executive branch only widened
that gulf.
If Reagan did seek to create a more easily persuaded
executive branch, he was successful to the extent his
66John Hoadley, "Easy Riders: Gramm-Rudman-Hoi lings andthe Legislative Fast Track," PS 19 (Winter, 1986): 30-36.67Harold Wolman and Fred Teitelbaum, "Interest Groups and
the Reagan Presidency," The Reaaan Presidency and thg
Governing of America
, eds. Lester Salamon and Michael Lund(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984), 306-
308; Salamon and Abramson, "Governance," 60. Schick,
"The Budget as an Instrument of Presidential Policy," 96-
7 .
c aDOSalamon and Abramson, "Governance," 63-4.
69Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 53.
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administration presented a unified front to the politica!
system on issues like budget reform; however, choosing to
pursue reform by staffing the executive branch with
administrators who were loyal to Reagan's principles
eroded support in Congress and increased Congressional
desires to reassert its will. Reagan's seemingly
..ir-
rational" technique for gaining power to persuade only led
to further erosion of his power to govern. Neustadt's
explanation cannot adequately account for Reagan's deci-
sion to govern through a loyal administration and to cen-
tralize the budget process.
2
-
"Personality;" The "Passive-Positive" w^rpr^
Interestingly, James David Barber describes Reagan as
a "passive-positive" president seeking approval, the
passive-positive is characterized as having a low self-
esteem and a superficial optimism. in addition, the pas-
sive-positive is agreeable and cooperative, although her
or his hopes are particularly fragile. 71 While Barber's
characterization does seem to capture some of Reagan's
personality, it seems ironic that the administration most
/uJames David Barber, Presidential Character , 3rd. ed.
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 463.
71Barber, Presidential Character . 1985, 9-10.
195
often described in terms of confidence, if not arrogance,
would also be described as approval
-seeking. Indeed, the
Reagan administration can hardly be described as "pas-
sive." While Reagan was not, l ike Lyndon Johnson, a
cyclone of activity, he clearly asserted presidential
authority to reduce resistance to his agenda. 72
Rather than surrender power or play a passive role in
governance, Reagan placed his greatest efforts at control
in the beginning of the administrative process (selection
of staff) rather than at the more traditional later stages
(such as policy formation or implementation, areas more
easily reached through reorganization)
. Although some
accounts of the transition period at the start of the ad-
ministration have suggested Reagan passively allowed his
"troika" to choose the Cabinet, more recent accounts belie
the story. 7 3
These "Reaganites" created the illusion of a passive
president (or, in more common parlance, a president
"asleep at the wheel") by carrying out the Reagan agenda
with less guidance than was previously necessary. 74 while
Reagan certainly did not involve himself in the daily
decisions of the administration, it would be a mistake to
suggest he failed to direct the administration. Although
72Goldenberg, "The Permanent Government in an Era of Re-
trenchment and Redirection," 402-403. The Johnson charac-
terization is Barber's at 8.
73Cannon, President Reagan . 1991, 73.
74Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 19-20.
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the public^ o£ the „passive Reaganu stiu ^
reality was much more complicated, as Garry will, ex.
plains
:
••it is hard to find a parallel forReagan's function, in government,business, or any other organiza-
tlon he is the indispensable
center, as well as the symbol, of hishighly personalized government
. .Rea-gan.
. .not only sells the product, he
is the product. 75
Reagan played a unique central role in his administration,
and misinterpretations of that role have led some to decry
and others to forgive Reagan's mistakes. But as many of
the more recent materials cited in this chapter suggest
(including Draper, Cannon and Barrett), Reagan was much
more active and central to his administration than earlier
"kiss and tell" books had indicated. This does not sug-
gest Reagan governed well or in the same manner as Johnson
or even Carter; it does suggest Reagan can hardly be
classified as a "passive" president. 76
A better characterization of Reagan's approach would
describe a president who is long on principle but short on
75Garry Wills, Reagan's America (Garden City: Doubleday
and Company, 1987), 321.
7 6Barrett even reports Reagan was quite angry with
Barber's characterization of himself as a "passive"
president. A revealing exchange is found in Barrett,
Gambling With History
- 1983, 22-24.
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knowledge about the process an* fla(. and details of governance .77
As Reagan himself noted in his autobiography,
I don't believe a chief executive
should supervise every detail of whatgoes on in his organization. The
chief executive should set broadPolicy and general ground rules, tellpeople what he or she wants them todo then let them do it; he should
make himself (or herself) available,
so that the members of his team can
come to him if there is a problem, ifthere is, you can work on it together
and, if necessary, fine-tune the
policies. But I don't think a chief
executive should peer constantly overthe shoulders of the people who are in
charge of a project and tell them
every few minutes what to do. 7 8
Measuring passivity in traditional ways, by counting
telephone calls to members of Congress or giving detailed
instructions on legislative strategy, fails to capture
this side of presidential activity. By relying on this
conception of the presidency, many were puzzled by Reagan:
he seemed to be both the center of a revolution and asleep
at the wheel. Thus, Reagan was occasionally compared to
both Franklin Roosevelt and Warren G. Harding in the
press, since both characterizations capture aspects of
Reagan's administration. Where one looks for presidential
77cannon, President Reagan , 1991, 47, 55.
°Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1990), 161.
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activity often shapes the perception of "active., and
"passive" characters.
Other interpretations suggest even this activity was
manufactured, however. Reagan is described as an actor
who never leaves the set of his presidency, a politician
who merely reads the lines clever handlers provide. As
noted earlier, this is reflected in Neustadt's account of
Reagan as well, while Reagan frequently relied on the
skills of his speechwriters, Lou Cannon recently argued
this reliance can be misinterpreted:
Though most of his speeches were
written by others, many of them still
reflected the uncluttered values hehad expressed on the banquet circuitfor a quarter century. He thought ofhimself as a man of principle, and he
was difficult to push on the issues
that mattered most to him. As presi-dent, he was at once the most malle-
able and least movable of men. 7 9
The budget record of 1981 also seems to refute this
characterization. Reagan's greatest and earliest effort
was to control the budget process, not passively surrender
it to Congress. The effort to control came so quickly,
David Stockman recalled, "We didn't have time to add up
all the numbers. "80 Reagan's willingness to allow Stock-
man a free hand in devising the budget cuts could be
79Cannon, President Reaaan . 1991, 35.
80Greider, "The Education of David Stockman," 54.
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int"Pretea 38 *»" « Politics, on the
to gambie on budget outs ana Ms Bkiu ^ hanfliing
Politics of Ms dealings with Congress durinj first
year. 81 In either^ ^^ ^
Reagan budget decisions.
Neither
..classic.. model of presidential behavior can
fully explain the administrative choices Reagan made
during his presidency. Both models fail to demonstrate
why Reagan would pursue reorganization and hndget stra-
tegies which would ultimately undermine the goals he
seemed to seek as president. To understand those deci-
sions, one must gain a greater appreciation of Reagan's
belief system.
~ ExPlainina the R^^ n Dec j fiinnc Relief Syst ems"
This section offers a more complete understanding of
Reagan's selection of his administrative strategies by
examining the role his political beliefs played in deci-
sion making. Reagan has often been described as one of
America's most "ideological'' presidents, the opposite of
the assessment usually given of Carter and, to a lesser
Barrett, Gambling With History
. 1983, 368.
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o con-
degree, Nixon.82 Arffuments^
^
servative principles abound, however, and a rentable
consistency emerges as one compares bis beliefs to those
of Nixon and Carter. Like his predecessors, Reagan was
frequently charged with inconsistency and political expe-
diency as critics evaluated his departures from true
conservatism, others finally conclude he was
..pragmatic,-
usually noting Reagan's complaint that conservatives
outside the administration seem to want to go "off the
cliff with all flags flying...83 Such debates ^
the "bias trap, however, by mistakenly concluding that
such inconsistencies mean political beliefs do not exist
(and by erroneously using the term "pragmatism" to charac-
terize an absence of political belief). Understanding
Reagan's political beliefs requires the observer abandon
the category of "conservatism" and examine the central
principles of Reagan's belief system.
Reagan's early speeches and political activities
reflect a remarkably consistent set of central political
beliefs, albeit less clearly articulated than those of
Nixon and Carter in their early years. Two themes are
82Because of this description, one has a difficult time
writing about Reagan's political beliefs without slipping
into the language of "ideology." Thus, terms like
"ideological" are rendered in the text with quotation
marks, to remind the reader that the term is often being
used by others to describe what Chapter One defines as
"belief .
"
83 Cannon, President Reagan . 1991, 114, 185-86.
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sgiven expression: a fundamental hostility for government
activity, and the importance of government for promoting
and encouraging proper social and moral values. Reagan's
dislike of government finds its earliest expression in hi
opposition to fascism and communism as "coiiectivist
Philosophies. Reagan argued that such philosophies were
inherently undemocratic and undermined principles of
freedom. 84 Suoh oollectivism> he ^
failure of such systems in the future. Early Reagan
speeches, particularly as spokesperson for General Elec-
tric, also argued individuals should act without govern-
ment help, since such help always led to inefficiency and
bad policy. 85
Reagan's objection to coiiectivist states did not
rest on abstract discussions of political philosophy,
however. The key to understanding Reagan's ant i- communism
was his belief that such systems undermined basic social
and moral values. Those values are reflected in the
common sense of purpose found in families and communities,
according to Reagan:
You get to know people as individuals,
not as blocs or members of special
interest groups. You discover that,
despite their differences, most people
have a lot in common: Every indivi-
dual is unique, but we all want free-
84Paul Erickson, Reagan Speaks (New York: New York
University Press, 1985), 18-21.
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85Reagan, An American Life . 1990, 127-28.
curitv peaoe - love «* —
worsM; Gof °
me
'
and 3 chanoe
•»
want tL ,t °Ur OWn wayj we ^1
our chil„^
a°0<
\
t0 96t ahead ana »*•ildren lives better than our
Reagan.
s
confidence in these principles as the central
ideas holding together African society also accounts for
the sense of African exceptional which characteri.es
his rhetoric. 86 Suoh oonfidenoe alsQ aocounts ^ ^
roots of the Reagan social and moral agenda. As Reagan
remarked to the National Association of Evangelicals in
1983 :
I want you to know that this admini-
stration is motivated by a political
Philosophy that sees the greatness ofAmerica in yOU/ her people, and inyour families, churches, neighbor-
hoods, communities
- the institutions
that foster and nourish values like
concern for others and respect for the
rule of law under God. 87
indeed, it is this character and not mere military might,
according to Reagan, which accounts for the success of
American foreign policy as it attempts to resist communist
expansion. 88
86For a fuller discussion, see Erickson, Reagan Speaks.
1985, 2-4.
87Quoted in Erickson, Reagan Soeaka . 1985, 157.
88Reagan, An American Life . 1990, 348, 484-85.
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These two central belief* n„v ^o nefs, linked together, also
account for Reagan's earlv fn^.jy flirtation with the New Deal
and his admiration for Franklin Roosevelt »K . Reagan admired
the active of the New Deal ia certain reaimg ^
particularly those whion encouragefl oomnunities ^
fellies to prosper.89 Reagan^ great^ ^ ^
autobiography in comparing his belief in the proper rQle
of government with that of Roosevelt, illustrating his
Point with a wot. £rom the architeot Qf fche ^
claimed "Continued dependence upon relief induces a
spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally destruc-
tive to the national fiber."*) Ia Reagan , s
the New Deal and the Reagan Revolution share the same
basic aims: government promotion of social and moral
values and, at the same time, the limitation of government
activity.
Thus, like Nixon and Carter, Reagan argues the sim-
plification of government should be the central idea of an
administration. Simplification takes on a different
meaning for Reagan, however, than it had for these earlier
presidents. Nixon's belief in simplification meant the
return of federal programs to individuals, as well as
tate and local governments, where political power would
t with those who knew their own problems best. Carter,
the other hand, wished to provide democratic control
"wills, Reagan's America . 1987, 72.
q a
^"Reagan, An American Life . 1990, 134.
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s
res
on
Le
over the federal governs, making process the vehicX,
for the exercise of political power. Uniike these presi-
dents, and indeed any other modern president. Reagan
sought to eliminate government activity, while in sym-
pathy with Hixon.s confidence in the individual, Reagan
disdained the idea of revenue sharing or block grants; he
simply did not believe any government should be involved
in the lives of its people at certain times. 91 In some
ways, Reagan and Carter aorpp „*xx g ee that government has somehow
failed the American people, and that some change is
crucial to returning the nation's well being. However,
Carter clearly believes improved communication is critical
to achieving broader democratic goals, while Reagan
believes government must be simplified to enable it to
carry out other elements of the Reagan agenda. To miss
the second element of Reagan's agenda, the transformation
of social life through carefully selected intervention, is
to miss the evangelical side of Reagan. As Reagan himself
explained to one interviewer during his first year in
office,
Listen, after you left I got to
wondering about some things.. What I
should have said to you yesterday was
91Weatherford and McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic
Policy," 130. Barrett notes some efforts at a Reagan-
style New Federalism program (although Reagan was loathe
to call it that) in 1981, but it received very little
support from the president. See Barrett, Gambling with
History , 1983, 342-44.
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that while I fe*»l »e> t a<= j-eej. as I do about th*»
statro
relati0nShiP
°
f
ate government, i feei that thosethxngs that are the federal govern!menfs responsibility, we damn "elldo them [sic] .92 611
This interpretation of Reagan- s words also accounts for
the centralis of this belief (Reagan spoke of this theme
-
the closing moments of his tenure, standing in an empty
Oval Office on the day of the Bush Inauguration) even as
he presided over the continued expansion of the federal
bureaucracy. 93 For Reagan
, ^ ^
sprang from its misguided choices of activism, not
efficiency or democratic theory. In Reagan- s own words,
"..as you look back on that myriad of new federal pro-
grams, ifs hard to find any that did much good for the
poor or the nation as a whole. "94
Thus, Reagan's ant i
-government theme encompassed more
than a simple count of government employees: government
was the problem because of the role it was playing in the
lives of Americans, and Reagan wanted to change that role.
In other words, Nixon changed government by vastly con-
stricting its scope, creating greater individual freedom
at the local level of government and for the individual;
Carter changed government by opening communication from
92Barrett, Gambling With History . 1983, 23.
93Weatherford and McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic
Policy," 20-21.
94Reagan, An American Life . 1990, 198.
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the "bottom-up- to make government activity more demo-
cratically responsive, Reagan changed government by
changing its agenda, and by altering it to become a more
effective tool for reaching these new ends. 95
indeed, as noted above, Reagan is hardly an advocate
of laissez-faire conservatism: like Theodore Lowi
•
s
characterization in The End of Tnberminm, Reagan does not
debate the existence of an activist state, he merely
wishes to direct that activity in the arenas of ..good" and
"evil," or over issues of morality rather than social
service. 96 This re;pjires aotion> ^ inaction< ^
government is the tool which must be honed and used to
these ends. Garry Wills captured the evangelical nature
of Reagan's belief system when he drew this interesting
comparison in 1987:
Jesse Jackson, in fact, more than any
other politician now on the scene,
resembles Reagan.
. .Both men are be-
lievers in the cause they embody, so
that self-promotion and ideological
commitment are fused. Both think,
always, of a way to turn each situa-
tion, each event, into a vehicle for
increasing the acceptance of their
message. Both make claims that are
one-sided, partial, over-simple, but
deeply felt and almost hypnotically
convincing to any listeners not ac-
tively determined to resist them.
.
..They both need to believe they are
95Ceaser, "The Theory of Governance of the Reagan
Administration," 79-80.
96Salamon and Lund, "Governance," 6-7.
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selling something far larger thanthemselves, but that the only way todo that is through themselves. Theycarry the message
.. .Neither is themanager. They look to others for ad-
ministrative direction. 97
Thus, any element of executive power must be used to
achieve that agenda, and the power of reorganization to
make government act in unison and the power of the budget
to define and set national priorities make these stra-
tegies primary instruments for the expression of political
beliefs. Government truly is the problem for Reagan, but
that statement does not reflect a desire to eliminate
government. instead, government must be properly shaped
to make the Reagan social and moral agenda the policy for
the nation. 98
Reagan's determination to achieve these goals is the
undertold story of the Reagan White House, while others
have noted his determined adherence to his political
beliefs, that adherence has been misinterpreted as
"unquenchable optimism." Confidence in a belief and
optimism are easily confused, as the former often includes
the latter, and separating the two can be difficult. 9
9
in
Wills, Reagan's America . 1987, 323.
98Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal," 45.
"This, I would argue, is the mistake Lou Cannon makes
his account of Reagan. Cannon himself argues Reagan was
smarter than many give him credit, and that he had a firm
grasp on the principles of his administration. To dismiss
Reagan's confidence in his political beliefs as mere
optimism seems to sell Reagan short. If Reagan was simply
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Heagai,s conf idence in his Political beliefs^ ^below th. surface of his otherwise agreeable
emerging at unexpected times.
This point is critical for understanding much of
Reagan-s decision making, since misinterpreting the role
of belief in Reagan's decisions has led to contradictory
conclusions in many accounts of his presidency. For
example, Reagan
s stubborn refusal to raise taxes even as
his closest economic advisers argued doing so was
necessary to close the deficit can be given two inter-
pretations, one argues Reagan was foolishly blind to the
consequences of his decision, optimistically ignoring the
advice being given by his aides. This explanation does
not account for Reagan's willingness to seek out and
accept advice from the same advisers in other situations.
Either Reagan haphazardly accepted and rejected advice
from the same group of trusted people, or he had his own
reasons for maintaining his opinion on this matter, if
one argues Reagan lacked political beliefs and simply did
the politically "rational.. (Neustadt) or the "agreeable"
(Barber), one cannot explain his decision to reject this
advice. 100
optimistic, he could be blind to principle, a point Cannon
goes to great lengths to disprove. In the end, I would
argue believing one is right in one's beliefs may seem
like optimism to those who do not share those beliefs.
See Cannon, President Reagan . 1991, 25, 179.
100Cannon, President Reagan . 1991, 134, 220. The fact
that Cannon describes this determination as "optimism, --
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Others misinterpret Reagan- s apparent lack of
interest in the conservative social agenda, or his
willingness to trade support for hi a -t s economic agenda by
compromising on r^T-t-a-Sr, ~ ncert xn elements of his social agenda, as
an absence of political belief But-t Reagan made the
economic program his first nri^-t p xonty, consciously excluding
social issues, in the belief that those changes would
follow f^prn and not come p^i^ his budget ^
do otherwise, in Reagan's mind, would be to
-put the cart
before the horse." In fact, it was the lesson of the
Carter presidency which led Reagan to this conclusion:
too much, too soon and with little attention paid to
prioritizing meant failure and frustration. 101
Given this system of political beliefs, it is clear
why Reagan would maintain that centralizing the decision
making process in the White House and short circuiting the
normal budget process were crucial and why Neustadt's
explanation for Reagan 's choices is inadequate. Reagan-
s
chief concern was control over the administration and
"stubbornness" and "confidence- all in the same biographysuggests he has failed to distinguish between the impli-cations of each term.
l 01Stockman is again the source of this interpretation ofReagan s social agenda. Because Reagan did not broadly
shake up" government in his first two years, Stockman
concludes Reagan is merely a "consensus politician" wholacks a strong ideology. But Stockman's criticism is
aimed at Reagan's decision not to disassemble the SocialSecurity program, a battle he would have certainly lost
and one which would have eroded congressional support for
the economic program he wished to advance. Cannon,
President Reaaan . 1991, 109, 111.
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Passage of the budget. Both were political instruments
for change in and of themselves, not disagreements over
priorities. 102 Por Reagan
, budget change ^
and he found it difficult- t-o av,„^ ,u rricuit o abandon his course even when
it resulted in deadlock. 103 with only success on the
agenda important to his political beliefs in mind, Reagan
could be happy with early victories in Congress even as he
guaranteed future defeats. 104 By pursuing the goal of
budget centralization, Reagan undermined his control over
the very tool he was trying to strengthen. His political
beliefs left him little choice. By considering the
influence of political beliefs on the goals of his deci-
sions, Neustadt would be better able to account for Rea-
gan's seemingly self
-destructive behavior.
Similarly, Barber's account of Reagan's behavior
would be enhanced by a consideration of the effect of
these political beliefs. Reagan can hardly be seen as a
"passive" president, and his unwillingness to compromise,
like that of Jimmy Carter, certainly casts some doubt on
the wisdom of classifying Reagan as an "active-positive."
In a sense, Barber's analysis leaves us no closer to
understanding Reagan than before.
lu
^Schick, "How the Budget Was Won and Lost," 42-3.
l° 3 Robert Dallek, Ronald Reagan: The Politics of
Symbolism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 71;
Barrett, Gambling With History . 1983, 338-9.
l° 4
"Reading Reagan," Economist . 286 ( 26March-lApril
,
1983): 21.
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For Reagan, as for Nixon and Carter
_ politioal
beliefs shaped his decision making in ways underappre-
ciated by traditional political science accounts. i„
final analysis, all three
..pragmatists" appear to make
decisions guided more by their belief systems than is
suspected by either '.classic- study of the presidency.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS, WITH REFLECTIONS ON THE BUSH PRESIDENCY
By examining the role of political beliefs in the
decision making process, the preceding chapters have
illustrated the often unappreciated role ideas play in
shaping action. As Chapter One noted, this study sought a
more complete understanding of decision making as an
important presidential activity. it is perhaps wise to
begin by concluding that a more complete explanation has
been found by examining belief systems, but by no means is
the "belief" model an explanation for all presidential
behavior. The model seeks to supplement, not replace,
current understandings of presidential behavior by ad-
dressing decisions which cannot be adequately explained by
dominant theories in contemporary American political
science
.
This is clear when one reconsiders the "classic"
models in light of the preceding analysis. The "rational
decider" model, argued Chapter One, fails to account for
213
apparently irrational behavior by presidents. The source
of this shortcoming lay in the methodology of the ap-
proach: the model presupposed the existence of certain
goals by assuming that the goals which the president
achieved or aimed for but failed to achieve at the con-
clusion of policy action were the original goals of the
decider. By making this assumption, the "rational de-
cider" model created a series of self
-fulfilling pro-
phecies, assuming the goals existed and then demon-
strating their existence by working backwards from the
conclusion to the inception of action. Doing so locked
Neustadt's analysis into a conceptual difficulty when he
attempted to articulate the proper activity for a presi-
dent who seeks to persuade his own executive branch to a
given policy. As the analysis in Chapters Two, Three and
Four demonstrated, the only solution Neustadt could
utilize to save himself from this difficulty was to blame
the personalities of the presidents involved for their
failure to correctly utilize his advice.
A greater appreciation of political beliefs acts as a
valuable guide out of that conceptual difficulty, however.
As the presidential chapters indicated, decisions made by
the presidents in the areas of reorganization and bud-
geting often pursued goals which sprang from political
beliefs which were unaccounted for by the "rational de-
cider" model precisely because they appeared to be "ir-
rational" by the definition of that model. By reexamining
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beliefs, one discovers a way to escape the "bias trap"
imposed by the assumptions built into the Neustadt thesis.
Similarly, the "personality" model was found to be
deficient in its explanations of presidential behavior.
Recall the objection raised in Chapter One centered on the
"personality" model's susceptibility to the same "bias
trap", selecting only certain aspects of personality to
consider and missing the interaction of beliefs with the
environment of the decider. For that reason, the presi-
dential chapters demonstrated, Barber's analysis consis-
tently failed adequately to account for presidential
decision making, even as one attempted to correct his
analysis on its own terms.
The "belief" model could better account for these
decisions, however, by reexamining this relationship and
providing a clear understanding of the role of beliefs in
decision making. By reconsidering the importance of be-
liefs, a realm of decision making left underdeveloped by
Barber's work is demonstrated to direct decision making in
ways his analysis cannot appreciate.
One important caveat to the conclusions drawn from
the preceding analysis is the important reminder that
while understanding political beliefs is important, it is
not the sole factor in presidential decision making. No
claim has been made that analyses of political beliefs
explain all presidential action. Instead, as the pre-
ceding summary indicates, the best one can venture is the
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statement that belief system influence decisions, often
in important ways, and that such influence can be used to
explain some decisions which would otherwise be unexplain-
able, or at least imperfectly explained. To claim more
from the analysis of this study would be hubris; to claim
less, however, would be to ignore the often dramatic
effect beliefs can have on decisions.
A second, equally important caveat, would point out
the limits of the case studies presented in this study.
Each sought to better explain a set of decisions inade-
quately explained by other models. None of the chapters
sought to engage in a revisionist reexamination of the
three presidents they considered. For example, nothing in
Chapter Two suggests Richard Nixon did not have an
unusual, even paranoid, personality. Instead, the chapter
argued that this understanding alone could not explain
certain decisions made by Nixon on reorganization and
budgeting. Similarly, Chapter Three did not seek to prove
Carter was a completely competent president, despite
analyses to the contrary. Chapter Three sought instead to
prove Carter's beliefs account for many of the "ir-
rational" decisions he seemed to make. Finally, the
intention in Chapter Four was not to prove that Reagan was
a president firmly in charge of all aspects of his admini-
stration. Rather, the reexamination attempted to show
that Reagan's beliefs had a greater amount of influence
over decision making than many scholars allow.
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With those caveats in mind, one t, le£t fcQ ^
usefulness of the
..belief TOael for explalning preai .
dential behavior. It is perhaps vaiuabie to apply the
-del to a final eXan,ple in hopes of sheading see light
on what appears to be an unexplainable decision „,aking
system.
While it is still too early to form firm conclusions
about the Bush administration, particularly when con-
sidering the areas of reorganization and budget policy,
some preliminary conclusions may be ventured which
illustrate not only the continuing need to appreciate the
importance of political beliefs but also the need to
reconsider political science's standards for judging
presidential behavior. Information on Bush is still
largely limited to that which is reported in the popular
press, with the exclusion of Bob Woodward's book on the
war with Iraq.l Judgements on the basis of this data must
be tentatively stated, but a picture of Bush decision
making has begun to emerge in a piecemeal fashion. This
section does not seek to continue the more formal analysis
of the previous chapters, but offers some observations
which suggest beliefs are important for explaining Bush's
behavior as well.
1But this book deals only tangentially with Bush as a
decision maker, in some respects. In fact, one of the
shortcomings of Woodward's analysis is the comparatively
small amount of information on the president. Bob Wood-
ward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1991) .
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The Bush administration began under rather unusual
circumstances. Bush is the first president since 1928 to
succeed a member of his own party, and the first sitting
Vice President since 1836 to be elected to office. 2 More
than mere matters of historical curiosity, these facts
have done much to shape the organization of the new Bush
administration. The differences between the presidencies
of Ronald Reagan and George Bush are dramatic, and yet the
public perception of Bush, shaped largely by his portrayal
in the media, are based on a standard drawn from Ronald
Reagan's administration (and, ultimately, Franklin Roose-
velt's). But the peculiar circumstances of the Bush
transition make such comparisons suspect and, as Chapter
Four suggests, even misleading if one utilizes an under-
standing of presidential behavior which neglects the role
of political beliefs in decision making.
The most peculiar circumstance of Bush's administra-
tion may be the continuation of the Reagan administrative
and budgetary agendas, aspects frequently ignored by the
media. 3 The general perception of the public primarily
focuses on the apparent "drift" of the administration.
Bush is frequently criticized for lacking a domestic
agenda, for presiding over an administration with few new
2 James Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency,"
Public Administration Review 50 (January/February 1990):
64.
JHaynes Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1991), 439.
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ideas, and (by the right, for surrounding himself with
less conservative, less committed advisers. 4 Bush thus
appears to drift from one domestic crisis to another,
reacting rather than acting, and concentrating on foreign
policy to the exclusion of domestic concerns.
5
But these images may have been a consequence of the
more active Reagan first years. As Fred Barnes pointed
out early in the administration,
-The problem with being a
caretaker president is that the press wants more from the
president than that, an expectation that makes Bush look
weaker than he is. "6 As Bush functions ag ^
quo" president, his reputation and administration remain
hostage to the status quo created by Reagan. 7 Bush him-
self professes to be comfortable with the Reagan agenda,
particularly where budgetary matters are concerned. 8 when
asked how President Bush would differ from President
Reagan, Bush rather lamely replied in his campaign auto-
biography by pointing out the fundamental agreement he had
with Reagan. Only after making this point did Bush ven-
ture a few extensions of Reagan policies but no breaks
4Kenneth Walsh, "Bush's First Quarter," U.S. News and
World Report 106 (May 1, 1989): 24-27.
5Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," 66.
6Fred Barnes, "Four Bore Years," New Republic 200 (March
27, 1989): 14.
7William Schneider, "The In-Box President," Atlantic 265
(January 1990) : 37
.
8George Bush and Victor Gold, Looking Forward (New York:
Bantam Books, 1988), 8-9, 80-81, 90, 202.
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with his predecessor. 9 The , ^rn few actual breaks with the
Reagan administration have been i ar^i, ^o l gely symbolic: Bush's
family is more visible (with a
from the public,, his work schedule more ^
administration more open and, despite John Sununu, ap-
parently more ethical. 10 As one 8en . Qr off ^ ^
Bush administration succinctly put it, "We inherited a
situation that was basically A-OK. People were happy with
the status quo. No domestic revolution was about to take
Place, with a few changes here and there, the G.O.P.
could rule forever." 1 !
The Bush transition seemed to reflect these circum-
stances. The transition team was exceptionally small,
particularly when compared to the organization assembled
by Pendleton James for the Reagan administration. Limited
in activity, the team ignored the type of planning James
had conducted. "Ideological" tests were abandoned, as
were the various uses of Civil Service law to "blanket in"
new appointees and punish malcontents. Instead, ap-
pointees were selected with personal loyalty to Bush as
the primary qualification, coupled with an equal concern
for "competency." As a result, Bush was more likely to
hire career public servants by selecting his immediate
9Bush and Gold, Looking Forward . 1988, xii-xviii
•••upf if fner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," 14;
Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History . 1991, 442-43.
1 1
—
L -LMichael Duffy, "A Case of Doing Nothing," Time 137
(January 7, 1991): 28.
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cabinet only and allo„ing each me-fcer to organi 2e her or
his department. Although Bush ^.^ fin^ ^
Pr°Tal
°
f 311
•«"*»*—:. for hiffiB6l f. the change signi .
fxcantly departed from the Reagan approach. 12
One might assume Bush departed from the Reagan method
of "reoraanization from within" because that reorgani-
zation had already taken place, and Bush could be com-
placent to simply carry over the Reagan appointees into
the new administration. Surveys of th« .™ • t, '" r e appointees find
this was not the case, however. Only approximately one-
third of the Bush appointees, at the end of his first year
in office, had seen service in the Reagan administra-
tion.^ As far as administrative personnel were con-
cerned, the new administration was indeed mostly new.
Thus, the Bush administration would seem to be
characterized by the basic agenda and functions of the
Reagan administration, but without the "ideological-
underpinnings of the Reagan selection system. The Bush
team is perceived as less "ideological," less conserva-
tive, more cooperative and malleable. The driven Reagan
years seem to have been replaced by the rudderless Bush
years .
^
4
Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," 67-69.
13Judith Haremann, "Reagan Regime Lives On Through
Appointee's Alumni Groups," Washington Post (August 25,
1989): A19.
14Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," 70-71.
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This understand of Bush, however, is also in some
measure a product of the popular perception of the new
administration through the prism of the Reagan year,
Like Bush, Reagan presided over a Cabinet which wa<
mixture of
"conservative., and "pragmatic" appointees. As
the previous chapter suggests, these distinctions are
rather meaningless for explaining the dynamic of the Rea-
gan White House, and they seem even less appropriate for
understanding Bush, ah of the currenfc president , g
closest assistants held positions of authority in the
Reagan administration; in that sense, Bush can hardly be
said to be playing the game with a "new team. "15 Indeed
,
the Bush "conservatives..
- Sununu, Thornburgh, Boyden
Gray, James Pinkerton, to name a few - are unusual in
their ready access to Bush, reflecting their close ties to
the president and their shared interest in domestic
policy. 16 Bush is hardly a "pragmatist " surrounded by
"pragmatists," as he is frequently described, as distin-
Oguished from the Reagan presidency. Instead, Bush seems
15
"Ready to Go," National Rpvi.w XLI (January 27, 1989)-
15. Haremann, "Reagan Regime Lives on Through AppointeesAlumni Groups .
"
16For details and examples, see Donald Baer, "A white
House of Many Mansions," U.S. News and World Rppnrh i 0 6(January 23, 1989): 16-17. Kenneth Walsh, "George Bush's
Idea-Free Zone," U.S. News and World Rppor^ n 0 (January
14, 1991): 34-35. Jason DeParle, "Point Man in Battle
for GOP's Soul Doesn't Worry About Drawing Fire," New York
Times (December 18, 1990): B12. Anne Riley Dowd, "How
Bush Manages the Presidency," Fortune 122 (August 27,
1990): 70-71.
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to have a slmilar mix Qf ^^ ^ ^ ^
the Oval Office.
*he Bush administration appears to Qperate w±th
beliefs to guide decision „aklaff
. But Bush . s
beliefs can he use, to innate his decision ma*^. and
a better understanding of Bush reveals a degree of con-
sistency in his decisions which may escape the casual
observer. Perhaps nowhere was this perception and ^per-
ception more evident than in the apparent
-flip-flop- Bush
did on the issue of raising taxes during the budget nego-
tiations of 1990. Bush seemed to change his mind several
times during the negotiations and did not seem to have a
sense of what goals his budget proposals hoped to achieve.
Without those clear goals, painted in the strong terms the
"Reagan Revolution" used to press the first budget cuts,
the Bush administration seems to drift." Bush seems to
violate Neustadt
• s advice that a president persuade others
to a clearly defined set of goals. Instead, Bush seems to
have no domestic agenda goals.
But Bush does seem in agreement with Reagan's agenda,
as noted earlier, while this has led some to engage in a
rather fruitless debate over the depth of Bush's con-
servatism,^ it is important; to note Bush himself is
17 For the strongest case for this view, see Schnieder,
"The In-Box President," 37.
18Ronald Elving, "House Service Set Course for New
President," Congress ional Quarterly Weekly Report. 47
(January 14, 1989): 55-57.
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comfortable with supporting ana ooatinuing what Reaaan hafl
started. 19 To understand the aif£erences ^
Reagan and Bush presidencies, and to understand the rea-
sons Bush altered the practices of the Reagan admini-
stration in the areas of reorganization and budgeting, it
is necessary to look beyond the record of the administra-
tion to the decision maker himself.
A closer examination of Bush's political beliefs
begins to shed some light on the Bush decisions and helps
to explain why Bush altered the Reagan selection process.
Recall that Reagan believed the best and only way to make
government work was to staff his administration with
appointees who were loyal to his principles and to press
an economic program in Congress no matter what the cost.
Bush, on the other hand, seems to believe the best and
only way to preserve the Reagan agenda is to create a
politics of inclusion, where potential challengers are
drawn into the agenda already in place. Bush seems to
prize the process of connecting individuals and ideas,
rather than the achievement of policy ends, as the primary
goal of leadership and the chief motivation for his deci-
sions as president.
Defining this idea in precise terms is difficult,
since Bush himself has failed to articulate it in a single
place and few have reflected on this aspect of the Bush
19..j. ve Been Underestimated," Time 132 (August 22, 1988):
20-21.
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-
AS
-"tion concur, most
eValUatl°nS
°
f BUSh
«-— of policy-orienta-
tion, as do the interpretive models o£ Neustaat Ma
Barher: presidents are pol . oy joai oriented> ^ ^
successful or „ ffooa „ presiaent is articuiates
model, in that hls speeohes ana .^^^ ^ ^_
meated with references to "listening., and
..including .
For example, a good leader, according to Bush, is . person
who bargains well, listens to opponents, includes those
who are normally excluded. 20 This extends to creation of
a process which provides this leadership, where policy
goals are less important than an open process which is
inclusive. 21
While this interpretation seems to be at odds with
political beliefs, it is in fact a belief in itself,
although its goals go undefined and are left to this
process to determine. m this sense, interestingly,
George Bush seems to resemble Jimmy Carter more than he
does Ronald Reagan: both Carter and Bush were criticized
for being "goalless" presidents, for being "pragmatists"
without political beliefs. Unlike Carter, however, Bush
20Examples of these positions are scattered throughoutBush and Gold, Looking Forward . 1988, 91-92, 94, 165, 228-
29, 251-52 with reference to both Reagan and himself
' (in
various positions).
21Kerry Mull ins and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Procedural
Presidency of George Bush," Society 28 (January/ February
1991): 51-52.
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displays little or no concern for democratizing this
Process. instead, Bush creates an interesting amal-
gamation of carter-
s confidence in process with Nixon-
s
concern for community and state decision making. For
Bush, being a conservative means the creation of con-
nections within families, between families in a community,
between conununities within nations and, arguably, between
communities of nations. This theme has been a consistent
belief in Bushes major speeches, from his first days in
Congress to his current administration. 22
This process is assured by appointing individuals who
can be trusted to remain loyal to the process. m this,
the reasons for the alteration of the Reagan selection
process can be better understood, while the dominant
question asked about Reagan appointees was "Is she/he with
us?", the important query for Bush nominees was "Is she/he
a team player? "23 The difference ifl gubtle ^ important:
the first question asks for loyalty to a principle or
policy, while the second asks for loyalty to a process or
person. it is this confidence in the people around him
which makes Bush happiest, as none seek to pull the
22Elving, "House Service Set Course for New President,"
55. Peggy Noonan, What I Saw at the Revolution (New York:
Ivy Books, 1990), 322-23.
23Dowd, "How George Bush Manages the Presidency," 70-71.
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Process in
. single direction, apart from the presiflent , s
wishes
.
24
A president whose focus is on process rather than
Policy is something new to modern presidential admini-
stration, and may suggest these presidents seek to avoid
the problems of the managerial presidency noted by Arnold.
Such a president would avoid directing policy but strive
to guarantee a process. By doing so, the problem of
"managerialism" is changed. Rather than marshal a vast
force to achieve policy ends, or seek drastic measures to
end the "government of strangers," presidents accept the
more limited goal of guaranteeing avenues of interest
articulation and methods for creating compromise. As a
result, even such presidents will be uncertain as to where
that process will end, even though they remain an active
and influential element in those negotiations. But the
perception of the public, as Wildavsky and Mullins point
out, is apparent policy "drift," as
..the political system and the pro-
cesses it requires to make the indi-
vidual parts mesh with the social
whole thus become crucial reference
points .. .This concentration on form as
substance is Bush's hallmark, and it
explains the purpose in his seeming
lack of purpose. 25
24Woodward's account of Bush is revealing in the loyalty
and attention Bush feels for those around him. See Wood-
ward, The Commanders . 1991, 47, 57, 245.
25Mullins and Wildavsky, "The Procedural Presidency of
George Bush, " 50
.
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Again, it is interesting to note that the same paragraph
could have been written about Jimmy Carter, despite the
very different definition of
..mesh" the
..bottom-up" stra-
tegy implied. The
..drift" of the prp also seems to be a
function of Carter's acceptance and belief in a "form as
substance." if Bush does prize this process, in any
event, it is clear why he might choose to "flip-flop" on
budget issues while striving to preserve a process which
would protect an agenda already in place. 26 Such a belief
would also explain why the "rational decider" and "per-
sonality" models would have a difficult time explaining
Bush's decisions, since both models base their evaluations
on policy goal achievement. A reconsideration of Bush's
belief system can provide a more complete understanding of
Bush decision making.
Parenthetically, such an explanation also helps to
account for the nature of the criticisms of Bush raised by
conservatives. Many believe Bush has abandoned the Reagan
path, but hold this belief because Bush has been less
confrontational, less willing to press the conservative
agenda. 27 In a sharply critical essay, the National
Review editorial board revealingly concluded by writing
"At the midpoint of the presidential cycle, conservatives
26charles Krauthammer, "The Great Cooperator, " Washington
Post (October 19, 1990): A23.
27Gwen If ill, "Restless Conservatives Debate Future,"
Washington Post (December 24, 1990): A3.
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assassin, George Bush.s Nestle record find themselves
about where they should have expected: hopeful here and
there and deeply vexed that they cannot be more hope-
ful. "28 By the 8ame pubUo standara< Bush faii^
conservative cause as well, but only if one adopts ^
view that the Reagan administration is the model for Bush
to follow.
The Bush example would seem to point to a final
conclusion, while the "bias trap" should make any ob-
server hesitant to offer presidential "types," the pre-
ceding analysis does seem to suggest two broad approaches
stemming from the influence of political beliefs on deci-
sion making. One approach, characterized by Nixon and
Reagan, demonstrates that decisions can be shaped by
"policy" beliefs, with little or no attention paid to
procedure. On the other hand, Carter and Bush seem to
suggest "process" beliefs may be considered more important
to decision making than policy concerns. In this manner,
their decisions on reorganization and budgeting will be
markedly different from those of "policy" presidents.
While these are tentative categories at best, they do
have certain implications for the study of presidential
behavior. The "policy" presidents are likely to be mis-
interpreted by the "classic" models since those models are
forced to assume certain gcals exist and can only consider
28
"Bush, At Home and Abroad," National Review XLIII
(February 25, 1991): 15.
229
"rational" policy ends. Simi iarly
, the „process „ pregi _
dents are even more likely to be widely misunderstood,
since their goals lie completely outside the realm of
these
-classic" models. In either case, the discipline
will be unable to explain those decisions.
Reconsideration of the three models presented in
Chapter One reaffirms this point. The "rational decider"
model, given its assumption of the beliefs of the decider,
can only provide explanations of behavior based upon the
outcome of the decision. By this standard, Nixon's deci-
sion to reorganize the executive branch to gain political
control for the purposes of decentralization is "ir-
rational," as are his persistent efforts to enact and
expand revenue sharing. Carter's preference for a
"bottom-up" strategy is "irrational," since it undermines
Carter's ability to make reorganization work. Similarly,
Carter's use of zero base budgeting is an "irrational"
fragmentation of his presidential power to make budget
reform work. Reagan's determination to enact his budget
goals through the use of an executive branch which has
been "reorganized from within," even as those actions
undermine his ability to maintain those reforms or his
governing coalition, is "irrational" by Neustadt ' s
standards as well.
The "personality" model suffers from similar short-
comings, based upon its presumptions. To classify each
president, Barber must assume the character of the presi-
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aent by reading into the policy outco.es of each decision
By this standard, Nixon- s personality should have led him
to covet power for its own sake,
..naturally, leading to
the Watergate affair. However, Barber-s analysis misses
Nixon-s goals for his centralization of power and revenue
sharing, and reasoning backward from that centralists
leads Barber to conclusions which ignore those goals.
Similarly, Carter- s decisions to pursue reorganizati<
through a "bottom-up., strategy and to create zero base
budgeting assumes each action was a policy end in itself,
part of an "active-positive", character, when those
decisions began to undermine the policies themselves,
Barber's analysis cannot adequately account for Carter's
determination to stand by both decisions. Reagan's
character cannot explain his decisions to politicize the
executive branch and pursue budget success through
politically destructive means, as Chapter Four concluded.
An examination of the "belief "model, however, helped
to better explain these decisions. Nixon's decision to
centralize government and pursue revenue sharing makes
better sense when one considers Nixon's belief that indi-
vidual power is (or, in terms of federalism, local and
state government are) fundamental to the health of Ameri-
can political society. Carter's determination to continue
"bottom-up" reorganization and zero base budgeting is
better explained when one takes into account Carter's
belief in government as an agent of communication in a
231
democratic society. Reaga„. s deciaion to ^
within- and to pur8ue budget re£orm^ ^
when one considers Reagan's h*-M.« •s bell ef in government as an
agency for social change, but onlv at***a / u ±y fter government itself
is retooled for that change.
While the "classic" models offer plausible expla-
nations for presidential behavior, they cannot offer
complete accounts of all behavior. The examples in this
study demonstrate the importance of understanding politi-
cal beliefs for decision making in different contexts and
in different presidencies. Certainly political actors
take actions, in some measure, on the basis of sincerely
held political beliefs about the role of government in
shaping the public good. Theoretical schemes which
attempt to understand those beliefs through pre-determined
categories of ideology, or through deterministic under-
standings of belief like Marxism, may dismiss the import-
ance of these beliefs for political action. But this
study demonstrates the importance of those beliefs for
guiding action, and ignoring those beliefs will prevent
any scholar of presidential behavior from truly under-
standing presidential decision making.
The effect of political beliefs on decision making
may be difficult to demonstrate with direct evidence, but
their effect can be seen in a variety of situations.
While beliefs may not be consistent enough (or widely
held) to constitute a true ideology, and while all beliefs
232
must be shaped by the larger oontext Qf
thought, it would be a mistake to dismiss belief as an
important element in decision making. Beliefs do not
always play the sole role in determining decisions, and
may sometimes play an unimportant role. However, at
times, an appreciation of political k.n.«. •wucicai Beliefs is crucial for
understanding why and how presidents decide.
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